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Abstract 
Appreciative Inquiry summits and organizational knowledge creation: 
A social systems perspective 
 
by 
Emi Makino 
Claremont Graduate University: 2013 
 
The purpose of this exploratory study is to develop alternative models for analyzing the 
systems dynamics of a large group conference format called appreciative inquiry (AI) summits. I 
apply Luhmann’s social systems theory to the strategizing activities of AI summits to examine 
how this particular format is capable of generating organizational knowledge. An AI summit is a 
strategic planning conference in which hundreds of internal and external stakeholders 
collectively design the future of the organization through structured activities. It applies the 
principles of AI, a consulting method used in organizational development that attends to the 
positive aspects of an organization as opposed to its problems. Critics challenge this 
unconditional focus on the positive, questioning the validity of its methods and techniques. 
Indeed, very few rigorous evaluations of AI methods including AI summits exist.  
I propose a new approach for assessing the effectiveness of AI summits. I focus on 
knowledge creation as the dependent variable. Previous studies have shown that successful AI 
interventions generate new knowledge, not just transformational change. I conceptualize an AI 
summit as a strategic episode that allows an organization to temporarily suspend its routines and 
structures for strategic reflection. 
 
 
According to social systems theory, organizations are autopoietic (self-reproducing) 
systems that maintain their identity through an ongoing production of decision communications. 
An AI summit consists of three different types of systems that co-evolve and are structurally 
coupled: an organization system, interaction system and the individual participants’ 
psychological systems. I propose a typology for analyzing episodes during an AI summit as a 
starting point for determining the structural dynamics inherent in an AI summit system. 
Using illustrative examples from a case study, I identify five structural features of an AI 
summit that facilitate organizational knowledge creation, including reduced communication 
barriers and the production of decisions during the conference. The study contributes to the 
existing literature by identifying the important but understudied role of self-organizing project 
teams in the knowledge creation process at an AI summit. Limitations and implications are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Study 
“Essentially, and perhaps arguably, there has been no innovation in the social technology 
of organization development (OD) since appreciative inquiry originated in 1987” (Burke, 2011, p. 
143). Appreciative inquiry—commonly referred to by its acronym AI—is a popular method used 
by OD consultants to drive strategic change. For over 25 years, organizations around the world 
have been using AI to promote change, growth and innovation. There is no shortage of cases 
documenting successful interventions at companies and institutions ranging from GTE (now 
Verizon), British Airways North America, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, BBC, to the United 
States Navy, World Vision, the United Nations, and the City of Cleveland (Bunker & Alban, 
2006; Cooperrider, Whitney, & Stavros, 2008). Most recently, Walmart, the world’s largest 
retailer, has been experimenting with AI to develop and execute a business case based on 
sustainability (Cooperrider, 2012). Yet for all its popularity, the validity of AI’s methods remains 
open to question. 
The AI approach emphasizes positivity, inclusiveness, and social construction—
essentially, the notion that words creates worlds (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 2008). In a sense, it 
represents an antithesis to traditional strategic management consulting practices. Strategists pride 
themselves on their ability to analyze a company’s competitive environment and business trends 
to arrive at “seemingly hard truths based on models” (Wooldridge, 2010). Such models are 
mostly grounded in microeconomics (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000). Management 
decides on a strategy based on these “hard truths” which is then rolled out to the rest of the 
organization for execution. This approach to strategy development can be characterized as “big 
think in the boardroom” (Wooldridge, 2010). Consulting companies market themselves as 
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delivering solutions, underscoring a world view that perceives organizations as problems to be 
solved.  
AI takes a fundamentally different approach. It seeks innovation, not solutions. AI was 
founded on the assumption that organizational life is constructed through the social interactions 
of the people who constitute the organization, both inside and out (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 
2008), in other words, a social constructionist view of the world (Gergen, 2009). Corporate 
strategy is usually developed by an elite group of people, often consisting exclusively of top 
management and the board (Andrews, 1980). Sometimes, strategy consultants from the likes of 
McKinsey and The Boston Consulting Group are brought in. In contrast, AI is a democratic and 
participative approach to developing and executing strategy in which the AI process, not the 
consultant, takes center stage. AI differs from conventional strategizing practices in other ways 
as well. One of its core principles is positivity. The AI method directs an organization to 
exclusively study areas of strengths and opportunities. Root causes of success, not failures, are 
analyzed. This singular emphasis on the positive has been both a source of inspiration and 
contention. Traditional strategy development depends on historical data analysis, both 
quantitative and qualitative. AI is future-oriented. A guiding, positive image of the future is 
deemed a more powerful vehicle for driving an organization’s success than a strategic plan 
developed by the “lords of strategy” as Kiechel (2010) called strategy consultants in his book 
chronicling the management consulting industry. 
As Burke (2011) noted in his critique of OD practice, the AI method is indeed creative. It 
also suffers from a credibility issue. Critics point to an “amazing lack of rigorous assessment of 
AI methodology or techniques” (Messerschmidt, 2008). Hundreds of articles have been written 
about AI globally, but very few have made it through the peer-reviewed process and rigor of 
2 
 
academic publishing. A review of the current literature suggests that AI has eluded evaluation 
partly because it has been framed as an OD intervention. OD deals mostly with organizational 
change. AI in particular is often described as an intervention for transformational change. One of 
the few studies evaluating the effectiveness of AI interventions across different organizations 
(Bushe & Kassam, 2005), for example, examines the degree to which transformational change 
occurred as the key success factor. But a more recent evaluation study by Bushe pointed to a 
dilemma. One of the sites that did not undergo transformational change would not have benefited 
much from such change because it already had a high-performing culture. In a more general 
sense, causally linking change to firm outcomes such as financial performance can be 
problematic. This is especially true for a typical AI intervention, which engages hundreds of 
stakeholders across the entire organization in many different types of activities over a prolonged 
period of time. With so many moving parts—the changing external environment 
notwithstanding—trying to build a working model of AI that reliably predicts firm outcomes can 
be a difficult exercise. Some organizations have claimed millions of dollars in benefits from 
adopting AI and its methods. For example, plants at John Deere achieved three million dollars in 
immediate cost savings and “millions more in new market share” as a direct result from an AI 
summit (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, & Griffin, 2003, p. xii). But one could also make the case that 
these companies were able to execute the ideas generated through AI because they had good 
management and leadership practices in place to begin with. Failed interventions rarely make it 
into case studies, suggesting the existence of a selection bias.  
For AI to endure as a valid and effective management technique, we need a better 
understanding of how and why AI functions as it does. I therefore propose a different lens with 
which to examine AI and its methods. In the literature review on AI (Chapter 2), I conclude that 
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there are two aspects of AI that have been relatively underexplored: its capacity to create new 
organizational knowledge, and its function as a strategizing practice. AI does not seek a solution 
to a pre-existing or emerging problem; it seeks innovation. The creation of new knowledge is an 
aspect of innovation. Scholars have only just begun to recognize the knowledge-creating 
capacity of AI (Richer, Ritchie, & Marchionni, 2009). While knowledge is also a slippery 
outcome to observe and measure, it is recognized as a source of sustained competitive advantage 
(Dierkes, Berthoin Antal, Child, & Nonaka, 2001; Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003b). Empirical 
studies in strategic management link knowledge to competitive advantage (e.g. Bierly & 
Chakrabarti, 1996; Narver, Slater, & MacLachlan, 2004; R. Sabherwal & Sabherwal, 2005; 
Zander & Kogut, 1995). If AI functions as method for creating organizational knowledge, then 
companies engaged in the practice may be building a dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997) or core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) for generating innovation, thereby 
endowing them with a sustained competitive advantage that is hard for others to imitate. 
The heightened interest in the study of organizational knowledge reflects a larger societal trend 
that Toffler (1981) called the third wave, the movement from an industrial society to the 
information society. Such a shift occurs in Western history only once every few hundred years 
(Drucker, 1993c). “The basic economic resource…is no longer capital, nor natural 
resources…nor ‘labor’. It is and will be knowledge” (emphasis in original, p.8). Knowledge as an 
economic resource poses many difficulties for traditional economic analysis and strategy 
development. In the industrial age, strategists relied heavily on the tools of microeconomics to 
aid decision-making in an organization. For example, Porter’s (1996) five forces model, one of 
the most famous conceptual frameworks for developing corporate strategy, used microeconomic 
principles to analyze a company’s competitive position in its industry. “An advantage of 
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economics, and one reason for its widespread use for analyzing individual and institutional 
decision making, is that it requires the analyst to be explicit about the key elements of the 
process under consideration” (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000, p.2). But knowledge cannot 
always be made explicit (Polanyi, 2009) let alone be quantified. As Drucker (1993c) noted, 
“there is no economic theory unless there is a model that expresses economic events in 
quantitative relationships. Without it there is no way to make a rational choice—and rational 
choices are what economics is all about” (p.185). Wooldridge, an economic journalist and 
commentator, wryly pointed out in a book review for the Wall Street Journal: 
Today the status of strategic thinking in the business world is somewhat confused…. The 
lords of strategy are now given to happy talk about “people”—on the grounds that people 
are the key to innovation and innovation is the key to long-term success. (2010, March 
12) 
It is not surprising that a new research program has emerged in strategic management that 
is shifting the focus of study to strategizing activities and practice (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & 
Vaara, 2010). Recent studies in this emerging area have great relevance for AI. Originally known 
in the literature as “strategy as practice” or SAP, this research program seeks to understand the 
doing of strategy as opposed to developing frameworks for formulating the right strategy 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Johnson & Melin, 2003). The latter is a description of traditional 
strategy research. It focused on the what of strategy and assumed that strategy is something that 
organizations have as opposed to something people do (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 
2010, p.7). Individuals were relegated to data points that are statistically correlated to 
quantifiable variables, resulting in a “curious absence of human actors” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 
2009, p. 70). I suspect that the traditional approach to studying strategy is no longer sustainable 
because the key economic variable, namely knowledge, defies easy quantification. 
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In the introduction to the Cambridge Handbook on Strategy as Practice, Golsorskhi et al. 
(2010) made some interesting observations that echo some of the fundamental assumptions upon 
which the AI approach is grounded:   
First, the world of strategy is no longer taken to be something stable that can be observed, 
but constitutes a reality in flux. Second, strategy is no longer regarded as “located” on the 
organizational level; instead, it is spread across many levels from the level of individual 
actions to the institutional level. Third, the world of strategy constitutes a genuinely 
social reality created and recreated in the interactions between various actors inside and 
outside the organization. (p.7) 
In this study, I turn away from the conventional view of AI as a change intervention, and 
situate AI as first and foremost a strategizing practice. An intervention implies that an outsider, 
usually a consultant with expert knowledge, steps in to intervene in order to cause some desirable 
outcome. Looking back to the origins of AI, however, Cooperrider (1986) and his colleagues 
initially developed the approach as a research method for building grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). The whole point of AI was to provide an organization a way to inquire into its 
life-giving properties. After all, AI stands for appreciative inquiry. So much of the fanfare (and 
criticism) surrounding AI has been directed to its unconditional focus on positivity (Bushe, 2012) 
that the aspect of inquiry tends to be overlooked. 
I posit that AI is a participative mode of strategizing that can accelerate the creation of 
organizational knowledge. The knowledge generated by AI endows an organization with a 
competitive advantage in a knowledge-based economy. Corporations are increasingly tapping 
collective strategizing methods like the AI summit format to propel growth and boost 
profitability. The purpose of this study therefore is to explore the effectiveness of AI compared 
to other forms of strategizing in the context of organizational knowledge creation. Adopting a 
systems perspective, the general research question I pose is: how and why AI as a whole, 
accelerates organizational knowledge creation?  I adopt a systems perspective for two reasons: 
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the complexity of AI summits, and its emphasis on working with whole systems. A systems 
perspective assumes that the system as a whole may be different from its parts. This should not 
be confused with the popular cliché “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” which 
assumes that the system becomes whole by adding up all its parts. Systems are not that simple. A 
system is characterized as a system when there is “order in the gross with freedom in the small” 
(Weiss 1971, p. v in Weiss, 1978, p. 18). The hierarchical order and group interdependencies of 
subsystems reduce the range of varied behavior capable by its individual components.  
To limit the scope of the research, I narrow the phenomena of interest to a specific format 
in the AI toolbox called the AI summit. It applies the principles of AI to a large group method 
(Bunker & Alban, 2006) of strategizing. The AI summit method has become the format of choice 
among many practitioners of AI. For example, in September 2012, Walmart conducted a major 
conference using the AI summit method. It invited hundreds of suppliers to flesh out a 
sustainability index to which Walmart’s supply chain would be held accountable (Personal 
communication, Cooperrider, 2012). The name summit is somewhat of a misnomer. Global 
summits such as the G8 are conferences where heads of states and ministers negotiate issues of 
contention. An AI summit is essentially the equivalent of an offsite strategy workshop, with two 
notable exceptions. Participation is not limited to the top management team, and the strategizing 
activities selectively focus on positive experiences and topics. Hundreds of people from every 
level of the organization are assembled in one room over multiple days to engage in structured, 
strategizing activities. Positive, democratic conversations are the order of the day. AI summits 
can be a powerful tool for developing strategy because internal stakeholders from all levels of 
the organization strategize in collaboration with external stakeholders such as customers and 
suppliers. This is achieved by structuring activities in many different group configurations in 
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terms of size and diversity. I review the literature on AI summits and large group methods in 
Chapter 3. The methodology used for this study is provided in Chapter 4. 
In the current analysis, I complement existing theories of AI and large group methods by 
viewing AI summits through an alternative theoretical lens: Luhmann’s social systems theory. 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is a good starting point for several reasons. First, social system 
theory is highly consistent with the social constructionist heritage common to both AI and large 
group methods. In fact, Luhmann has been labeled as being part of the “radical constructivism” 
movement (Luhmann, 1995), as his theories are based on a radical systems view of biology 
called autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980). In Luhmann’s formulation of the world, social 
systems are comprised of communications, not people. People fall into a separate category of 
systems—cognitive systems—and can only interact with social systems; they can never be a 
component of one. Organizations are a special type of social system that reproduces itself based 
on an ongoing production of decision communications. Luhmann’s lens allows for a decoupling 
of the effects of positive psychology from the dynamics inherent in organizations and interaction 
systems, because social systems cannot think or feel—only people can. 
Luhmann’s social systems theory fits well also because it is based on a relatively new 
approach to thinking about systems called autopoiesis. The theory of autopoiesis was developed 
by the Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela (1980) in the 1970s. It has since had a 
tremendous impact on systems thinking, affecting the work of Senge (2006) among others. 
Winograd (1987) applied autopoiesis to computer systems design. Under his guidance, his 
students, Page and Brin invented a highly effective database retrieval system that now dominates 
search on the Internet—Google.  
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I provide an overview of autopoietic theory in Chapter 5. Autopoiesis means self-
reproduction (Maturana & Varela, 1980). An autopoietic system reproduces itself and its 
components, using only its components. A social system cannot be autopoietic if it is comprised 
of people, because society cannot produce people. An autopoietic system is simultaneously a 
closed and open system. Its operations are completely closed from the environment, but it is 
open to its environment through interactions. A key insight of this so-called new systems theory 
is that an autopoietic system can refer only to itself. It is self-referential. It operates according to 
its internal structures and logic. This means that the environment can never directly affect a 
system. An external event in the environment is a trigger that perturbs the system. The system is 
not immune to the environment, because it is interactionally open. External events can trigger a 
perturbation so great that the system disintegrates. It is in this respect that autopoietic theory is 
different from open systems theory, which relies on a logic based on inputs and outputs between 
system and environment. Luhmann (1995) wrote: “The distinction between ‘closed’ and ‘open 
systems’ is replaced by questions of how self-referential closure can create openness” (p. 9). A 
theory of cognition and knowledge based on autopoiesis, leads to the conclusion that there is no 
pre-given world from which we select and process information to make ever more accurate 
representations of the world. Rather, “we have only the world that we bring forth with others” 
(Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 248).  
Luhmann (1995) looked at the mechanism of autopoiesis, and concluded that autopoiesis 
can be used to describe social systems, not just living and cognitive systems. He recognized 
autopoiesis as a major paradigm shift in systems theory. Maturana and Varela (1987) were 
hesitant in applying autopoiesis to social systems. Some have deemed that Luhmann’s 
application to sociology is inappropriate (e.g. Mingers, 1995). That said, his theory has had great 
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utility in highlighting the communication issues inherent in law (Luhmann, 1988), the mass 
media (Luhmann, 2000b), art (Luhmann, 2000a), and sustainability (Luhmann, 1986). I 
introduce the key concepts of social systems theory relevant to this study in Chapter 6. In 
particular, I look at the implications of Luhmann’s conceptualization of organizations as social 
systems that reproduce themselves based on their ongoing production of decision 
communications. This radical view of organizing forces one to seriously consider the role of the 
observer—the researcher—in the study of organizations. Although Luhmann’s theory is 
notoriously complex, it has the benefit of developing models that disambiguate social dynamics 
from psychological and cognitive effects. Luhmann’s lens allows one to scrutinize the structural 
couplings between various systems to sort out phenomena occurring at different units of analysis. 
I look at recent studies that apply Luhmann’s theory to management to develop a new 
conceptual model of AI summits. A leading scholar in the emerging strategizing activities and 
practice research program, Seidl (2005b), has drawn on Luhmann to develop new ways of 
thinking about organizational identity, management consulting (Mohe & Seidl, 2011), strategy 
workshops (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008) and organizational knowledge (Seidl, 2007). These 
studies serve as a foundation in building alternative ways of viewing AI summits through a 
social systems lens. This line of theorizing defines knowledge as structures that determine how a 
system deals with information (Seidl, 2007). The premises a company uses for its decision 
making, for example, qualify as organizational knowledge because they specify what matters to 
the organization—“the difference that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1979) and determines the 
meaning of that information (Seidl, 2007).  
Guided by the work of Seidl and his colleagues, in Chapter 7, I begin modeling AI 
summits through a social systems lens. First, I situate AI in the context of management 
10 
 
consulting. This allows me to contrast AI with other forms of management consulting. Luhmann 
(2005b) has written about the communication barriers inherent in management consulting. Mohe 
and Seidl (2011) expanded upon Luhmann’s ideas in theorizing the client-consultant relationship 
in consulting. I apply their methodology in my analysis of AI summits.  
I conceptualize an AI summit as a strategic episode (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in which an 
organization suspends its operational routines to reflect upon itself in a strategic context. I 
develop a conceptual model of AI summits based on Luhmann’s theoretical concepts. The model 
describes the components, and the structural coupling mechanisms of a generic workshop, a 
large group method, and finally an AI summit. It begins to surface how an AI summit is 
differentiated from other types of strategic workshops and large group methods. The model 
shows that hundreds of individual psychological systems are structurally coupled to the 
organization system through their positions within their company. These couplings form an 
intimate type of structural coupling called interpenetration. Not only can systems co-evolve 
through interpenetration, they can leverage the structural complexities of the other system to 
facilitate their autopoiesis. Such extremely tight couplings between individual participants, the 
organization and the summit’s interaction system create a social dynamic that enable the 
production of organizational decisions during the strategic episode.  
In contrast, strategy meetings at many organizations typically limit participation to a 
handful of executives and at times, external consultants. Although their positions may be at the 
apex of an organizational hierarchy, not all decisions can be produced during the strategy 
meeting. Many, if not most decisions must be produced closer to the fringes of the 
organization—at the level of managers and front-line employees, the people who implement the 
chosen strategy. A social systems lens allows us to see that such decisions are produced in vivo 
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so to speak, at a summit. This is possible because the communications barriers between the 
consultant and the client company, as well as between executives and the rest of the company, 
are significantly reduced.  
In the next step, I focus on the characteristics of an AI summit as a strategic episode. An 
AI summit is comprised of dozens of episodes that unfold in linear sequence over several days. 
Each episode varies in the degree to which existing structures are suspended. This creates a 
dynamic oscillation between strategic and routine contexts throughout the duration of the summit 
conference. I develop a typology of episodes based on four dimensions: overall context, group 
composition, activity and level of decoupling from the organizational system. I posit that this 
constant oscillation between different contexts play a significant role in generating new 
knowledge structures. 
In Chapter 8, I expand the social systems theoretical lens to explore the dynamics 
involved in the generation of organizational knowledge at an AI summit. I propose that the AI 
summit method structurally couples its systems components, such that communication barriers 
are reduced, and access to “nonknowledge” (Seidl, 2007) increases. The summit system creates, 
modifies and reinforces organizational knowledge through the production of decisions. These 
decisions are not only produced, but also can reconnect back to the organization’s operations 
while the strategic episode is still ongoing. This accelerates knowledge creation while making 
more robust, emerging but fragile decision premises that are produced at the summit. I identify 
self-organizing project teams as one of the most important outcomes of an AI summit in the 
context of organizational knowledge creation. I then introduce a case study to illustrate some of 
the dynamics identified in this chapter and the previous chapter. A discussion and implications 
for future research follows in Chapter 9.  
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Chapter 2 Appreciative Inquiry 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the literature on appreciative inquiry (AI). As the name implies, 
AI was originally conceived as a method of inquiry (Cooperrider, 1986; Cooperrider & Srivastva, 
2008). One of AI’s co-founders, Cooperrider (1990), emphasized that AI is first and foremost, a 
joint process of knowing. AI seeks to discover new knowledge about an organization by 
understanding what gives it life. Organizations are treated as though they are living systems. 
Once the life-affirming properties of the organization are identified, they become the basis for 
articulating possibilities for a better organizational future. Dialogue is the primary means by 
which knowledge is generated and strategic plans are developed. New knowledge and new 
images of possibility can disrupt and interrupt the status quo, but are nevertheless valued because 
the process unfolds through shared experiences. AI’s methods aspire to include every person 
who has a stake in the organization’s future, whether they are employees, executives or external 
customers and suppliers. Knowledge is jointly created, and corresponds to the visions of human 
and social possibility, which are jointly imagined (Cooperrider, 1990). 
In the 25 years since the seminal paper on AI was published in 1987, AI and its 
application in practice have evolved considerably, sometimes in ways the founders did not intend 
or anticipate. AI’s emphasis on positivity, inclusiveness and holism has generated a large and 
devoted practitioner following in the field of organization development (OD). AI has been hailed 
by some as the most innovative social technology to emerge in OD in recent years. There has 
been no shortage of case studies documenting success stories, often written by the very 
consultants who designed and executed the intervention. In contrast, scholarly research on AI’s 
methods has been limited. Despite the method’s popular appeal, few scholarly articles on AI 
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have been published in the mainstream literature in business and management studies. This 
implies that theories of AI have not developed as quickly or robustly as the practices of AI. 
Therefore, as part of this review, I retrace AI’s history and examine in particular, its theoretical 
heritage and foundations, some of which have been pushed into relative obscurity in the rush to 
apply AI in practice. 
Criticism of AI in the literature for the most part has been concentrated in one area: 
positivity. From its very beginning, AI’s selective focus on the positive aspects of organizing has 
been a source of considerable concern. Advances in positive psychology offer some remedy. 
Others have proposed that generativity as a more useful concept than positivity. Scholars are also 
paying more attention to the dark side of AI, linking it to concepts like the shadow organization. 
Practitioners have also begun to reflect more carefully about why some interventions fail. 
That said, the lack of rigorous evaluations of its methods continues to undermine the 
validity of the approach and its techniques. I argue that one of the reasons AI has eluded 
evaluation is the perception that AI is a change intervention. Change is often difficult to link to 
firm performance, the generally accepted standard by which methods are tested. I propose 
turning to a different outcome to measure AI’s effectiveness: the creation of organizational 
knowledge. AI is first and foremost a strategizing practice. Its goal is innovation. Positioning AI 
as a strategizing practice is consistent with existing theories of AI. However, the knowledge 
creating aspect of AI has not been fully explored. Organizational knowledge is a known source 
of competitive advantage in the post-industrial economy. Alternative theories and conceptual 
models are necessary to understand how and why AI can generate knowledge in organizations. 
Such frameworks can generate testable propositions upon which AI’s effectiveness can be 
critiqued and evaluated.  
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What is AI?  
AI has been described simultaneously as a philosophy (Cooperrider et al., 2008), social 
technology (Burke, 2011), constructive inquiry process (Cooperrider & Avital, 2004), and most 
often as a change intervention (Bunker & Alban, 2006). A practitioner-oriented definition is 
given in the leading handbook and textbook on AI (Cooperrider et al., 2008): 
Appreciative Inquiry is the cooperative co-evolutionary search for the best in people, 
their organizations, and the world around them. It involves the discovery of what gives 
“life” to a living system when it is most effective, alive, and constructively capable in 
economic, ecological and human terms. (p. 3) 
 
The handbook lists 20 application areas in which AI has been used successfully including 
“innovations leading toward the ideal organization,” strategic planning, leadership development, 
work process redesign, culture change, diversity initiatives, evaluation, and new product 
development (p. xxix).  
The method originated at Case Western Reserve University in the 1980s. Cooperrider 
was a doctoral student at the time, working with faculty and students on a consulting project for 
the Cleveland Clinic, one the world’s largest medical centers. Cooperrider had been interviewing 
physician leaders there. His advisor, Srivastva “was impressed by the excitement in his young 
student” and “encouraged him to put the problems aside and focus on what gave life and vitality 
to the organization” (Bushe, 2012, p. 8). The study led to an article theorizing conditions for 
egalitarian ways of organizing (Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1986), which was published in Human 
Relations. The AI model was mentioned as a footnote. Citing Cooperrider’s dissertation and a 
chapter in press, it described AI in the following way: 
[AI] is based on an assumption that organizing is a miracle to be understood rather than a 
problem to be solved. It seeks to uncover the forces which give organizational life its 
vitality and self-generative capacity. It seeks to contribute knowledge about 
organizations-in-action which is: (1) appreciative,(2) applicable, (3) provocative, and (4) 
collaborative. (p. 686) 
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 The initial reception to Cooperrider’s idea of focusing on the positive was apparently quite cool. 
During a presentation Cooperrider gave 1984 at the Academy of Management, “he was laughed 
at” (Bushe, 2012, p. 9) when he suggested organizations should be appreciated as mysteries. 
When he gave his first presentation on AI to practitioners at the OD Network conference in San 
Francisco, 1985, he was met with similar skepticism. Bushe, who subsequently became a leading 
scholar in AI, attended the conference. It was his first exposure to AI. 
I remember how the majority of those in attendance were incredulous at the suggestion 
that they should stop focusing on problems. It seemed too one sided. Many thought the 
argument that diagnosis should be abandoned, as it simply recreated the mental models of 
those doing the diagnosis, was fanciful at best. (Bushe, 2012, p. 9) 
AI would have to wait over a decade for the emergence of a similar turn in psychology that 
became the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  
Nevertheless, AI resonated with many. AI represented a genuine breakthrough in OD 
(Bunker, Alban, & Lewicki, 2004), a sub-field of management consulting that evolved out of 
social psychology. Burke (2011) described it as an innovative social technology. AI’s popularity 
grew exponentially in the 90s among consultants and practitioners involved in strategic planning 
and organizational change efforts. Applications of AI spread rapidly in part due to the 
publication of high profile success stories (Bunker, 2004). Forbes ran a feature story on 
Roadway Express which had conducted an AI conference in which teamsters and managers 
wrote business plans together. By the early 21st century, its status had risen to “the current hot 
intervention” (Bunker et al., 2004) in organization development. Even McKinsey has been 
sending their consultants to AI training sessions (Personal communication, 2009). AI also 
extended beyond OD into areas such as community development (Messerschmidt, 2008), nursing 
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and social work (eg. Richer, Ritchie, & Marchionni, 2009), IT (Gonzales & Leroy, 2011), and 
education (Bushe, 2010; Conklin, 2009).  
Methods of AI 
Whitney and Trosten-Bloom (2003) have identified at least eight different methods of AI. 
Common to them all is a process known as the 4D model (Cooperrider et al., 2008). An 
intervention cycles through the four phases of Discover, Dream, Design, and Destiny 
(alternatively Deploy or Deliver). In the first D, stakeholders discover the organization’s positive 
core, what makes it tick. This is usually done by sharing stories and conducting interviews about 
the high point moments of organizational life. The second D encourages stakeholders to dream 
and construct images of its preferred future. Facilitators push participants to dwell on “what 
might be” rather than “what is.” This is a major aspect of AI that differentiates it from other 
strategizing approaches. It is also why AI tends to be associated with change interventions than 
strategizing. In the context of strategy development, AI’s future- oriented framework is a 
significant break from convention. Traditional strategy development is grounded in analysis of 
data collected from its past. Historical data analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, is crucial 
for understanding the organization’s competitive advantages in order to develop strategy. A 
guiding, positive image of the future is a deemed a powerful vehicle for driving positive actions 
in an organization (Cooperrider, 1990). The images of the future become the equivalent of a 
strategic focus or vision of the organization (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005).  
The second half of the 4D cycle represents the planning side of strategizing. In the third 
D, stakeholders begin to design the elements necessary to realize the images of the future they 
created in the dream phase. What the participants design depends on the topic and purpose of the 
inquiry. “Good news-stories are used to craft provocative propositions that bridge the best of 
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‘what gives life’ with a collective aspiration of ‘what might be’” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 
162). Provocative propositions are also called design statements and possibility statements, 
depending on the organization. They can be called the equivalent of a corporate vision statement. 
More recently, AI practitioners have been incorporating the industrial design company, IDEO’s 
(T. Brown, 2009) product design approaches. Instead of design statements, participants are 
involved in a brainstorming activity followed by a rapid prototyping exercise (Cooperrider et al., 
2008). At Fairmount Minerals, participants of a 3-day AI summit made a cardboard mock-up of 
a new sand filter that purified water. They presented it “with a skit demonstrating its use in a part 
of the world where many children suffer from lack of clean water” (p. 173). Rapid prototyping is 
far more effective than “a five-page report” because “they persuade and they help move the ball 
forward for real-life experimentation” (p. 173). 
The final D is called Destiny but is also known as Deploy or Deliver. In some AI formats, 
participants develop specific plans for executing the visions and prototypes developed in the 
previous three phases. This includes two aspects: 1) “aligning the actual organization with the 
provocative propositions created in the Design phase” and 2) “building AI learning competencies 
into the culture” (p. 200). The focus is on generating action. Cooperrider and the co-authors of 
the AI Handbook for Leaders of Change have insisted that the ultimate goal of the Destiny 
process “is to create highly improvisational organizations” (p. 205). Following Barrett (1998) 
these are organizations that are “affirmative, expansive, generative, and collaborative” (p.205). 
These competence areas are expanded by an ongoing application of the skills used during the 4D 
process.  
Practitioners have noted that the 4D model overlooks an important step: defining the 
topic of inquiry. According to Bushe (2012), the Clergy Leadership Institute in the U.S. 
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advocates a 5D model, the first step being Define. In the 4D model, the affirmative topic choice 
is at the core and centers the entire intervention (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005). A successful 
intervention will cycle through all four or five phases. If we step back for a bit, and situate AI not 
as an intervention but as a strategizing activity, the 4D process resembles a qualitative approach 
to strategy development. Data is collected, coded and analyzed for patterns and themes during 
Discover. In the Dream and Design phase, hypotheses are generated from the data in the form of 
vision statements and prototypes. They are then tested against reality once again in the Destiny 
phase when participants begin to develop executable plans and deploy them.  
The specific activities and levels of participation vary depending on the actual method 
deployed (Whitney & Trosten-Bloom, 2003). The form of engagement ranges from involving a 
small, core group of people to conduct the activities, all the way to involving all stakeholders 
from the entire organizational system, often including external stakeholders. The scope of the 
intervention can be limited to a specific project, as in an “AI learning team” method. GTE 
adopted a “positive change network” in which the company trained hundreds of its employees in 
AI to share resources and best practices. In a “mass mobilized inquiry” thousands of interviews 
are conducted across communities and organizations. One of the most popular methods in the 
corporate sector is the AI summit (Ludema et al., 2003), which is a conference involving large 
groups of stakeholders who go through the entire 4D cycle in two to four days. A “whole system 
4D dialogue” was conducted at Nutrimental in Brazil, which temporally shut down its operations 
to enable literally all its employees to participate in an AI summit (Barros & Cooperrider, 2000). 
Theoretical background 
The theoretical framework used to justify AI has changed over the years from the one 
originally proposed by Srivastva and Cooperrider in the footnotes of their 1986 article. It is 
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useful to trace AI’s theoretical roots, as some of its history has been lost in translation, so to say, 
as the practice of AI took off and evolved. Two of the most important influences on AI theory 
have been the work of Lewin (1946) and Gergen (1978). Lewin is considered by some, the 
founding father of OD. He pioneered research in group dynamics (1947a, 1947b). He also 
developed the concept of action research. Lewin (1946) envisioned research as being inseparable 
from action. The scientist (or consultant) is not a detached observer but part of the action. 
Diagnosis is necessary yet insufficient to help the practitioner. Furthermore, Lewin emphasized: 
“Socially, it does not suffice that university organizations produce new scientific insight. It will 
be necessary to install fact- finding procedures, social eyes and ears, right into social action 
bodies” (Lewin, 1946, p. 38). Lewin was neither denying the role of logical positivist modes of 
research nor underplaying the importance of theory. Rather, he called for research methods that 
incorporated both action and theory.  
Cooperrider and his colleagues at Case Western Reserve University conceived of AI as 
an action research method that would enhance an organization’s capacity for social innovation 
(Cooperrider, 1986; Srivastva & Cooperrider, 1986). Cooperrider contended that action research 
had diverged from Lewin’s ideal, and as a result, had become pre-occupied with action and 
problem solving. AI’s original agenda was to bring creative theorizing back into the picture. 
According to Cooperrider, the inability to “dream” constrained organizations from reaching their 
full potential to innovate. He cited Kierkegaard in his dissertation:  “If I were to wish for 
anything, I should not wish for wealth and power, but for the passionate sense of the potential” 
(Cooperrider, 1986, p. 1). Cooperrider and Srivastva wrote in their 1987 article “Appreciative 
Inquiry in organizational life” that they were attempting a “conceptual re[con]figuration of action 
research”(Cooperrider & Srivastva, 2008, p. 353) based on a social constructionist view of 
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science. They claimed that “good theory may be one of the best means human beings have for 
affecting change in the postindustrial world” (p. 353). What they were proposing was a method 
for generating such theories. 
Cooperrider was drawn to the work of Gergen (1978) who championed social 
constructionist thought in psychology. In social constructionism, the world is constructed 
according to how we approach the world. How we approach the world “depends on the social 
relationships of which we are a part” (Gergen, 2009, p. 2). Therefore, “the realities we live in are 
outcomes of the conversations in which we are engaged” (p. 4). In 1978, Gergen wrote an 
influential article titled “Toward generative theory” in the prestigious psychology journal, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. He rejected the logical-positivist assumptions that 
dominated at the time, writing: 
Much contemporary theory appears to lack generative potency, that is, the capacity to 
challenge prevailing assumptions regarding the nature of social life to offer fresh 
alternatives to contemporary patterns of conduct. (Gergen, 1978, p. 1344) 
Gergen urged for a “sociorationalist” perspective which “places the locus of knowledge not in 
the minds of single individuals, but in the collectivity” (Gergen, 1982, p. 207). Knowledge and 
rationality is generated through “a social process of communication” instead of in the minds of 
individuals. This notion of sociorationalism lies at the heart of AI. 
In 1990, Cooperrider wrote a chapter on the impact of positive images on actions in a 
book he co-edited on appreciative management. He reviewed the literature in neuroscience and 
psychology to build a case that positive images lead to positive action in organizations. 
Synthesizing this material with his earlier work, Cooperider and his colleagues formulated a new 
set of five principles which represent “the most widely accepted” (Bushe, 2011) theoretical 
framework of AI: constructionist, simultaneity, poetic, anticipatory and positivity (Cooperrider et 
al., 2008).  
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Constructionist reflects AI’s social constructionist roots inspired by Gergen. Simultaneity 
refers to the dynamic feedback loop of inquiry and change. It is analogous to the “circulatory 
response” (Follett, 1924)  and the double interact (Weick, 1979) in which stimulus and response 
can simultaneously be a cause and an effect, a cornerstone of systems thinking (Senge, 2006). It 
also builds from the famous studies by Rosenthal and his colleagues in which the expectations of 
the experimenter can be transmitted to participants of an experiment (Rosenthal, 1966), drawing 
the conclusion that inquiry is in and of itself an intervention.  
The poetic principle assumes that an organization’s inner talk or narrative has a profound 
effect on organizational outcomes. This is consistent with Weick’s views on historicizing (Weick, 
1979), Boje’s storytelling organizations (Boje, 2008) and the power of metaphors (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003; Morgan, 1997). The anticipatory principle takes the view that the image of the 
future guides current behavior. Weick’s theory of future perfect thinking, which will be 
described in detail in the next chapter, supports this notion. Finally, the principle of positivity 
“grows out of years of experience with AI” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 9) based on the claim 
that change requires energy and momentum which can be created through positive affect.  
Bushe (2011) has claimed there are ten theoretical levers he identified in the literature 
that explain the underlying change mechanisms of AI. His critique includes theories of discourse 
and narrative (Barrett, Thomas, & Hocevar, 1995), stakeholder engagement (Gergen & 
Thatchenkery, 1996), and self-organizing processes (Jantsch, 1980). Bushe singled out the theory 
of “inquiry as intervention” as the most important contribution AI has made to theories of 
organizational change. According to Bushe, Cooperrider and his colleagues theorize “that 
organizational inquiry is simultaneously the production of self-and-world. What researchers 
choose to study and how they study it creates as much as it discovers the world” (Bushe, 2011). 
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AI criticism 
Positivity. 
The claim that has been the greatest allure and has drawn the greatest criticism toward AI 
is the principle of positivity. Critics of AI worry that an unconditional focus on the positive may 
do more harm than good. One major concern is the possibility that AI dodges conflict and 
important structural problems under the rug. Pagés (1990), a psychoanalyst and researcher from 
Europe, shared his reservations and discomfort towards a focus on the positive dimensions of 
organizational life in a book edited by Srivastva and Cooperrider in 1990.  
I fear it may be used to create solutions so distinct from reality that one could view it as a 
defense mechanism rather than a visioning process grounded in reality. Such a coping 
mechanism may overlay profound conflict; it may prove ephemeral and damaging in the 
long run. (Pagés, 1990, p. 354) 
In a critical review of AI interventions in health care published in 2011, some participants 
who were interviewed by the reviewers echoed these concerns. One project developer was 
quoted as saying: “Some people may look at AI as yet another concept that will be a ‘band aid’ 
to the symptoms that really block our change” (Dematteo & Reeves, 2011, p. 206). The authors 
of the review noted that a lack of critical analysis can undermine examinations of existing 
structural tensions in the workplace—interprofessional tensions between nurses and doctors, for 
example. As a result, AI “may have also helped to legitimate existing unequal power relations” 
(Dematteo & Reeves, 2011, p. 206), despite the appearance of a democratic change process, and 
restoration of hope and meaning towards the future among the participants. Although the 
participants clearly desired more interprofessional collaboration, Dematteo and Reeves 
concluded that in the absence of critical analyses of structural issues, AI will be limited in its 
effectiveness in securing lasting change in health care. Aldred (2009)  criticized AI’s use in 
community development for similar reasons, especially in situations in which “institutional 
23 
 
legitimacy and trust are low” (p. 66). She questioned whether participants in an AI intervention 
were really in control of their destiny as opposed to a temporary feeling of control arouse 
through provision of “a bounded space for flouting convention” (p. 66).  
Reflective practitioners have noted that in some situations, facilitators may have 
inadvertently stifled opportunities for liberal discourse by steering a group away from talking 
about the negative issues and constraints of the larger system. Grant and Humphries (2006) 
critiqued four case studies from their own AI practice involving school boards, and noted that in 
one instance, the researcher-facilitator’s positive bias “could have exacerbated participant 
perceptions of the relative power imbalance within the research group and the de-valuing of local 
knowledge within the action research process” (p. 413). Grant and Humphries raised the 
possibility that deflecting attention from negativity may have led to a diminished sense of trust 
within the group, resulting in members being less open and granting less disclosure in the inquiry. 
None of the four cases were able to complete the full 4D cycle of AI. 
A comparative study by Bushe (2010) of AI interventions within the same organization 
provides a partial response to the issues raised above. Bushe examined interventions at eight sites 
belonging to a large, urban school district. AI summits were an integral part of the intervention 
methodology in all eight sites. Half the sites achieved transformational change where changes 
could be attributed to the AI process, and where the normative routines of teachers at the site 
clearly differed after the process. Change was incremental at two sites where the observed 
changes were consistent with change efforts prior to the AI process and were not changes to 
normative routines. Two sites were classified as having no change (Bushe, 2010).  
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What is noteworthy in his study was “that the inquiry needed to address some problem, 
issue or concern that was widely shared for transformational change to occur” (Bushe, 2010, p. 
22).  
Sites where there were no identified “problems” that the AI was attempting to solve 
either had no change or incremental change. When there were obvious, unresolved 
conflicts in the system not addressed by the AI there was no change. It is probably 
significant that the two sites with the highest levels of morale and pride prior to the AI 
was it to that experienced only incremental changes…. Sites that experienced 
transformational changes, however, were those where the AI was connected to real, 
shared concerns within the schools and helped to ‘solve problems’ that were meaningful 
to participants. (Bushe, 2010, p. 19)  
 
Sites with no change were significantly worse at getting the right people to participate in the 
process given the topic of inquiry. “AI does not magically overcome poor leadership, 
communication failures, and unresolved conflicts” and requires normal OD processes necessary 
for successful change (Bushe, 2010, p. 22). Bushe also found that  levels of positive affect 
generated by the inquiry did not predict levels of change. 
This line of reasoning is similar to the objections to the positive psychology movement 
raised by some psychologists. Depending on the context, negative emotions such as anger can be 
generative and lead to positive change (Hunter, 2009). Bushe has argued that, “the generation of 
new, compelling ideas was central to the change process” (Bushe, 2010, p. 21). Generativity, not 
positivity, was core to the AI change process (Bushe, 2007). Elliott has pointed out that AI is an 
“appreciative” approach, deliberately differentiated from a positive or affirmative approach 
(Elliott, 1999). The positive lens is a way of compensating for “the tendency in our culture to 
highlight deficiencies” (Elliott, 1999, p. 10) and ignore the positive and the pleasing. At the same 
time, it is important for AI not to undervalue the “shadow” (Fitzgerald, Oliver, & Hoxsey, 2010). 
Grant and Humphries cite an analogy by Rogers and Fraser who question an unconditional focus 
on the positive as risking distortion similar to a lopsided plant reaching out to the sunlight 
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(Rogers and Fraser, 2003, cited in Grant & Humphries, 2006). That said, Bushe raised the 
possibility that positive affect may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful AI 
interventions because all eight sites reviewed showed high levels of positive affect after the 
completion of the AI summits (Bushe, 2010, p. 21).  
Advances in positive and cognitive psychology suggest that the positive affect generated 
during an AI intervention may have effects that influence their outcome. Research on the 
benefits of positivity on individuals, groups and organizations has expanded significantly 
(Donaldson & Ko, 2010). One of the foundational theories on positivity was posited by 
Fredrickson who hypothesized that positive emotions play an evolutionary role in that they 
broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoire of an individual, allowing them to 
build resources for physical, intellectual and social resiliency (Fredrickson, 2001). Lab 
experiments not only support this hypothesis (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; K. J. Johnson, 
Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010) but also show that positive emotions can reduce own-race bias and 
increase the likelihood of recognizing faces of a race other than our own (K. J. Johnson & 
Fredrickson, 2005). In the organizational behavior literature, Losada and Heaphy (Losada & 
Heaphy, 2004) used non-linear modeling to demonstrate that high performance teams in business 
have a higher “positivity ratio” than their lower performing counterparts. The ratio was 
calculated by dividing the number of positive comments by negative comments in meeting 
settings. High performance teams showed an orientation towards others and inquiry as opposed 
to self and advocacy. These findings lend support to the effectiveness of an approach that 
stresses appreciation and inquiry. That said, it is not clear from the current literature how 
individual level outcomes translate into organizational ones.  
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The validity of AI methods. 
Lewin (1946) noted that action must be evaluated by some criteria that determines the 
relation between effort and achievement or else there is no way of judging whether “an action 
has led forward or backward” (Lewin, 1946). One significant concern continues to weigh down 
AI:  a lack of evaluation of results and methods. There continues to be a dearth of literature 
evaluating the effectiveness of AI. In 2008, Messerschmidt estimated that there were over 500 
articles on AI in the international literature. Yet there was “an amazing lack of rigorous 
assessment of AI methodology or techniques” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 455). Messerschmidt 
observed, “many AI practitioners appear almost evangelical in their belief in the ‘positive 
affirmation’ theory” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 455). The studies that Messerschmidt identified 
were illustrations of “only tentative attempts at evaluating AI” (Messerschmidt, 2008, p. 463). 
 Relatively few articles on AI have been published in peer-reviewed research journals in 
management. Many of the scholarly articles on AI have appeared in the Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science. Founded by the NTL Institute, the journal is devoted to OD and “the effects 
of evolutionary and planned change” according to the publication’s web page 
(http://jab.sagepub.com/). Six articles have been published in JABS with the keywords 
“appreciative inquiry” in the abstract. Burke’s critique is one of the six. A keyword search in all 
fields in the journal retrieved 61 citations. A similar search of publications of the Academy of 
Management—the world’s largest scholarly society in the discipline—yielded nine citations 
containing the words in the abstracts. Of these, only one was a published, academic journal 
article (Powell et al, 2004). Six were conference papers and symposia presented at AOM’s 
annual conference, and two were book review related. A full-text search of the AOM archives 
retrieved 85 citations. This is a drop in the bucket, considering that these results were culled from 
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the full-text of all journals and conference proceedings for the past 25 years. These results 
suggest that mainstream academics in the management field may not be taking AI seriously. 
Burke was careful to include the words “and perhaps arguably” in describing AI as one of the 
greatest technical developments in OD; the legitimacy of AI is still in question. Is AI an enduring 
innovation? Or is it a fad that will fade once OD clients who “are eager for the new and different, 
for any magic that will make change easier” (Bunker et al, 2004, p. 404) inevitably move on to 
the next big thing? 
One of the first published quantitative analyses of an AI intervention was a laboratory 
experiment by Bushe and Coetzer (1995). They compared three conditions: team-development 
using AI, task-oriented team development (TOTD) and a lecture (placebo). Significant 
differences were found between both treatment groups and the placebo in task performance, 
group processes and outcomes. However, in comparing AI with TOTD, significant differences in 
variance were limited to task performance, with TOTD scoring higher (Bushe & Coetzer, 1995). 
Jones (1998) studied the effect of AI interventions on employee turnover at 94 fast-food 
restaurants and found that a test group using the AI methodology resulted in 30-32% higher 
retention rates compared to two control groups (Jones, 1998).  
Van de Haar and Hosking (2004) have argued that quantitative evaluations comparing pre 
and post intervention outcomes, which they call  the “product evaluation” approach, are 
inconsistent with the social constructionist assumptions of AI. “A ‘product evaluation’ approach 
does not aim to be responsive to multiple local ontologies, imposes one reality construction (in 
the name of science and rationality) on others and so reproduces relations of  ‘power over’” (p. 
1028).  
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After ten years of experience using the AI method, Whitney and her colleagues 
conducted a qualitative study to evaluate why it works (Whitney & Trosten-Bloom, 2003). They 
used the AI approach for the study. Many of the participants were from Hunter Douglas, which 
had experienced great financial success from the AI interventions. Their data suggested that the 
liberation of power contributed to the success of AI. There were at least six conditions for power 
to be liberated: the freedom to be known in relationship, to be heard, to dream in community, to 
choose to contribute, to act with support, and to be positive (pp. 238-239). 
To date, there has only been one published study that systematically compared different 
interventions from different organizations to ascertain the conditions necessary for a successful 
intervention. Bushe and Kassam (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 20 published case studies 
AI interventions prior to 2003. The interventions were evaluated for transformational outcomes. 
Seven showed transformational change that went beyond “what we might expect from any 
competently managed change process” (p. 171). The authors identified conditions that were 
common to the transformational cases. Before discussing those conditions, I will briefly point 
out some issues on the methodology of comparing case studies.  
Limitations of meta-analysis of case studies 
Case studies are generally accepted as a valid research method (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & 
Mitchell, 2011). However, a perception persists in academia that they are not scientifically 
rigorous (Yin, 2011). There are valid concerns regarding comparisons of AI case studies, 
because they are vulnerable to selection bias. Most are written by scholar-practitioners who were 
hired by the clients as consultants. This has consequences: many more cases are written about 
successes than failures. People are reluctant to talk about failed interventions. The facilitators of 
the intervention have no interest in talking about and neither is the organization.  
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Failed interventions, therefore, are likely being systematically excluded from being 
documented and published as case studies. Bushe and Kassam (2005) sampled published case 
studies that may have been susceptible to such biases. A more fundamental issue has to do with 
the validity of a meta-analysis of AI case studies. A meta-analysis analyzes the results of 
previously published research according to certain criteria. They are often used to compare and 
contrast quantitative findings from experimental studies. Meta-analyses of qualitative methods 
like case studies are far less common and are relatively undeveloped (Rudel, 2008). The 
application to AI cases begs another question: are AI interventions even comparable to one 
another? AI comes in many shapes and forms. There are at least eight different methods. 
Depending on the method, data might be collected by the consultant, a select group of employees, 
or by hundreds of internal and external stakeholders. The degree to which management and 
employees buy into the approach may also differ. Such factors make it problematic to pool data 
in the first place. 
Reframing the purpose of AI 
AI and knowledge creation 
Despite the methodological issues, Bushe and Kassam’s (2005) meta-analysis provide 
some crucial insights into the conditions for successful AI interventions. They compared 20 
published cases of AI prior to 2003 and evaluated them for transformational outcomes. Seven 
showed transformational change that went beyond “what we might expect from any competently 
managed change process” (p. 171). All cases reporting transformational outcomes 1) created new 
knowledge, 2) created a generative metaphor, and 3) changed or created new background 
assumptions underlying the organization’s actions. In contrast, none of the non-transformational 
cases created knowledge, and only one case each showed 2) or 3). Transformational cases tended 
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to take a more improvisational approach in the final AI phase. Bushe and Kassam concluded that 
in the transformational cases, the organization was able to: 
(a) generate new, internally validated knowledge that is meaningful to system members 
and provokes new actions and 
(b) plan for, and guide, the action phase in a way that supports local innovations without 
requiring a consensual or centralized approval. (p. 178) 
 
In the more recent comparative study of AI summits at four different sites of the same 
organization, Bushe (2010) was unable to find any significant correlation between positivity and 
transformational outcomes. Bushe (2007) stressed in an earlier article that the generative aspects 
should be emphasized, not just the positive. 
It is the quest for new ideas, images, theories and models that liberate our collective 
aspirations, alter the social construction of reality, and in the process, make available 
decisions that were not available or did not occur to us before. When successful, AI 
generates spontaneous, unsupervised, individual, group and organizational action toward 
a better future. (p. 30) 
 
In the language of strategic management, AI can be conceptualized as a systematic strategizing 
process for practicing innovation and entrepreneurship. It is not surprising that AI echoes many 
of the management principles advocated by Drucker (2009): “An organization will have a high 
spirit of performance if it is consistently directed toward opportunity rather than toward 
problems. It will have the thrill of excitement, the sense of challenge, and the satisfaction of 
achievement if its energies are put where the results are, and that means on the opportunities,” (p. 
460). An organization is destined to die if it loses its spirit of performance. According to Drucker 
(2008), “the purpose of organization is to enable ordinary human beings to do extraordinary 
things. It is a means to make strengths productive and weaknesses irrelevant” (p. 280). To do so, 
the focus must be on performance and opportunities. AI not only orients an organization’s 
attention to areas of strengths and opportunities, but it does so in a way that engages the entire 
organizational system. Opportunities are identified collectively as a whole instead of in 
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organizational silos or by management consultants, raising the likelihood that resources are 
allocated to areas with growth potential.  
The AI method can be viewed as a way for an organization to adjust what Drucker calls 
its theory of business. An organization can stall if its theory of the business becomes incongruent 
with its operating environment. Cooperrider intended AI to enable organizations to creatively 
theorize about itself. AI often engages external stakeholders such as suppliers and customers in 
its strategizing activities. Their presence serves both as a reality check and a source of insight. 
The theories that emerge form the basis for generating images of the future. This is in line with 
Drucker’s famous words: “the best way to predict the future is to create it.”  Strategic planning is 
an entrepreneurial skill. “Forecasting attempts to find the most probable course of events or, at 
best, a range of probabilities. But the entrepreneurial problem is the unique event that will 
change the possibilities” (Drucker, 2009, p.124). The key question is “What should our business 
be?” as opposed to “What is our business?” 
According to Drucker (1993), innovation is one of two basic functions of a business (the 
other being marketing). “Innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by which 
they exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or a different service” (p. 19). 
Drucker identified three managerial practices required for entrepreneurship in existing businesses. 
First, managerial vision must be focused on opportunity. Second, an entrepreneurial spirit must 
be generated throughout the entire management group. This includes constantly asking the 
people and units who do things better and differently, “What are you doing to that explains your 
success?” (p. 157). Third, scheduled sessions should be systematically carried out in which a 
member of top management sits down with junior people from various divisions of the company 
to listen to their aspirations, their views of where the opportunities and threats are, their ideas for 
32 
 
new things. All three practices are highly congruent with the AI approach. Indeed, the AI summit 
format appears to incorporate the three practices in a large group setting. 
Additional insights can be culled from a recent study of an AI intervention in nursing. 
Richer, Ritchie and Marchionni (2009) examined the use of AI to promote innovative ideas for 
improving work environments of nurses and health care workers. They sought to answer the 
question “How does an AI change process lead to the development of innovative ideas regarding 
the organization of health care services?” (p. 949). The authors developed a theoretical 
framework relying on the notion that” knowledge is a source of innovation and change that 
requires synergy between individuals within a group” and situated AI as process in which tacit 
and explicit knowledge is exchanged to build a shared future. Using a multiple embedded case-
study methodology, they looked at an AI change process at two cancer care clinics consisting of 
11 one-hour sessions with each health care team simultaneously over nine months. In addition to 
participant-observation of the sessions, the researchers observed management meetings and 
conducted interviews with team members. Participants classified ideas that were generated from 
the sessions as innovative or not.  
Their results suggested that in addition to change processes, AI creates opportunities and 
some of the conditions promoting the emergence and implementation of innovative ideas.  
Throughout the AI process, discussions between different members of the team permitted 
the refinement and the evolution of the generated ideas. This process of knowledge 
exchange and development is in line with Nonaka’s (1991) proposition that the 
emergence of innovative ideas or new knowledge always begins with individuals, is 
embedded in values and beliefs and is created when tacit knowledge is made explicit and 
transformed into something new. (p. 952) 
 
The authors elaborated how the AI process served as a “space” where knowledge is developed 
and shared.  
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This shared space, called “ba” (Nonaka & Konno 1998, Nonaka et al. 2000), 
encompasses any virtual or physical area designed for the creation of collective 
knowledge and the development of relationships. Thus, the common context in which 
knowledge was shared, created and utilized during the AI process united physical and 
mental spaces, “ba”, that promoted the sharing of common goals and provided a platform 
for innovation. (Richer et al., 2009, p. 953) 
 
 Nonaka’s (1994) theory of knowledge creation is one of the best known theories in the 
organizational knowledge literature (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003b). In Nonaka’s framework, 
knowledge is dynamic, and at a fundamental level, created by individuals. Referencing the work 
of Varela and his colleagues (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), “cognitive experience is 
‘embodied action’ rather than a mere representation of a world that exists independent of our 
cognitive system” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 24). He explained: 
 An organization cannot create knowledge without individuals. The organization supports 
creative individuals or provides a context for such individuals to create knowledge. 
Organizational knowledge creation, therefore, should be understood in terms of the 
process that “organizationally” amplifies the knowledge created by individuals, and 
crystallizes it as a part of the knowledge network of organization. (Nonaka, 1994, p. 17) 
 
Nonaka describes innovation as a key form of organizational knowledge creation. 
Innovation cannot be adequately explained in terms of information processing or problem-
solving, he argued. “Innovation can be better understood as a process in which the organization 
creates and defines problems and then actively develops new knowledge to solve them” (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 14). In Nonaka’s theory of knowledge creation, knowledge is dynamically converted 
from tacit to explicit forms, from the individual to the organizational level, in four phases known 
as the SECI model. Knowledge goes through a conversion between tacit and explicit modes in 
four phases: Socialization, Externalization, Combination and Integration, hence the acronym 
SECI (pronounced “seki”). Knowledge is created in shared contexts (ba) which are perpetually in 
motion and transcend physical space and time. The various AI methods including an AI summit 
could constitute the shared context necessary for knowledge to emerge.  
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Nonaka’s model is very intuitive. Polanyi’s (2009) famous insight that “we know more 
than we can tell,” is something most people can relate to. Thus, it naturally follows that 
companies that are better able to convert the tacit knowledge of its employees into an explicit 
mode in which it can be leveraged and exploited, have more knowledge resources and are more 
competitive. Ambrosini and Bowman (2001) have suggested cognitive mapping as one way of 
operationalizing tacit knowledge. Knowledge comes in various degrees of tacitness. Not all 
knowledge can be made explicit. Some of it is embodied deep in our adaptive unconscious 
(Wilson, 2002) and is out of reach. Cognitive mapping methods such as causal mapping, the 
authors claimed, can make explicit, at least some of the tacit knowledge that is closer to the 
surface. AI’s appreciative interviews can be considered a form of causal mapping; stakeholders 
probe deeper and deeper into the root causes of success to make explicit the organization’s 
positive core.  
Nonaka’s work had a great “popularizing influence”(Emphasis in the original, Easterby-
Smith & Lyles, 2003a, p. 11) in the burgeoning field of organizational knowledge studies. The 
Knowledge Creating Company co-authored by Takeuchi (1995) expounded on important ideas 
including “the importance of national culture and philosophy to understanding the construction 
and communication of knowledge” (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003a, p. 11). There are some 
issues, however. Critics have contended that the very nature of tacit knowing prohibits it from 
ever being converted into explicit knowledge (Tsoukas, 2003). Nonaka takes the view of 
knowledge as a resource—a resource based view (Barney, 1996), whereas Tsoukas and others 
take more of a social practice view of organizing. The two approaches have yet to be reconciled 
(Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). There are some issues in the empirical application of the SECI 
model as well. Demonstrating the acquisition and transfer of tacit knowledge in the socialization 
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and externalization phases is especially problematic, and any description can be open to 
interpretation. For example, a second-order observer—an individual reflecting upon 
themselves—may have a very different perspective from a third-order observer who is observing 
the individual from the outside in. One interpretation can be just as valid as another.  
The study by Richer and her colleagues is nevertheless informative in that there appears 
to be something embedded in the AI process that contributes to the creation of organizational 
knowledge. It is worth pointing out here that, despite the social constructionist roots of AI, its 
methods implicitly acknowledge a representational view of knowledge. AI is referred to as “a 
search for knowledge” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 3) in the AI handbook for practitioners, a 
choice of words more consistent with the notion that knowledge is out there to be grasped. The 
first phase of AI sets out to discover an organization’s positive core, implying that some positive 
core already exists and is begging to be found. The purpose of the current study therefore is to 
pursue the line of vision opened up by Richer et al. that situates AI as a shared context for 
generating new knowledge leading to innovation.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on AI and identified the following points 
pertinent to this study. First, AI originated as a research method, not an intervention. Second, the 
role of positivity in AI remains controversial. Third, past studies of AI suggest that the purpose 
of AI can be reframed as a shared context for organizational knowledge creation. This suggests 
that there may be alternative ways of evaluating AI’s effectiveness by situating AI as a 
strategizing practice for organizational knowledge creation, rather than a change intervention. 
  
36 
 
Chapter 3 The AI Summit: A Large Group Method of Strategizing 
Introduction 
Although there are a variety of methods available to appreciative inquiry (AI) 
practitioners, the AI summit has recently become the format of choice at many companies. The 
AI summit integrates AI with another recent innovation in OD: large group methods. Formerly 
known as large group interventions (Bunker & Alban, 1997), these methods seek to involve a 
wide range of stakeholders in the decision-making process for systemic change (Bunker & Alban, 
2006). The four characteristics common to these methods are the inclusion of stakeholders, 
engagement of multiple perspectives through interactive activities, opportunity to influence 
outcomes, and a search for common ground as opposed to conflict resolution (pp. 19-21).  
Bunker and Alban categorized large group methods into four types based on their 
purpose. The first are methods geared towards “creating the future together” (pp. 10-13), 
including AI. They all revolve around a conference with participants ranging from about 40 
people to as many as several thousand. Creating a future is equivalent to developing strategy. 
Therefore, these methods are analogous to strategy workshops in large group configurations. The 
two others are methods for “work design” (pp. 13-15) and for “whole-scale participative work” 
(pp. 15-19). These methods, redesigning the flow of work and engaging people in participation, 
are similar to business process reengineering projects except they utilize large group meetings. 
The last category is methods for “discussion and decision making” (pp. 28-31) such as World 
Café.  
Large group methods emerged partly in response to the increased levels of complexity 
that confront organizations today. Advances in information technologies promoted globalization 
and greater levels of interdependencies between what used to be independent, self-contained 
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systems. In practice, OD consultants were frustrated by the unintended consequences and 
unexpected changes in the environment that accompanied conventional interventions. “The idea 
that change must involve the whole system has been growing in currency over the last forty years” 
(2006, p. 4) wrote Bunker and Alban. 
The idea of a system-wide approach may sound appealing to an OD consultant. But 
proposals that seek the participation of lower-level employees in strategic decisions in 
organizational level strategic planning and change development “meets definite resistance and 
skepticism” (Powley, Fry, Barrett, & Bright, 2011, p. 69) from management. There is a strong 
perception that large groups take too long to reach consensus, are “unruly” and “seldom result in 
action” (p.69). Yet there has been a considerable amount of experimentation by practitioners 
since the mid-1980s, based on developments in research in social psychology. The AI summit is 
a beneficiary of such trial and error. That AI’s popularity has not waned for over 25 years may 
have as much to do with the innovations in large group methods as the AI approach itself.  
In this chapter, I trace the theoretical origins of large group methods and how those 
theories were integrated into practice. I then turn to the AI summit format, and review the 
findings of a case study of AI summits conducted by the US Navy (Powley et al., 2011). The 
authors suggested that the AI summit format can be used as a participative management tool in a 
command-control environment like the Navy. Of particular interest is their observation that the 
AI summit “represents a communal atmosphere where the temporary suspension of normal 
organization structure allows for the accomplishment of significant, empowered strategic work” 
(p. 78). The mechanism of suspension allows the members of a strictly hierarchical organization 
like the Navy to engage in democratic dialogue without permanently altering the formal 
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command-control structure. I pick up this thread and connect it to recent studies on the concept 
of strategic episodes (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in the strategic management literature.  
Hendry and Seidl developed the concept of strategic episodes by applying Luhmann’s 
social systems theory to strategy meetings. “Episodes, in Luhmann’s theory, provide a 
mechanism by which a system can suspend its routine structures and so initiate a reflection on 
and change of these structures” (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 175). I introduce the findings from 
Jarzabkowski and Seidl who conducted a study of 51 strategy meetings of a university. Despite 
the ubiquity of strategy meetings and workshops in organizational life, strategic management 
scholars have largely overlooked their role in strategy development. Jarzabkowski and Seidl 
analyzed the meetings through the concept of strategic episodes. I conclude the review with 
some thoughts on how Luhmann’s theory is a useful lens through which to evaluate the 
conditions that make AI summits effective as a space for creating organizational knowledge. 
Large group methods: Theory and practice 
Group dynamics meets systems theory. 
Large group methods evolved through a combination of theory and practice. In 2006, 
Bunker and Alban published the most comprehensive book on large group methods to date, The 
Handbook of Large Group Methods. They identified three strands that became the precursors to 
large group methods of organizing. The first strand can be traced back to the research of Lewin 
and Bion. Independently of each other, they developed the foundational ideas and theories of 
“group dynamics,” the former in the US, the latter in the UK. Lewin is credited for having coined 
the word group dynamics in a 1939 article (Weisbord, 1987). He emigrated to the US from 
Germany in 1933 after working with two of the founders of Gestalt psychology, a stream of 
psychology that focused on understanding the whole rather than the elements of cognitive 
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processes. He made significant contributions to social psychology in general, and large group 
methods in particular. In reflecting upon those contributions, Weisbord wrote:  
Lewin wed scientific thinking to democratic values and gave birth to participative 
management.… He taught that to understand a system you must seek to change it.… 
Diagnosis does not mean just finding the problem, but doing it in such a way as to build 
commitment for action.… Not only could you solve the problem, you could 
simultaneously study your own process and thereby refine the theory and practice of 
change. (p. 72) 
 
Lewin posited that group experiences based on mutual tasks, changed the attitudes and 
actions of everyone in that social system more quickly than through individual exercises. 
According to Weisbord, Lewin discovered a core principle during his experiments with 
anthropologist Margaret Mead in the midst of World War II, in which they were tasked with 
getting housewives in Iowa to reduce their consumption of rationed foods. The principle was:  
“we are likely to modify our own behavior when we participate in problem analysis and solution 
and likely to carry out decisions we have helped make” (Emphasis in the original, Weisbord, 
1987, p. 89). Lewin saw a downside in conventional methods of consulting. When an expert 
comes in to do everything from defining the problem to generating the solutions, ironically, the 
more the expert does, the less inclined are the people affected by the proposed solution to 
cooperate. Instead, Lewin called for an action-oriented mode of consulting and research in which 
the expert collaborates with those experiencing the problem at hand, enabling “those with a stake 
in the problem to define and solve it” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 190). Lewin’s conceptualization of 
action research was crucial not only to the development of large group methods in the context of 
whole-system change, but also to the emergence of the appreciative inquiry approach to 
consulting. This latter point will be explored in a later section. 
Meanwhile, Bion, an army psychologist in the UK trained in psychoanalysis, paved the 
way for advancing theories in group dynamics at the Tavistock Institute. Guided by his 
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observations in group psychotherapy, Bion theorized that when groups are confronted with high-
anxiety change, there is a tendency for people to behave based on one of three emotional states: 
fight-flight (battle or withdraw), dependency (rely on leader or expert), and pairing (find a 
partner within the group) (Weisbord, 1987). Different leadership behaviors were needed to be 
matched with the different emotional states of the group. Researchers at the Tavistock Institute 
went on to further develop Bion’s work through “a form of laboratory” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 147) 
that conducted training sessions using learning groups called “Tavi” groups. “When people fight, 
run away from the task, pair up defensively, or depend on a leader to solve their problems, they 
become childish, immature, and unable to grow” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 149) impeding creativity 
and joint action. These insights were later applied to developing methods for work design and 
studies of leaderless groups—self-organizing work teams.  
Systems theory was brought to the Tavistock Institute by Emery, an “assertive young 
activist” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 157) who had been studying the open systems theory of von 
Bertalanffy (1969). In the 1940s, the Austrian biologist von Bertalanffy (1969) proposed a 
“theory of the organism as open system” (p. viii), which described living organisms as open 
systems that continuously interact with their environment. Emery was one of the first social 
scientists to fully appreciate the significance of the open systems ideas for psychology and the 
social sciences (Weisbord, 1987). He collaborated with Trist, one of the founders of the institute 
and a colleague of Bion’s. Trist had been studying the impact of new technology in the coal 
mining industry. The two developed their ideas into a theory of sociotechnical systems (STS) 
which recognized the importance of understanding how both technology and people relate to 
“the larger whole they serve” (p. 159). STS showed “how changes in technology can disrupt 
system functioning, even when what is being introduced is a more efficient technology” (Bunker 
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& Alban, 2006, p. 5). A change in one part of the system can lead to unintended consequences in 
another. This insight meant that in order to institute sustainable change, the whole system must 
be taken into account (Bunker & Alban, 2006), and provides the theoretical rationale for bringing 
the whole system into the room. 
Future perfect thinking. 
Lewin’s colleague Lippitt is one of the researchers credited for bringing in the final 
dimension, futuring. Lippitt played back tape recordings of 30 planning groups in action. He was 
struck by “how voices grew more depressed” as they went down their list of problems, especially 
those that were beyond their control. Lippitt noted that the motivation “was to escape the pain 
induced in part by the method itself: the piecemeal listing of problems, the solution of any one of 
which might create still more problems” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 283). Lippitt shifted gears. He 
teamed up with Lindaman, a planning director for the Apollo mission to the moon. Weisbord 
wrote: 
Lindaman believed that the future was created by our present ways of confronting 
“events, trends and developments” in the environment. The “preferred future”—an image 
of aspiration—could be a powerful guidance mechanism for making far-reaching course 
corrections. (Weisbord, 1987, p. 283) 
 
The two found that when they asked people to work back from the future they desired to plan the 
present, “they develop energy, enthusiasm, optimism, and high commitment” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 
283).  
People also give more detailed and understandable accounts of hypothetical situations 
that are temporally in the past than in the future (Bavelas, 1973 as referenced by Weick, 1979). 
In an experiment, accounts of an imagined trip that “will occur” were less detailed, shorter and 
less sensible than if the trip was presented as if it had already occurred. Weick cites Schutz 
(1967) who explained: “because it is pictured as completed, the planned act bears the temporal 
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character of pastness…as if it were simultaneously past and future” (Weick, 1979, p. 198). 
Weick has described this as thinking in the future perfect tense. 
The future event is more sensible because you can visualize at least one prior set of 
means that will produce it. The meaning of that end is those means that bring it about. 
Furthermore, when one imagines the steps in a history that will realize an outcome, then 
there is more likelihood that one or more of those steps will have been performed before 
and will evoke past experiences that are similar to the experience that is imagined in the 
future perfect tense. (Weick, 1979, p. 198) 
 
In contrast, the simple future tense has a greater cognitive load because without a cognitive 
anchor, any number of outcomes is possible. Weick linked these ideas to organizational sense-
making. 
When an event yet to happen is treated as if it’s over, this aids sense-making because that 
imagined completion can be related more easily to similar cause maps that have already 
been enacted. When something is thought about as ongoing and changing, it’s harder to 
match it with something known in the past than if the event is thought of as completed 
and fixed. (Weick, 1979, p. 201) 
 
Breakthrough in practice. 
As Powley and his colleagues pointed out, large groups are perceived to be unruly. In the 
late 19th century, the French physician and writer, Le Bon (1930) wrote a bestselling book titled 
The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind.  
The fact that [individuals] have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of 
a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite 
different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in 
a state of isolation. (pp. 29-30) 
 
Le Bon described the characteristics of crowd psychology such as impulsiveness, irritability, an 
exaggeration of sentiments, among others (p. 39). These are certainly not the characteristics one 
would hope for in a strategizing meeting that will determine the future direction of an 
organization. According to Bunker and Alban (1997), issues of large group dynamics fall under 
four categories: dilemma of voice, dilemma of structure, a systems problem, and the contagion of 
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affect. The dilemma of voice arises from the limited amount of airtime available for all 
participants to speak, resulting in some speaking a lot and others staying silent. This can lead to 
the tyranny of the few, causing those who are silent to feel marginalized and even less inclined to 
contribute. Latane and Darley’s (1968) “diffusion of responsibility” suggests that as the number 
of people in the group increases, the sense of personal responsibility for the outcome decreases. 
The second issue is the dilemma of structure. Having too much or too little structure can cause 
anxiety in people. There is fear of losing control and the potential for chaos and total 
disorganization. “The right amount of structure is reassuring and allows people to function in a 
healthy way” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 204). The problem is we neither know how much 
anxiety exists nor how much structure is needed. 
The third issue is a systems problem. Analogous to the blind man’s elephant, employees 
have a limited range of vision of their organization. This is the egocentric dilemma. At the 
beginning of a large group event, “hundreds of people with differing pictures of organizational 
reality all act as if theirs is the only true reality” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 207). Some of these 
issues are exacerbated due to the contagious nature of affect in larger groups, the fourth issue. 
Bunker and Alban (1997) have suggested that “people begin to experience feelings because they 
feel them vicariously in others, not because they are all having the same experience” (p. 208). 
The affective center of a group is easily manipulated. In extreme cases, strangers can quickly act 
in concert and turn cruel and violent, even in a simulated role play, as the Stanford prison 
experiments by Zimbardo (1973) demonstrated. 
Breakthroughs in large group methods came with the realization that many small groups 
can be the equivalent of one large system (Bunker & Alban, 2006). Large group conferences 
became effective by adopting “small group technologies and processes that allow people to 
44 
 
participate fully and feel engaged” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 204). Large groups can be divided 
into many small groups of 12 or less, and assigned specific tasks. Groups interacting within the 
larger framework of the whole system in the room reduced the probability of contagion. 
Clear task and group structures lower the potential for chaos while encouraging active 
and individually determined behavior. Functional group roles such as recorder and reporter can 
be rotated, promoting individuation and leadership (Bunker & Alban, 1997). As the methods 
matured, professional facilitators were no longer needed at every discussion table, paving the 
way for organizations with smaller budgets to adopt the methods (Bunker & Alban, 2006). By 
bringing the whole system in the room, participants gain a holistic view of the organization and a 
better sense of what it is like to be in the shoes of someone in a different functional position.  
Large group methods in practice. 
Strategy development consists of making sense of the future. In the 1980s, Emery. 
Weisbord, and others sought to integrate and apply these theories to strategic planning through 
large group conferences designed to search for the future. Weisbord’s seminal book, Productive 
Workplaces (1987) examined the contributions of Taylor, McGregor and the theories outlined 
above “in a new light” (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p. 22) that made clear the implications for large 
group methods. Weisbord also referenced some theories of practice culled from his own 
conference model called Future Search. Weisbord took the “back to the future” concept and 
combined it with conference management processes consistent with democratic values. The 
conference is based on three assumptions: 
1. Change is so rapid that we need more not less, face to face discussion to make 
intelligent strategic decisions. Teleconferencing won’t do.… 
2. Successful strategies—for quality goods and services, lower costs, more satisfying 
ways of working—come from envisioning preferred futures. Problem solving old 
dilemmas doesn’t work under fast-changing conditions.… 
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3. People will commit to plans they have helped to develop. (Emphasis in the original, 
Weisbord, 1987, p. 285) 
There are four steps in the Future Search conference. Participants build a database, look 
at it together, interpret what they find and draw conclusions for action (Weisbord, 1987, p. 289). 
It is worth noting here that these processes closely resemble qualitative research methods (Yin, 
2011): data collection and compilation, coding, analysis and discussion. Participants are tasked 
with looking at the past and present from various perspectives (self, company, society, outside 
and inside), then generating images of the future (Weisbord, 1987, pp. 288-290). Participation is 
limited to people who have a stake in the organization’s future. Groups of 50 to 60 people are 
chosen for diversity with consideration to their linkages to the outside. Planning for the 
conference involves external consultants and a voluntary committee of four to six potential 
participants. The committee sets the agenda and decides the selection method for participants. 
Some methods emerged independent of developments in OD. One of the better known 
methods is GE’s Work-Out (D. Ulrich, 2002). According to Bunker and Alban (1997), Work-
Out was the brainchild of GE’s former CEO, Jack Welch and Jim Bowman, the head of the 
Crotonville learning center at the time. The method emerged in the late 1980s. Welch was 
dismayed at supervisors and employees who were telling him at training sessions that they liked 
Welch’s ideas but didn’t have the power to make things happen (Bunker & Alban, 1997, p.170). 
The Work-Outs were designed to overcome the stiff joints of bureaucracy. They were led by 
teams of internal and external consultants, conducted off-site, and typically involved 100 to 200 
employees crossing functions and positions. Part of the success, Bunker and Alban (1997) have 
suggested, appeared to be Welch’s presence at these meetings:  
Rumor has it that if the workers’ recommendations were reasonable and the upper-level 
manager procrastinated or balked, Welch would bang his fist on the table and say, 
“Sounds good to me. Let's do it!” Whether this story is true or not, what is true is that 
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Welch's presence brought strong support for the process and sent a clear message to the 
decision makers. (p. 171) 
 
The Work-Out eventually became an internalized process within GE. A book (D. Ulrich, 2002) 
is currently available that details the process. 
Another method emerged in the 1980s out of a training engagement for Ford (Bunker & 
Alban, 2006). Ford had asked Dannemiller, a student and colleague of Lippitt, to “train Ford 
middle managers to be more proactive” (p. 7). She refused. Dannemiller thought the training was 
destined to fail because “the Ford system did not encourage that kind of behavior” (p.7). 
Dannemiller said she would take on the engagement if Ford would let her take 500 managers 
from all three levels of management to an off-site meeting for a week. By assembling such a 
large number of people at one time, Dannemiller’s method demonstrated that an entire 
organization or division “could work on the same issue together and make decisions that would 
stick and could be immediately implemented” (p. 7). The method was initially called Real Time 
Strategic Change, is currently known as Whole-Scale Change (Dannemiller Tyson Associates, 
n.d.). World Café created by Brown (2005) and Open Space Technology by Owen (1997) are 
also well known large group methods. The 21st Century Town Meeting was developed by 
AmericaSpeaks as a method developed specifically for town hall meetings on public policy 
issues. 
Origins of AI summits 
The AI summit is modeled after Weisbord and Janoff’s (2010) Future Search conference 
format. But it “breaks new ground by stressing the relational nature of innovation and by 
highlighting the power of the positive to unleash extraordinary organizational performance” 
(Ludema et al., 2003, p. 20). AI summits differ from Future Search in three ways. First, summits 
tend to be larger in scale. A typical Future Search involves 60 to 100 people, whereas an AI 
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summit usually engages hundreds, sometimes thousands of people (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, & 
Griffin, 2003; Weisbord & Janoff, 2010). Second, activities are structured differently. Future 
Search goes through five “sessions”—focus on the past, focus on the present, focus on the future, 
discover common ground and action planning. Activities include mind-mapping around time-
lines and trends, future scenario development, and planning around common ground statements. 
AI summits begin with a one-on-one peak experience interview, then move through the 4Ds 
through activities such as group discussion, skits, possibility statement design, brainstorming, 
rapid prototyping, and business plan development. Both methods take advantage of small group 
activities, large group report-outs and voting schemes to select themes to focus on (Ludema et al., 
2003; Weisbord & Janoff, 2010). The most important distinction is that AI summits selectively 
focus on positive experiences while Future Search “accepts all experiences as relevant” 
(Weisbord & Janoff, 2010, p. 12). 
The origins of AI summits date back to the mid-1980s when Cooperrider and two fellow 
graduate students at Case Western Reserve University experimented with large group methods in 
strategic planning. They brought together 350 partners of Touche-Ross Canada to take part in a 
“fully participatory, open, dialogical” roundtable to develop strategic plans. Through this 
experience they learned the power of full participation in crossing the “generational divide” (p. 
14) among organizational members. Storytelling and creating images of the future were two 
other aspects of the roundtable that left an impression (Ludema et al., 2003). This was followed 
by a leadership development program funded by the US Agency for International Development, 
which brought together 30 to 100 executives at a time to engage in the AI process. In 1994, a 
group of AI practitioners tested an idea to bring entire organizations to the table. Working with 
the international development organization, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee 
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(CRWRC), they designed AI meetings that blended Future Search with AI. They were called 
“Appreciative Future Search Conferences” (p. 16). 
According to Ludema et al., the word “summit” replaced the name of the conference 
format when Cooperrider and Whitney were involved in the United Religions Initiative (URI) 
from 1995 to 2000. URI was an initiative to promote interfaith cooperation. The summit format 
was used for regional and global summits of between 100 to 250 people in order to develop a 
charter. This culminated in a global summit in June 2000, for the signing of the charter. Ludema 
and his colleagues wrote that they learned through this process, three lessons. First, that 
appreciation can dislodge certainty. Second, a good AI interview guide can allow “people to 
anticipate the entire summit within the first hour or so of the four-day meeting” (p. 18). They 
called this a “holographic beginning” (p.18). Third, “leadership levels the playing field” (p. 19). 
By this they mean that leaders join in as peers, as fellow inquirers.  
Key success factors of AI summits 
Ludema et al. (2003) have written that there are six factors that contribute to the AI 
summit  approach’s effectiveness. Summits were quicker at enabling change, better at building 
organizational confidence, provided broad and immediate access to information, promoted a 
“total organization mindset,” inspired action, and gave a means to sustain positive change (p. 
xiii). These are generally consistent with the findings of Powley et al. (2011), who analyzed AI 
summits held at the US Navy. They are benefits derived from the structure of an AI summit 
which puts the whole system into one room for multiple, consecutive days, concentrated on a 
common purpose and tasks. Powley et al. were focused on how the AI summits structure 
conversations, a dialogical perspective.  
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The authors proposed three design principles for successful democratic organizing: 
normative consciousness, holistic collegiality and communal conviction. Normative 
consciousness “is a practical awareness of oneself in relation to others” (p. 74). The physical 
presence of so many organizational members in one place at one time heightens an awareness of 
relatedness. Holistic collegiality refers to a cooperative environment where people are aware of 
the connectedness of their micro-level interactions to the macro-level issues of the organization, 
“giving each person an opportunity to experience a sense of efficacy in relation to others and the 
organization” (p. 76). Communal conviction is “a sense of commitment to the organization and 
its future well-being” (p. 76). Individuals willingly engage in conversations about substantive 
issues, thereby enhancing intrinsic motivation and a willingness to commit.  
In the minds of the authors, the key differentiating factor of an AI summit as a forum for 
strategizing is the democratic nature of its activities. Powley et al. noted a general trend in 
organizations of a more participative form of management. Employee stock options, open-book 
management, and an emphasis on teamwork are some of the examples they gave as evidence of 
this trend. “There is no question that we are in the participative era of management and 
leadership. Yet at the strategic level, we seem equally rooted in the hierarchical mode of 
decision-making and action taking” (p. 67). The AI summit is a democratic and participatory 
method which makes it “possible and worthwhile to bring everyone into the inner circle of 
strategy” (p. 69). Although some dialogic practices for involving multiple stakeholder groups 
exist,  “these interventions, when attempted, generally encourage and support the voices of all 
participations up to the point of recommending action” (Emphasis in original, p. 69). Ultimately, 
“a senior sponsor or other organizational leader decides which proposals to legitimize and which 
to set aside” (p. 69). Indeed, the authors warned that AI summits can at times backfire. They 
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wrote, “a short-lived Summit experience may in fact discourage organization members from 
truly participating in post-Summit work groups” (p. 79).  
Powley et al. cited research in small groups that linked dialogic participation to team 
outcomes (eg. Losada & Heaphy, 2004). This research generally demonstrated that the issue of 
voice mattered in groups such that employees felt more ownership towards outcomes they had a 
hand in designing and monitoring. This is consistent with Lewin’s wartime experience in trying 
to change food habits (Weisbord, 1987). Procedural justice also mattered. Kim and Mauborgne 
(1998) have argued that “when people feel their strategic decision-making processes are fair, 
they display a high level of voluntary cooperation” (p. 323). Powley et al. were blunt: “Leaders 
should not hold a Summit if they fundamentally do not wish to expand the involvement, 
participation, and discretion of employees” (2011, p. 78).  
Democratic organizing can be a challenge for organizations like the military that depend 
on a command-control structure. Powley et al. proposed the AI summit format as a method for 
achieving this goal without compromising the necessary structure. A longitudinal study 
observing the process and outcomes of two AI summits at the navy showed that the summits 
were useful for creating and strengthening informal ties that cut across organizational silos.  
In the comparative study by Bushe (2010) of eight sites in a Canadian school district, all 
conducted an AI summit. Two affirmative questions were chosen for the intervention: “What do 
educators do that create exceptional learning experiences?” and “What choices and options 
offered in educational settings most enhance learning?” (p. 10). The purpose of Bushe’s study 
was to determine what contributed to differences in the levels of change in the following year. 
Four sites had transformational outcomes (as defined by clear and compelling changes in 
normative routines), two had incremental outcomes and two experienced no change. The factors 
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identified in the study were “how generative the inquiries were, how well the Discovery phase 
was managed and the quality of Design statements that came out of the summits” (p. 7). Each 
summit lasted two days with participants ranging from 50 to 100. The Discovery phase was 
conducted prior to the summit. Technically, the summits only went through the Dream and 
Design phases during the summit, as the bulk of the processes for Destiny happened after the 
summit ended. Therefore, of the three factors that contributed to the difference in change 
outcomes, at least one was not part of the summit activities. The Destiny phase commenced at 
the summit but the communication of the results differed by different sites. Bushe noted that 
“many of the design statements and commitments to action faded with time” (p. 22). Whether the 
Design statement would have mattered as much had the summit had more time to devote to the 
Destiny phase remains an open question.  
Bushe’s study also raised another important point. “It is probably significant that the two 
sites with the highest levels of morale and pride prior to the AI were the two that experienced 
only incremental changes” (p. 19). Bushe discussed this in the context that sites needed to have 
some level of shared pain for there to be transformational change. The incremental sites did not 
transform “because stakeholders were pretty happy with their leaders and with their school” (p. 
22). Bushe raised these points to highlight “that it is inaccurate to say that AI is not concerned 
with solving problems” (p. 22). The term transformation implies a dramatic change, in this case, 
normative changes in organizational routines. As the cliché goes: “Don’t fix what isn’t broken.” 
More insights into the AI process might be gained if sites that were already thriving prior to the 
intervention were evaluated by measures other than the transformation of existing norms.  
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Towards AI as a strategizing practice 
The 2011 article by Powley et al. is the only one on AI that has been published in the 
journals of the Academy of Management (AOM). It appeared in the Academy of Management 
Executive, a peer-reviewed journal more oriented towards practitioners. It is interesting to note 
that while the content of article is mostly about the benefits of admitting a wider set of 
stakeholders into the inner circle of strategy, the title acknowledges AI’s OD roots: “Dialogic 
democracy meets command and control: Transformation through the appreciative inquiry 
summit” (p. 67). During the proceedings of a symposium on the future of OD at the annual AOM 
conference in 2012, Burke reiterated the views he expressed in his article in 2010 that OD has 
become too preoccupied with the concept of change. This is the article in which he set off to say 
that “perhaps arguably” there had been no innovation in OD since AI. He wrote that “the failure 
rate for organization change efforts is around 70%,” with rates even higher for mergers and 
acquisitions (p. 144). 
Burke was one of the invited panelists of a symposium including OD heavyweights like 
Schein, a pioneer in the study of organizational culture. Burke pointed out that OD has become 
very knowledgeable and adept at loosening the tightly coupled structures of bureaucratic 
organizations. Conversely, the field knew very little about how to deal with “loosely coupled” 
structures. Burke suggested that OD needs to go beyond the idea of “managing change” if it is to 
be relevant in a world in which new forms of organizing such as virtual organizations and teams 
are emerging. 
The US Navy is a prime example of a tightly coupled organization. Powley et al. 
demonstrated the utility of AI summits for enabling democratic organizing in a command-control 
organizational structure. One of the key characteristics identified by the authors was the AI 
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summit’s ability to temporarily suspend its organizational routines and realities. This aspect of 
AI summits should hold regardless of how tight or loose the underlying structures may be. As 
part of the strategizing activities and practice (SAP) literature, Hendry and Seidl (2003) have 
developed a concept called “strategic episodes” that encapsulates the mechanism necessary for 
organizational processes of strategic change. The switching of contexts from the operational to 
the strategic, the temporal features of the episode, the choice of participants, and the 
reconnection back to the organization’s ordinary routines are some of the key elements of a 
strategic episode. The authors posited that “strategy presents two distinct faces” when seen from 
a sociological perspective. 
On the one hand, strategies serve to structure, organize and give meaning to the complex 
operations of business organizations…. On the other hand, the discourses of strategy and 
the role-definitions of strategists are very largely concerned with change. Strategy, for 
practitioners as well as academics, is explicitly concerned with the future, and with how 
this might differ from the present: with what “should be” rather than what is. (pp. 176-
177)  
 
This description of strategy is a very good fit for the practice of AI. AI aims to give new 
meaning to organizations by using a positive lens, and develops an image of a preferred future. 
Because so many of the organizational members are personally involved in the development of 
the strategy, more people are likely to buy in and commit to action. Jarzabkowski and Seidl 
(2008) applied the concept to an analysis of strategy meetings at a university. Their findings 
suggested that a strategy meeting can stabilize the strategic direction of an organization, 
especially if the organization is “loosely coupled” like a university. In other words, strategic 
“change” may, in some organizational contexts, denote a change from flux to stability.  
In the context of strategic management, scholars in the SAP research stream take a more 
constructivist approach to strategy making (Grand, Rüegg-Stürm, & von Arx, 2010). Strategy is 
defined “as a situated, socially accomplished activity” (p. 70). Practice is considered a both “the 
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situated doings of the individual human beings (micro) and to the different socially defined 
practices (macro) that the individuals are drawing upon in these doings” (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, 
& Seidl, 2007, p. 7). The actions and interactions of people as they accomplish that activity is the 
primary focus of inquiry. The research stream is relatively new, consisting mostly of European 
scholars. At AOM, SAP remains an “interest group” that complements the work of other 
divisions like organizational behavior and organization management theory.  
There are some notable gaps in the SAP literature that a study of AI summits will likely 
fill. Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) identified that there has only been one study that looked at 
the impact of external practitioners on strategy making. External practitioners such as consultants, 
regulators and special interest groups certainly impact strategy, but “these interactions have been 
widely neglected in empirical strategy research so far” (p. 79). In addition, conferences have also 
been understudied. The most detailed and comprehensive study of the impact of conferences has 
been by Garud (2008), who examined how academic conferences affected innovation in the 
hearing device industry. These academic conferences were attended by scientists from device 
manufacturers with vested interests in trying to persuade the scientific community to adopt 
particular scientific models over others. Jarzabkowski and Seidl (2008) looked at the role of 
strategy meetings at a university with regard to their effect on strategic orientations. Gustavsen 
and Engelstad (1986) reviewed how work-life reform can be affected by democratic dialogue in 
conferences. To date, no large group methods of collective strategizing have been studied from a 
social practices perspective. 
In this study, I extend the concept of strategic episodes to AI summits. An AI summit can 
be described as a strategic episode that extends over several days with the participation and 
engagements of large numbers of stakeholders from both within and without the organization. 
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One of the purposes of AI is to generate organizational knowledge that can stimulate innovation. 
In the corporate world, AI has primarily been used in hierarchical organizations with tightly 
coupled structures. This study, in contrast, was inspired by my participation in a summit 
conducted by a relatively young, fast growing, entrepreneurial automotive company. What I 
experienced felt different from the descriptions of AI summits as a change intervention. I situate 
AI summits as a strategizing practice and ask: How and why does an AI summit, as a whole, 
generate and possibly accelerate organizational knowledge creation? 
To answer this question, I propose an analysis of AI summits using Luhmann’s social 
systems theory, upon which the notion of strategic episodes is based. Following an overview of 
the methodology used for this study (Chapter 4), I devote two chapters to explain the two 
theoretical lens I will be using. These chapters introduce readers to the radical systems theory 
that underlies the analysis. In Chapter 5, I explain the concept of autopoiesis (self-reproduction), 
a theory that has had an enormous impact on systems theory in general, and on Luhmann’s social 
systems theory in particular. Autopoiesis was developed by the Chilean biologists Maturana and 
Varela in the 1970s as a biological theory for explaining cognition and living systems. It 
radicalizes and extends general systems theory by positing that living systems are operationally 
closed but interactionally open. The core ideas are complex and counterintuitive for those of us 
who take open systems theory for granted, but it is crucial to understanding Luhmann’s social 
systems theory. I will also briefly review how Luhmann’s theories are being applied to the study 
of organizations.  
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
Overview 
 The purpose of this study is to develop an alternative conceptual framework for 
understanding how and why appreciative inquiry summits function as a system for organizational 
knowledge creation. The goal is to build theory rather than to test the validity of an existing 
theory. I use a case-study research design to facilitate theory-building and to identify illustrative 
examples of the propositions that have been developed.  
In the discipline of management, case studies have become a widely accepted research 
method for building theory, especially for studies of organizational processes. A case study is a 
type of qualitative research design. Qualitative methods generally seek to describe and explain 
rather than provide empirical evidence supporting specific theory-based hypotheses and claims. 
Qualitative methods are appropriate for studying phenomena that are not easily quantifiable (Yin, 
2011). Processes by their very nature are difficult to quantify. In an article on strategies for 
conducting process research, Langley (1999) cautioned: “Process data is messy” (p. 691). 
Process data often deals with the intangible assets of an organization, the so-called soft side of 
the business like people’s thoughts, interpretations, and relationships.  
Process models are driven by stories of what happened (Langley, 1999). They typically 
consist of “events, activities and choices ordered over time” (p. 692). Such characteristics render 
process data from organizational settings “difficult to analyze and manipulate” (p. 692). 
Consequently, process research does not try to explain organizational behavior through models 
of variance, in which a difference in an independent variable X (e.g. strong leadership) might 
account for the variance in the dependent variable Y (e.g. profits). Rather, a process model seeks 
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an explanation based on how and why events, activities and choices lead to an outcome. The 
conceptualization of events and pattern detection are important in analyzing data. 
Case studies are a good fit for research in which how and why questions are being asked 
of a contemporary event over which the researcher has little control (Yin, 1984, p. 20). In other 
words, they are useful for studying processes in the context within which they unfold. This 
applies to the current study which seeks to understand the organizational knowledge creation 
processes in the case of one specific AI summit; the researcher essentially has no control over the 
summit itself. Case studies are often used for exploratory research such as this one, when there is 
little or no existing theory. The preceding chapters demonstrated how conventional theories do 
not adequately address how AI creates organizational knowledge. Strategy workshops and 
conferences have been underexplored by scholars both theoretically and empirically, and the few 
existing studies also relied on a case study design.    
In this study, I probed the activities of a single AI summit. Although a comparison of 
multiple cases can lead to more robust, generalizable findings, the exploratory nature of this 
study justifies the use of a single-case design. The research question asks the question of how 
and why an AI summit generates organizational knowledge from a systems perspective. A 
systems perspective requires one to look at the phenomenon of interest as a whole that is 
different from its parts. “The performance of a system is not the sum of the independent effect of 
its parts; it is the product of their interactions” (Gharajedaghi & Ackoff, 1985, cited in Patton, 
2002, p. 121). The foundational question revolves around the “how” and the “why” a system as a 
whole functions the way it does (Patton, 2002). This assumption is consistent with Luhmann’s 
social systems theory, which is grounded in a systems perspective.  
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The study takes an inductive and iterative approach to theorizing. At the early stages of 
this research during the pilot phase, I was planning to study the impact of the psychological state 
called “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) on the outcomes of an AI summit. Flow is a state in 
which one is fully absorbed in the task at hand. It has been linked to optimal performance in 
individuals. However, when I actually participated in a summit conference as part of the pilot 
study, I was struck by the extent to which knowledge was made explicit, shared and combined 
into new knowledge, which then formed the basis for further action.  
The presence of external stakeholders was also extremely important. My participant-
observations from the summit shifted my focus to organizational knowledge creation. I began 
theorizing by drawing upon the organizational knowledge creation theory proposed by Nonaka 
and his colleagues (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 2000). These findings were 
presented to the sales leadership team who sponsored the summit. Nonaka’s theory seemed to be 
in congruence with the overall dynamics that appeared to be driving the summit in terms of tacit 
to explicit knowledge conversion. However, on closer scrutiny, the theory was insufficient in 
explaining the specific social practices and activities at a summit. I then looked at the literature 
on organizational knowledge creation that was more grounded in Maturana and Varela’s theories 
of cognition. In the next iteration, I shifted to Luhmann’s social systems theory to develop a 
conceptual model and propositions. 
After familiarizing myself with Luhmann’s social systems, I went back to the data I had 
collected, analyzing the data for illustrative examples of the conceptual model I had developed. 
The study is inductive and iterative in its theorizing. It is important to note that it does not take a 
grounded theory approach to theorizing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory consists of a 
specific, research method, which involves systematic procedures of coding and categorizing 
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(Patton, 2002, p. 127). In its purest form, grounded theorists begin with no presupposed theory. 
The empirical data grounds the theory. In contrast, this study tries to build theory not only by 
extrapolating from the empirical data, but also guided by pre-existing theories from neighboring 
domains.   
Sampling 
 The sampling strategy for this study was opportunistic. I had taken a course on 
appreciative inquiry by Cooperrider in the spring of 2010 at the Drucker School of Management 
as part of my requirements for an MBA degree. I approached Cooperrider about my research 
interests in the AI summit methodology, and in January, 2011, he offered to introduce me to a 
mid-west company that regularly conducted these summits for visioning and strategic planning     
purposes. Cooperrider was a consultant to this company, and was planning to be facilitate an AI-
based sales summit in February for this company. The company, TireCo—a pseudonym—
distributed tires to car dealers in the US and Canada. The AI approach to organizational 
development was an integral part of their growth strategy, and it had been conducting AI 
summits on a regular basis for approximately five years. 
 The Chief Sales and Marketing Officer (CSMO) of TireCo was the sponsor of the 
February Sales Summit. She had been working with Cooperrider for more than 10 years, and is 
considered one of the experienced practitioners of AI. In her previous job at a major trucking 
company, she had organized and executed dozens of summits. She immediately approved my 
request to participate in the 4-day summit in the mid-west as an external stakeholder. I was 
required to be a full-participant in the conference and not an observer. I paid for travel and 
accommodation, but all conference expenses for materials and meals were paid for by TireCo. In 
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return, I committed to writing a post-summit report (about 5,000 words) about the conference, 
which was submitted to TireCo’s sales organization in April, 2011. 
 I observed and participated in the February AI summit as an external stakeholder in the 
capacity of a graduate student conducting a pilot study for her dissertation research. One of the 
goals of the pilot study was to determine how flow might be measured, especially in the group 
setting of an AI summit. Prior to my participation, I had not realized how often the group 
configurations changed during a summit. In addition, the aspect of knowledge creation appeared 
far more significant than the literature had suggested. Subsequently, the research question was 
changed to reflect these observations. The revised research question focused on how and why the 
activities of an AI summit create organizational knowledge. Institutional Review Board 
approvals were sought and provided based on the revised research question.  
Key characteristics of the Sales Summit 
 A closer analysis of the TireCo summit revealed five major characteristics that benefit the 
study. First, the summit falls within the parameters of a “regular” summit. AI summits come in a 
variety of shapes and sizes. They can be as short as one or two days by selectively focusing on a 
particular part of the 4D cycle. They can involve a dozen people on site at the organization, or 
tens of thousands of people by utilizing virtual conferencing technologies. TireCo’s summit was 
organized very much in line with the practices outlined in Ludema et al.’s (2003) handbook for 
practitioners on running AI summits. The summit involved about 400 stakeholders of which 
about one in ten were from outside the organization. A steering committee conducted the 
planning for the summit, including the choice of a topic statement and the selection of 
participants. The summit went through the entire 4D cycle over four days. The activities for each 
phase were also standard, starting from high point moment paired interviews in the Discovery, 
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and ending with the presentation of business or action plans in the Deployment. A 43-page 
workbook was printed and distributed to the participants. The summit relied on self-managed 
group activities in which the participants themselves, appointed facilitator roles such as time-
keeper, recorder and presenter. The overall summit was facilitated by one external consultant.  
 Second, the summit method is a routine business practice for strategy development at 
TireCo, not a novel, one-time intervention for transformational change. Appreciative inquiry is a 
standard business practice that is embedded into their business planning cycle. TireCo is an 
entrepreneurial company founded in 1999. Despite the challenging market environment of the 
US auto industry, the company has experienced sales growth of nearly 40% a year on the heels 
of an innovative new business model. About five years prior to the Sales Summit, TireCo put 
together a new management team and recruited executives who had been working at a Fortune 
500 trucking company based in the mid-west. The trucking company was one of the early 
adopters of the AI method. The management team incorporated the AI method for strategizing 
purposes. TireCo had implemented AI summits in previous years to create a set of guiding 
principles and values for the company, and to generate a strategic roadmap for the future. 
Although TireCo executives talk about the need for constant, transformational change, the 
explicit purpose of this particular Sales Summit is strategic planning. The summit was held in the 
larger context of positive business results. It is therefore is different in nature from some of the 
early, documented cases of AI summits which often involved larger, more established companies 
that were using AI as a means for breaking out of stagnation or conflict through transformational 
change.  
Third, the summit method had buy-in from multiple levels of the organization because it 
is an ongoing practice with demonstrated results. The company’s leadership, including its two 
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founders, fully supports the AI method. Buy-in for the method exists among line level 
management and employees as well, since many of those who have been at the company longest 
have experienced an AI summit and seen the results from those summits. The AI summit 
methodology is well aligned with TireCo’s organizational culture. For example, one of the 
guiding principles of the company is fairness. This is highly consistent with the democratic 
principles of organizing that are foundational to AI summits. At the same time, the summit has 
not become so rigid that it has become merely a ritual. A board meeting for developing corporate 
strategy, for example, at some corporations can lose its practical value when the business 
practice has more meaning as a ceremony or ritual. TireCo has had to hire at a rapid pace to keep 
up with accelerating sales. As a result, a significant proportion of the Sales Summit attendees 
were relatively new to the company, and for them, the AI method is novel. For those newcomers, 
the summit format itself serves to reinforce the open-book culture that TireCo leaders are 
promoting.  
Fourth, TireCo’s summit is run and facilitated by the most experienced practitioners of 
AI, and can be considered a best practice in AI summit execution. The main internal “owner” 
and sponsor of the Sales Summit process—the chief sales and marketing officer—is an expert in 
AI. She has been working with Cooperrider for many years, and has directly supervised dozens 
of summits, making her one of the most seasoned practitioners of AI summits in the world. 
Cooperrider himself, is the external consultant facilitating the Sales Summit. Cooperrider is a co-
founder of the AI approach, and continues to be considered the foremost expert in AI. Since 
TireCo has conducted several summits before, the company has procedures, positions, and tools 
in place to facilitate the smooth execution of the summit. Nearly 80% of the employees at the 
time attended the summit in the previous year and have first-hand experience of the process. 
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Significant financial resources were committed for implementing the summit as well. The 
conference was held at a luxury hotel in the downtown area near TireCo’s corporate office, using 
the main ballroom for the plenary session, and many of the adjacent meeting rooms for breakout 
sessions. Hundreds of participants were flown in from across the country. The conference was 
conducted from Tuesday to Friday, requiring accommodation from out-of-town participants for 
at least four nights. The entire proceedings for the plenary session were recorded by a 
professional video production crew. A graphic artist was hired to graphically record the key 
point of the conference in real time.  
 Finally, the summit also includes events that are not purely strategizing activities, 
allowing for better observation of the oscillation between strategic and operating routines. 
The Sales Summit also included sessions that were not part of the AI summit. For example, the 
morning of the second day was devoted to education and training sessions. Recognition dinners 
were held in the evening to honor the best performers of the sales organization. Other social 
events encouraged networking among the sales organization. Breakfasts and lunches often 
doubled as an unofficial space for conducting business meetings. Breaks between the summit 
activities were often used to conduct day-to-day operations. This meant that a given individual 
would go back and forth between strategizing, networking and operational activities, offering an 
opportunity to study how such oscillations affect knowledge creation. 
 The sampled case also has weaknesses. The summit focused specifically on the sales 
organization rather than the business as a whole. Roughly half of the company’s employees 
participated in the conference, with representation from all departments but skewed heavily 
towards sales and marketing. External stakeholders mainly consisted of TireCo’s customers such 
as dealers and auto manufacturers. Suppliers such as tire manufacturers, software vendors and 
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transportation companies were not represented, possibly because a separate summit had been 
organized the week after to address the supply chain. As a result, the Sales Summit did not 
represent the whole organizational ecosystem. In addition, since this study developed out of a 
pilot study involving a single researcher—myself, I could only observe and participate in the 
activities of one group configuration at a time. These issues will be addressed more fully in the 
next section on data collection. Despite these shortcomings, the paucity of existing empirical and 
theoretical research on the strategizing activities of an AI summit means that this study will 
likely make a contribution to the literature.  
Data collection 
Data was collected in two stages. In the pilot study phase, I collected data from three 
sources: participant-observation, informal conversations, and documents. I was a full participant 
of all of TireCo’s activities during the four days of the Sales Summit, including all of the summit 
activities and most of the corporate events (training, socials and recognition dinner). Detailed 
notes were taken of my observations, including my comments related to reflexivity. I did not 
keep a separate research journal on my reflections. Instead, I recorded observations of reflexivity 
and possible bias directly into my observation notes. I also had many informal conversations 
during the summit activities, breaks and at social events. I kept notes of the conversations that I 
thought might have implications for my research. I also exchanged emails with some of the 
participants after the conference. Prior to attending the summit, I conducted a document search 
on the Internet. I collected data from the company’s website, as well as news databases to gather 
published news articles about the company. TireCo also sent me emails after the summit 
regarding post-summit activities. Some of the data collected was used to write a 5,000 word 
post-summit report which was submitted and distributed to the key sales executives at TireCo 
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including the chief sales and marketing officer. The report was a subjective account of the 
summit proceedings written in a journalistic format. 
During the pilot study, I had been reading Polanyi’s (2009) seminal book on tacit 
knowing, The Tacit Dimension as well as Bohm’s (1996) book On Dialogue. These two books 
had a profound influence on how I approached and thought about the summit, and precipitated a 
shift in the topic of interest towards knowledge creation. A more thorough literature review on 
both appreciative inquiry and organizational knowledge creation was conducted, and the research 
question was revised to reflect the shift in focus. Permission to collect data was obtained from 
the Internal Review Board in September, 2011, on the basis of  the revised research question.  
The second stage of data collection began shortly after IRB approval. The additional data 
collected consisted of video footage from the Sales Summit, interviews, and additional 
documents from the Sales Summit. This data was collected during a visit to TireCo’s Cleveland 
headquarters for 3 days in October, 2011. TireCo provided me with approximately 15 hours of 
unedited video footage from all four days of the plenary session of the Sales Summit. The 
footage came from one of the three cameras, Camera C, which recorded the speakers on stage. 
Audio from speakers on the floor was also captured. All the video was time-coded. The High 
Definition digital video files were saved on a hard disk drive. This video was then converted into 
WMV file formats with time codes embedded in the footage, using Adobe Premiere. These 
WMV files were imported into nVivo, a qualitative analysis software package, and then 
manually transcribed.  
During the November visit to TireCo, I conducted interviews with several TireCo 
employees and executives. All interviewees signed a consent form. The purpose of the 
interviews was to begin gathering data about the impact of the Sales Summit on the interviewees 
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and the operations of TireCo. Notes were taken and in some cases, the interviews were recorded. 
I also delivered a presentation to TireCo’s sales executives on the topic of the current study, 
including an overview of Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory. Although 
participant feedback was not officially recorded, the participants were supportive of the study, 
and genuinely interested in my take of AI as a system of knowledge creation. In addition, TireCo 
provided additional documents and artifacts from the Sales Summit. Digital files of planning 
materials including floorplans, master planning document, meeting notes, agenda, workbook, 
group configurations and presentation PowerPoint slides were obtained. I was given a 
photocopied set of the handwritten table notes from the group tasks. 
Multiple sources of data will not only enhance the depth and breadth of the data, but also 
increase validity through triangulation (Yin, 2011). The video footage in particular, allows a 
robust way to validate observations made during my participant-observation. Since the video 
only recorded presentations and comments delivered at the plenary session, planning documents 
and table notes from the summit provide additional levels of detail about the composition of the 
groups, and discussions at the breakout session. However, the strategizing activities in table 
groups were not fully recorded. Observations from these sessions are limited to the notes I took 
during my participant-observation in the pilot phase. No data was collected to reconstruct what 
happened in the breakout sessions I did not participate in, except for the table notes recorded by 
the recorder, and the remarks made by the presenters in the plenary session. The breakout 
sessions are important from a group dynamics perspective. An ethnographic study of the micro-
level strategizing activities at a summit would be incomplete without a comprehensive record of 
the breakout session. The temporal ordering of events is important in process research, and the 
breakout sessions represent gaps in the data set if the entire AI summit. In this study, I focus on 
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the plenary session as the interaction system of interest, as it is only the plenary session in which 
all the participants of the summit are physically present. Although it is desirable for future 
studies to collect more data on the breakout sessions, for the scope of this current study, 
supplementing these gaps with my observations from the pilot study should suffice.    
Data analysis 
 This study is theoretical in nature and does not aim to test an existing theory. Data was 
reviewed and analyzed in multiple phases to facilitate theorizing. In the first phase, I developed a 
descriptive, 5,000 word summary of the conference, based on the notes I had taken during my 
participant-observation. This exercise familiarized me with the data. These reflections, coupled 
with a literature review on AI, large group methods and organizational knowledge creation, 
enabled me to begin conceptualizing AI summits as a forum for creating new organizational 
knowledge. In the next phase, I focused on Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory 
as an alternative framework for explaining AI summits. I reviewed my notes to find illustrative 
examples of the theory. While it was relatively easy to find examples of Externalization and 
Combination, I found it difficult to operationalize tacit knowledge. I consequently went back to 
the literature on social systems theory to develop a conceptual model of AI summits from 
Luhmann’s social systems perspective. 
Data was entered into a database created with the software package nVivo. The primary 
data source was the transcriptions from the 15 hours of video footage from the plenary session, 
supplemented with other data described in the previous section. I then looked for illustrative 
examples that demonstrate the insights gained by analyzing the structure of an AI summit seen 
through a social systems lens. As most readers will be unfamiliar with the theories of autopoiesis 
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and Luhmann’s social systems, the next two chapters will provide an overview of their core 
concepts and how they are being applied to organizational studies.  
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 Chapter 5 Theoretical Lens: Autopoiesis  
 
Empirical origins of autopoiesis 
The empirical roots of autopoiesis can be traced to experiments Maturana conducted on 
vision in the 1960s. Maturana taught biology at the medical school of the University of Chile in 
Santiago while pursuing research in the neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of vision. Varela 
had been his student. For a while, Maturana experimented on frogs and pigeons without ever 
questioning the conventional view that there existed “an objective reality independent of the 
observer”(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xv). But when he and his fellow researchers began to 
examine color vision, they quickly found this approach “leads to deep trouble” (p. xiv). They 
could not seem to map the visible world of color in the external world onto the activity of the 
nervous system. They tried a new approach. Instead of correlating physical stimuli to the nervous 
system, they attempted “to correlate the activity in the retina with the color experience of the 
subject” (p. xv). Explains Maturana: 
The new approach required us to treat seriously the activity of the nervous system as 
determined by the nervous system itself, and not by the external world; thus the external 
world would only have a triggering role in the release of the internally-determined 
activity of the nervous system. (p. xv) 
 
This approach required them to “close off” the nervous system from its environment and 
treat it as if it were the whole system. Perception would be viewed not “as a grasping of an 
external reality, but as the specification of one” (p. xv). What this means is that it is impossible 
to distinguish perception from hallucination in a closed system. The color spectrum experienced 
by the nervous system would be essentially the same for visions of reality or hallucination. This 
approach is a radical departure from the tradition in biology of assuming there is “an objective 
reality independent of the observer”(p. xiv). Perception had to be studied from the inside out, 
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“looking at the properties of the nervous system as the generator of phenomena, rather than as a 
filter on the mapping of reality” (Winograd & Flores, 1987, p. 42). The goal was to understand 
how the retina and the nervous system participate in generating the color space. This radical 
approach enabled Maturana and his colleagues to map out the entire color space of the observer. 
Previous experiments in vision by other researchers lent credibility to treating the nervous 
system as closed, autonomous, and self-referential. Maturana and Varela (1987) cited research 
by Sperry in the mid-1940s as an example. In this experiment, the eye of a tadpole is surgically 
rotated 180 degrees and left to develop into its mature adult state. The experimenters then cover 
the rotated eye so that the frog can only see with its normal one. The frog is shown a worm. Its 
tongue shoots out to capture its prey. When the frog can only see with its rotated eye, however, it 
consistently misses by a deviation of exactly 180 degrees. “The frog shoots out its tongue as if 
the retinal zone where the image of the prey is formed were in its normal position” (p. 125)  
noted Maturana and Varela. This could “be direct evidence that the operation of the nervous 
system is an expression of its connectivity or structure of connections and that behavior arises 
because of the nervous system’s internal relations of activity” (p. 126).  
Maturana felt he had made significant findings in his research on vision and perception, 
and began studying cognition as a biological phenomenon. In March of 1969, Maturana accepted 
an invitation from von Foerster—a  physicist and a prominent figure in cybernetic theory—to 
speak at a conference in Chicago on the anthropology of cognition (Maturana & Varela, 1980). 
The interdisciplinary nature of the symposium inspired him to reflect upon the broader 
implications of his research and to deliver a speech on the neurophysiology of cognition without 
talking about neuronal circuits. The following year, he published an essay based on his findings. 
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What is autopoiesis? 
What Maturana would propose represented a paradigm shift in the way we think of 
systems today. In traditional biology, living systems were viewed as purposeful, open systems 
that have inputs and outputs. Change came from the environment. Living systems respond to 
those changes based on its purpose. Open systems thinking was first proposed by the biologist 
von Bertalanffy (1969) in 1940. “The organism is not a closed, but an open system. We term a 
system ‘closed’ if no material enters or leaves it; it is called ‘open’ if there is import and export 
of material” (p. 121). The theory’s scope was expanded from physics and biology into a general 
systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1969). The idea that systems are open and that the environment 
can change a system has become so pervasive that we take it for granted. Porter’s five forces 
framework for industrial analysis is more or less exclusively about how the environment 
influences a company’s competitiveness. “Traditional approaches to organization theory have 
been dominated by the idea that change originates in the environment” (Morgan, 1997, p. 253). 
Maturana’s experiments on vision led him to the conclusion that living systems are 
closed, not open, in their organization. In the early 1970s, Maturana expanded those ideas with 
his student Varela into a theory of cognition that rigorously explained what attributes make 
living systems living. “Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally, 
they are continually self-producing” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 43). Living systems are 
systems of interactions, they argued. These interactions are not organized in the linear mode of 
inputs and outputs, where a certain input leads to a certain output. Instead, the units of 
interactions are “all organized in a closed causal circular process” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 
9). These systems of interactions maintain their circularity, independent of the environment; they 
are closed systems. The closed system’s autonomous, circular, self-referential structure, enables 
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it to reproduce itself on the basis of an ongoing production of its own components using the very 
components that itself produced. This process is called autopoiesis.  
Autopoiesis is a word invented by Maturana and Varela. Maturana stumbled upon the 
Greek word poiesis while conversing with a friend who had written an essay on Don Quixote. 
His friend was analyzing Don Quixote’s “dilemma of whether to follow the path of arms (praxis, 
action) or the path of letters (poiesis, creation, production)”(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. xvii). 
The prefix auto was added. “We could not escape being immersed in a tradition, but with an 
adequate language we could orient ourselves differently and, perhaps, from the new perspective 
generate a new tradition” (p. xvii). 
The formal definition of autopoiesis is rather intimidating. Maturana and Varela 
described autopoiesis in the context of living machines. An autopoietic machine (or system) is: 
…a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production 
(transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: 
(i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and 
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a 
network. (Maturana & Varela, 1980, pp. 78-79)  
 
Maturana and Varela described this at the cellular level in The Tree of Knowledge, a book 
intended as an advanced introduction to their theory. A cell’s molecular components are 
dynamically related to each other through a dynamic network of ongoing interactions, what 
biochemists call “cell metabolism” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, pp. 43-44). What makes cells 
distinctive from other natural collections of molecular transformations (and hence, make them 
living) is their autopoiesis.  
…this cell metabolism produces components which make up the network of 
transformations that produced them. Some of these components form a boundary, a limit 
to this network of transformations. (p. 44) 
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This boundary is the cell’s membrane; it is a product of the cell’s metabolism. The membrane 
limits the cell’s network of transformation (the cell’s metabolism) from extending beyond the 
membrane. In this sense, the membrane is not only produced by the transformation network but 
also actively participates in the network by playing a functional role, so to speak. It is this special 
spatial arrangement (i.e. the membrane separating the cell from its medium) that prevents the 
cell’s metabolism from disintegrating into “a molecular mess that would spread out all over  and 
would not constitute a discrete unity such as a cell” (p. 46). 
Open systems theory has conditioned us to hardly question the distinctions we draw 
between a system and its environment (Morgan, 1997). Maturana and Varela challenged the 
validity of system boundaries in open systems, because those boundaries are drawn by an 
external observer, not by the system itself. “The most striking feature of an autopoietic system is 
that it pulls itself up by its own bootstraps and becomes distinct from its environment through its 
own dynamics” such that the system and its environment become “inseparable” (p. 47). The 
system’s dynamics produces a system’s boundary which in turn produces the system’s dynamics 
and so forth in a circular, self-referential manner. Unlike an input-output model, there is not 
beginning or end.  
When self-referential systems couple to other self-referential systems, “a change in any 
one element can transform all the others” (Morgan, 1997, p. 254). This is reminiscent of chaos 
theory and the butterfly effect, in which a flutter of a butterfly’s wing can generate a string of 
interactions that produce a hurricane weeks later (Gleick, 1987). Morgan used the honeybee to 
demonstrate the implications of autopoietic theory in analyzing complex systems. A honeybee is 
part of a chain of circular, self-referential relations. Its physiological system is coupled to a 
society of bees which is coupled to a wider ecology. Eliminating the bees changes the whole 
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ecology because the bees are linked to the botanical system which links to other systems such as 
insects, animals, and people. I quote at length, as Morgan eloquently explains a crucial point: 
We could attempt to understand such systems by drawing an artificial boundary between 
system and environment—for example, around the individual bee, or the society of bees, 
or the bee-flora-fauna system—but in doing se we breake the circular chain of interaction. 
An understanding of the autopoietic nature of systems requires that we understand how 
each element simultaneously combines the maintenance of itself with the maintenance of 
the others. It is simply not good enough to dismiss a large part of the circular chain of 
interaction as “the environment.” The environment is part of the bee system, and the 
different levels are in effect coproduced. (Morgan, 1997, p. 254) 
The implication of autopoiesis for thinking about change is not insignificant. Changes do 
not come from the environment. They come from “variations within the overall system that 
modify the basic mode of organization” (p. 254).   
Adaptation through structural coupling 
The ultimate aim of autopoietic systems is self-reproduction. “Their own organization 
and identity is their most important product” (Morgan, 1997, p. 253). When it loses its identity as 
a unified whole, the system disintegrates. Maturana and Varela had proposed the simple but 
powerful idea that “the essential characteristic of a living system is that it is a collection of 
components constituting a unity that can live or die” (Winograd & Flores, 1987, p. 45) and 
therefore, “that exactly this simple property leads to the complex phenomena of life” (p. 45).  
Maturana and Varela’s (1980) theorizing culminated in the essay “Autopoiesis and 
Cognition” first published in 1973. “This small book is very large: it contains the living universe,” 
proclaimed Beer (1980, p. 66), a prominent cybernetician who wrote the introduction to the 
essay when it was republished in book format seven years later. He explained: 
The authors first of all say that an autopoietic system is a homeostat. We already know 
what that is: a device for holding a critcial systemic variable within physiological limits. 
They go on to the definitive point: in the case of autopoietic homeostasis, the critical 
variable is the system’s own organization. It does not matter, it seems, whether every 
measurable property of that organizational structure changes utterly in the system’s 
process of continuing adaptation. It survives (p. 66).  
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There are two ways an organization can remain static and constant. Either the 
components themselves are held constant or the relationships between components are 
maintained. Autopoietic systems fall in the latter category. Autopoietic systems can be integrated 
into larger systems as parts without losing their autopoietic nature. Physical, autopoietic systems 
can be divided and analyzed as parts, but this “does not reveal the nature of the domain of 
interactions that they define” (p. 82). 
The theory of autopoiesis invites the observer to see the system in its unity, not by its 
components. The way a system maintains its circularity (i.e. how the system organizes itself) can 
evolve over time. Maturana and Varela posited that living systems are closed, but they are by no 
means isolated. Nor do they claim that the structure of the system is fixed; a living system’s 
structure is plastic and can change so long as those changes allow it to maintain its overall 
organization and identity. Autopoiesis assumes that living systems are inherently purposeless; 
there are no innate programs or projects being realized in and through them (p. 85). Nor do 
systems have any inherent role or function per se. These notions “are established by the observer 
and belong exclusively to his domain of description” (p. 86). Therefore, “the notions of purpose 
and function have no explanatory value in the phenomenological domain in which they pretend 
to illuminate” (p. 86).  
An autopoietic system simultaneously tries to maintain itself while it maintains other 
unities that are structurally coupled to it. A particular living being exists “in a medium that 
constitutes the ambience in which it emerges and in which it interacts”(Maturana & Varela, 1987, 
p. 95). The ambience has its own structure “operationally distinct from the living being” (p. 95). 
These two structures—the living being and the environment—interact with each other in 
congruence with their respective structures. They may trigger perturbations in each other’s 
76 
 
structure but importantly, neither the living being nor the environment can specify or instruct the 
structural changes in the other resulting from the interaction. A history of recurring interactions 
results in the structurally coupled systems to adapt their structures accordingly.  
Autopoietic systems interact with other systems through its environment, just like 
systems in open systems theory. However, operationally, they are closed. Systems can 
structurally couple to one another in a circular manner, just like the dynamic feedback loops in 
open systems theory. The difference though, is that systems can only refer to itself. It is self-
referencing. Unlike open systems theory, the system produces the distinction between itself and 
the environment, not an external observer. The system produces its boundaries and distinguishes 
itself from the environment. It is this distinction that the system makes, that makes a system a 
system. Without that distinction, the system is no longer a unity and would collapse into the 
environment. The system can refer to the environment, but only on its own terms. Its references 
to the environment can never be accurate one-to-one representations. The environment might be 
described through language. Those descriptions are produced by the system and are therefore, 
self-referential. 
A nervous system is autopoietic. “For the operation of the nervous system, there is no 
inside or outside, but only maintenance of correlations that continuously change”(Maturana & 
Varela, 1987, p. 169). Furthermore, “in each interaction it is the nervous system’s structural state 
that specifies what perturbations are possible and what changes trigger them” (p. 169). The 
nervous system is recognized as a unified whole by virtue of its operational closure. Maturana 
and Varela objected to the popular metaphor of referring to the brain as “an information 
processing device” saying that not only is it ambiguous, “but patently wrong” (p. 169): 
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…the nervous system does not “pick up information” from the environment as we often 
hear. On the contrary, it brings forth a world by specifying what patterns of the 
environment are perturbations and what changes trigger them in the organism. (p.169) 
 
Autopoiesis and human cognition 
Living systems are characterized by autopoiesis. Couplings on the second-order create 
unities such as metacellular systems and organisms. Organisms can further couple on the third 
order and generate new domains from which social phenomena can emerge. Maturana and 
Varela go on to describe communication, language, and cognition based on the theory of 
autopoiesis. When we observe organisms coordinating their behavior with one other, as 
observers, we define this as communication. “Biologically, there is no ‘transmitted information’ 
in communication” (p. 196). The notion of transmitting information is false because “each 
person says what he says or hears what he hears according to his own structural determination; 
saying does not ensure listening” (p. 196). Animals can communicate. Only humans though, 
have evolved enough to produce the phenomena called language. “The so-called ‘language’ of 
bees, for instance, is not a language. It is a mixed case of instinctive and linguistic behaviors” (p. 
208). The stability of the linguistic behavior of bees “depends on the genetic stability of the 
species and not on the cultural stability of the social system in which they take place” (p. 208), 
and hence, do not constitute language. 
Language is an ongoing process, perhaps better described as “languaging.” Language can 
radically modify domains of human behavior. For example, languaging “enables those who 
operate in it to describe themselves and their circumstances through the linguistic distinction of 
linguistic distinctions” (Emphasis in the original, p. 210). Self description, therefore, is a key 
feature of language. Distinctions made using language form webs of distinctions that give rise to 
meaning, observation, reflection, and consciousness. All these are social phenomena. The 
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phenomenon of consciousness is one of the “unique features of human social life and its intense 
linguistic coupling” (p. 223). Maturana and Varela posited that phenomena such as self-
consciousness, awareness and mind take place in language, and therefore “take place only in the 
social domain” (p. 230) or in other words, “the realm of social coupling” (p. 234), and not 
something that is within our brains. They came to a radical conclusion, reminiscent of social 
constructionism.  
Language was never invented by anyone only to take in an outside world. Therefore, it 
cannot be used as a tool to reveal that world. Rather, it is by languaging that the act of 
knowing, in the behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a world. (p. 234) 
 
Maturana and Varela’s theory of cognition—knowing how we know—provided a 
biological case for social constructionism. “What biology shows us is that the uniqueness of 
being human lies exclusively in a social structural coupling that occurs through languaging” (p. 
246). Language generated “the regularities proper to the human social dynamics, for example, 
individual identity and self-consciousness” (p. 246). It also generated recursive social dynamics 
that necessitated “a reflection enabling us to see that as human beings we have only the world 
which we create with others—whether we like them or not” (p. 246). 
Artificial intelligence, autopoiesis and the birth of Google 
 Maturana and Varela’s theory of cognition has had less an impact in biology as it has in 
other disciplines. Winograd, a professor in computer science and artificial intelligence at 
Stanford University, wrote an influential book on the implications of autopoiesis for computer 
systems design in the 1980s. Winograd later mentored two students who went on to revolutionize 
the world of information systems: Page and Brin, the founders of Google. Winograd was 
introduced to autopoiesis through his co-author, Flores. Flores was a former Chilean Minister of 
Economics and Finance, who “was instrumental in a large-scale project to apply cybernetic 
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theory to practical management problems” (p. xii) in Chile. The project was implemented by 
Beers but never completed; Augusto Pinochet ousted Salvador Allende’s government in 1973 
and the project was disbanded. Their book, Understanding computers and cognition, devotes a 
large portion towards explaining philosophical and biological theories including those of 
Heidegger and Maturana. In the preface to the book, the authors justify their approach as 
follows: 
Readers with a background in science and technology may find it implausible that 
philosophical considerations have practical relevance for their work. Philosophy may be 
an amusing diversion, but it sees that the theories relevant to technological development 
are those of the hard sciences and engineering. We have found quite the opposite. 
Theories about the nature of biological existence, about language, and about the nature of 
human action have a profound influence on the shape of what we build and how we use it. 
(p. xii) 
 
 In their book, Winograd and Flores called for programmers to look at systems design in a 
new way. The authors criticized “descriptions of human thought as ‘decision making’ and 
language understanding as the manipulation of representations” (p. 178). They were deeply 
concerned “with the discourse and actions that are generated by a rationalistic interpretation of 
human action” (p. 178), especially since computers have a powerful impact “because they are 
machines acting in language” (p. 178). Referring to Maturana and his ideas that our cognitive 
systems have a plasticity which gives it the “power of structural coupling,” the authors argued: 
We cannot directly impose a new structure on any individual, but whenever we design 
changes to the space of interactions, we trigger changes in individual structure—changes 
to the horizon that is the precondition to understanding. (p. 178) 
 
 Winograd played a pivotal role in the development of the search engine that became 
Google. Page and Brin, developed the original search engine in his lab at Stanford. Page and 
Brin entered the doctoral program in computer science just as the World Wide Web was 
emerging. They began collaborating on a project to develop a search engine that could deliver 
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high quality search results while keeping up with the exponential growth in web pages. 
Winograd was Page’s dissertation adviser at the time. Although the developers of Google did not 
explicitly apply autopoiesis to its design, their PageRank system utilized the logic of the internal 
structure of the web, specifically its linking structure. This is a major break from previous search 
engines that were based on a content classification scheme that categorized web pages according 
to “high quality human maintained indices” (p. 1). Unfortunately, such systems  are “subjective, 
expensive to build and maintain, slow to improve, and cannot cover all esoteric topics” (p. 1). 
They were also not that meaningful. “Anyone who has used a search engine recently, can readily 
testify that the completeness of the index is not the only factor in the quality of search results” (p. 
3).  
The PageRank system created massive maps containing hyperlinks. The authors 
explained: 
These maps allow rapid calculation of a web page’s “PageRank”, an objective measure of 
its citation importance that corresponds well with people’s subjective idea of importance. 
Because of this correspondence, PageRank is an excellent way to prioritize the results of 
web keyword searches. (pp. 3-4) 
 
An inspiration for this design had been the citation mechanism used in academia. The 
more an article is cited, the more the author is considered important and relevant. Page noticed 
that the link structure of the web allowed Google’s search engine to incorporate a similar logic. 
This is why their search results tend to deliver superior results compared to engines using 
categories or keywords in text to retrieve pages. Categorization imposes a structure onto the 
content and is limited in scalability. In autopoietic terms, the search engines at the time were 
essentially imposing an external logic—a search index created by people—onto a system that 
was closed, self-referential and reproducing itself based on the ongoing production of hyperlinks. 
In contrast, the PageRank algorithm looks at the context of the web page in relation to the whole 
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system. The algorithms determine what interactions between pages are relevant and calculate a 
score that continually changes as more pages and interactions are added to the system. The 
resulting engine, later named Google, has become such a staple of our digital lives that 
“Googling” has become synonymous with searching for relevant information. Google’s artificial 
intelligence is transforming how humans acquire and interact with knowledge. 
Autopoiesis in organization studies 
 The theory of autopoiesis is deep and complex. At first sight, it seems to complicate 
rather than simplify the already challenging task of dealing with a world of complex systems. 
Taking autopoiesis seriously requires us to acknowledge the closed nature of systems, and by 
extension, challenges the utility and validity of observations and analyses made by a detached, 
neutral, objective observer. This has real methodological and research implications for social 
scientists. Von Krogh and his colleagues (1994) pondered the consequences of adopting 
autopoiesis as the foundation for a new “corporate epistemology.” Their essay appeared in The 
Strategic Management Journal, one of the most influential journals in organization studies. It 
began: 
Dear reader, 
Please try to forget the reality you have previously constructed and let yourself be open to 
the signals this article carries. These signals are truly distinct from those in previous 
articles and books within the strategic management field. (p. 53) 
 
In the essay, the authors proposed autopoiesis as an alternative lens to the cognitivist 
approach that had come to dominate strategic management theory. Citing Varela’s work, the 
cognitivist notion of knowledge is one in which cognition is primarily characterized by 
“information processing and rule-based manipulation of symbols” (p. 57). In this view, 
“knowledge is abstract, task-specific and oriented towards problem solving” (p. 57). At the heart 
of cognitivism is a representationist view of the world; the goal is to create ever more accurate 
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representations that correspond to a pre-given world. These representations are then stored in 
knowledge structures (p. 58). As I introduced earlier, autopoiesis rejects this representationist 
view of the world. “Knowledge is a component of the autopoietic (self-protective) process, it is 
history-dependent, context-sensitive and, rather than being oriented towards problem solutions, 
knowledge enables problem definition” (p. 58). 
Von Krogh et al. assumed that knowledge is embodied in the individual, and therefore, 
“languaging is the nexus of organizational knowledge development” (Emphasis in the original, p. 
63). They identified “knowledge connectivity”—how knowledge connects to other 
knowledges—as key to understanding organizational knowledge. They also emphasized the 
importance of the advancement activities of an organization. Conventional studies in strategy 
were oriented towards survival activities, such as market position, planning, and controlling. 
Advancement activities on the other hand, develop options for the organization. “Advancement 
emerges from knowledge development” (p. 64). Many companies do not have such practices in 
place. “There are few theories explaining the, limited knowledge on how to research them, and 
few outlets in which to publish” (p. 64). 
According to the authors, strategic management simultaneously requires both survival 
and advancement activities. They go a step further and argued that “firms can be less different in 
terms of their survival activities and more different in terms of their advancement activities” (p. 
65). Advancement activities include developing distinctions and norms, scaling knowledge, 
ensuring knowledge connectivity, and activities related to self-referencing and languaging. The 
research of such activities requires new methodology because the observer-independent 
paradigm is unacceptable in an epistemology based on autopoiesis. Von Krogh and his 
colleagues questioned the systems-distant observer paradigm, which ran “the risk of becoming 
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less and less relevant to practice” because theorizing was becoming ever more self-referential 
within the closed domains of academia. They proposed methods such as ethnographies and 
action research as appropriate for studying the languaging aspect of advancement activities. 
“Languaging in strategic management research means that researchers and practicing 
managers cospeculate, costudy, and cowrite” (p. 66) concluded the authors. Appreciative inquiry 
(AI) as a research method would fit this bill. But the AI summit method in particular, seems to 
go beyond the parameters set by von Krogh and his colleagues have laid out. There is no doubt 
an AI summit is an advancement activity. A question remains though, in one of the assumptions 
von Krogh et al. made about organizational knowledge. They assumed that individual knowledge 
scaled up to organizational knowledge. Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation model is 
certainly one way to explain the conversion from individual to organizational knowledge. But as 
I noted earlier, Nonaka’s model is difficult to apply to AI summits because of the tacit dimension 
of personal knowledge. What I observe to be a tacit to explicit knowledge conversion is based on 
my self-referential interpretation of a particular summit. Another observer may interpret the 
same events differently. Furthremore, such an analysis would not be based on the system’s 
internal logic.  
A framework based on autopoiesis would require “that one must be able to give a precise 
description of the component production processes” (p. 56). Luhmann tried to do so for social 
systems and his theorizing culminated into a general theory of social systems. Application of 
autopoietic theory in organizational studies have mostly relied on a Luhmannian lens (See 
Bakken & Hernes, 2003). In the next chapter, I will introduce the core ideas of Luhmann’s social 
systems theory.  
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Chapter 6 Theoretical Lens: Social Systems Theory 
Introduction 
In his book, Mind and Nature, Bateson (1979) chastised our choice of metaphors for 
describing and explaining mental phenomena. Words like power, tension, energy, and forces, all 
had a “strange physicalism” to them which in Bateson’s view, reflected notions that were ancient 
and obsolete (p. 217). Cognition and behavior are phenomena that arise out of the biological 
domain. We unheedingly use words borrowed from physics to describe and explain social 
phenomena. Power, tension, energy and forces are staples in the linguistic domain of sociology 
and organization studies. 
Maturana and Varela’s (1987) concept of autopoietic systems gave us a theory for 
explaining the biology of mind and cognition. But they had serious reservations towards 
applying their theory to social systems. Autopoietic systems “are characterized by a circular 
organization of production processes that continually reproduce and replace the components 
necessary” (Mingers, 1995, p. 29) to maintain the system’s unity and survival. To apply 
autopoiesis to social systems would require “a precise description of the component 
processes…and systems” (von Krogh et al., 1994 p. 56). The conventional view of social 
systems such as society and organizations is that they are made up of people. Clearly, society and 
organizations cannot reproduce people. 
An early attempt to apply autopoiesis to organizations was by Morgan (1997), who chose 
autopoiesis as one of the metaphors to describe organizations in his book, Images of 
Organization. Morgan used autopoiesis in a metaphorical sense to give an alternative view of 
organizations as entities that are in “flux and transformation” (1997). Like Heraclitus’ river, 
organizations and their processes never stand still; they are constantly changing. An autopoietic 
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view of organizations looked very different when juxtaposed against other metaphors such as the 
organization as brain or prison. 
Luhmann (1995) went much further. He spent much of his later career rigorously 
applying autopoiesis to sociology. He recognized autopoietic theory as “the current state of the 
art in general systems theory” (p. 11), and developed a theory of social systems around it. His 
innovation was to specify what a social system produced. Social systems produced 
communications. They were autopoietic systems that maintained their unity of organization 
through the ongoing production of communications. Organizations were conceptualized as a 
special type of social system, one that maintains itself through the ongoing production of 
decision communications. 
Luhmann wrote over 50 books and several hundred articles during his lifetime (Seidl & 
Becker, 2006). He died in 1998. Luhmann scholars like Seidl and Becker have written that he “is 
generally considered of equal rank and standard to the works by such prominent social theorists 
as Bourdieu, Giddens, Foucault and Habermas” (p. 10). The bulk of Luhmann’s work has not 
been translated into English, however. One of his important works on organization theory 
Organisation und Entscheidung (“Organization and decision”) published posthumously in 2000 
has yet to appear in English. He remains virtually unknown in the United States. Recently, 
scholars in Europe such as Baecker, Seidl, Becker, and Schoeneborn, have been actively 
publishing research applying Luhmann’s theories to the study of organizations. For this study 
therefore, I will rely heavily on the work of these scholars that have appeared in English 
language books (Bakken & Hernes, 2003; Seidl & Becker, 2005b), and journals including 
Organization (e.g. Baecker, 2006; Mohe & Seidl, 2011; Seidl & Becker, 2006), Academy of 
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Management Review (Kieser, 2007), and Organization Studies (Blaschke, Schoeneborn, & Seidl, 
2012; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008).  
Similar to von Bertalanffy (1969), who generalized a biological theory into open systems 
theory, Luhmann abstracted the principles of autopoiesis and modified them into a general theory 
for explaining social systems. Luhmann was already a highly prolific and noted sociologist in his 
native Germany when he began contemplating the sociological implications of autopoiesis in the 
1980s. Born in 1927, Luhmann began his academic career extending the work of  Parsons, whom 
he met while studying at Harvard University in 1960 to 1961 (Seidl & Becker, 2005a). In the 
early 1970s, he “quickly gained publicity as a relentless critic” (Knodt, 1995 p. xiv) of Habermas, 
a sociologist who represented the Frankfurt School of thought. Luhmann went on to develop his 
own “grand theory” by proposing a paradigm shift in sociology. He called for a “break with the 
structural-functionalism of Talcott Parson” (Knodt, 1995 p. xiv) and instead adopt “theoretical 
models developed in the biology of cognition and second order cybernetics” (p. xiv). This 
culminated in the publication of Soziale Systeme published in German in 1984, and translated 
into English in 1995 under the title Social Systems.  
Luhmann (1995) claimed in his introduction to Social Systems that traditional sociology 
“adheres to the model of the classical authors” (p. 1) and has not linked to the developments in 
systems theory. He described what he saw as a “paradigm change” in systems theory that could 
greatly benefit the study of society. There were two moves that brought about this shift. The first 
was “to replace the traditional difference between whole and part with that between system and 
environment” (Emphasis in the original, p. 6). This move was led by von Bertalanffy who 
developed open systems theory. A closed system in this context was defined as a system “for 
which the environment has no significance or is significant only through specified channels” (p. 
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7). Rather than looking at the difference between the whole and its parts, attention shifted to 
discerning different systems. 
The second turn, argued Luhmann, came from “a surpassingly radical further step” (p. 8) 
in the form of theories of self-referential systems. He conceded there is no generally accepted 
theoretical foundation for such theories. “Enough is apparent, however, for us to assess the 
consequences for a theory of social systems” (p. 8). He was referring to the theory of autopoiesis. 
He explained: 
The theory of self-referential systems maintains that systems can differentiate only by 
self-reference, which is to say, only insofar as systems refer to themselves (be this to 
elements of the same system, to operations of the same system, or to the unity of the 
same system) in constituting their elements and their elemental operations. (p. 9) 
 
Given the constraints of only being able to refer to themselves, for systems to differentiate 
themselves they have to do the following:  
Systems must create and employ a description of themselves; they must at least be able to 
use the difference between system and environment within themselves for orientation and 
as a principle for creating information. Therefore, self-referential closure is only possible 
in an environment, only under ecological conditions. (p. 9) 
 
Everything that is attributed to the environment can only be introduced as a distinction between 
system and environment. “The (subsequently) classical distinction between “closed” and “open” 
is replaced by the question of how self-referential closure can create openness” (p. 9). 
 The resulting theory is more complex and nuanced. “One can now distinguish the 
system/environment difference as seen from the perspective of an observer (e.g., that of a 
scientist) from the system/environment difference as it is used within the system itself” (p. 9). 
Luhmann identified some of the “remarkable shifts” in general systems theory that this provoked, 
“from interest in design and control to an interest in autonomy and environmental sensitivity, 
from planning to evolution, from structural stability to dynamic stability” (p. 10).  
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 Luhmann tried to bring autopoietic theory into the realm of action systems. Some 
scholars like Mingers (2003), however, question the validity of applying autopoiesis to social 
systems. But Luhmann has emphasized that he was abstracting the principles of autopoiesis 
relevant to a general systems theory rather than adhering to them literally. One of the most 
important consequences was what Luhmann (1995) called “the radical temporalization of the 
element” (p. 11). An element is anything that comprises a system. An element is produced as a 
result of being used by the system (Luhmann 1997, pp. 65-66 in Seidl & Becker, 2006, p. 16). 
Anything that is not used by the system for its self-reproduction is not an element. When 
appropriating the theory of autopoiesis to action systems such as organizations, the theory cannot 
hold unless it is taken as a fact that system elements have no duration. Elements of a system 
vanish as soon as the system produces them. This is not so in biological systems. Elements have 
a shelf life, no matter how short. Luhmann (1995) was saying that the constraint peculiar to a 
social system’s autonomy is: 
the fact that the system would simply cease to exist in any, even the most favorable, 
environment if it did not equip the momentary elements that compose it with the capacity 
for connection, that is, with meaning, and thus reproduce them. (p. 11) 
 
Luhmann was conceptualizing social systems as meaning systems. Meaning dissolves no sooner 
than it appears. When meaning loses its ability to connect to meaning, a social system cannot 
maintain its identity and will cease to exist.  
Luhmann’s theorizing has been called radical not only for his application of a radical 
form of systems theory, autopoiesis. His work is sometimes characterized as radical 
constructivism, a form of social constructionism that “expresses the idea that all cognitions 
(ideas) are constructs of the respective cognitive system and do not in any way reflect any kind 
of external reality” (Seidl, 2005a, p. 23). Luhmann also assumed that systems exist. Though this 
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may not sound radical, some theorists use systems exclusively as a construct or concept used for 
analysis. “The most narrow interpretation of systems theory as a mere method for analyzing 
reality is deliberately avoided” (1995, p. 120). Systems are real; they are part of our world. 
Without systems, “the social world disintegrates, as it is no longer possible to distinguish what is 
from what is not, from what is the system and what is the environment” (Bakken & Hernes, 2003 
p. 10). That does not imply that social systems are living systems. On the contrary, Luhmann 
drew a sharp distinction between meaning and life.  
In Luhmann’s hierarchy of systems (Figure 1), social systems and living systems are 
separate entities. They are distinguished according to their purpose: to give meaning or to give 
life. Since cognitive systems give meaning, they are not living systems either. Luhmann labeled 
the cognitive systems of people “psychic systems” and differentiated them from social systems 
based on “whether they use consciousness or communication as modes of meaning-based 
reproduction” (Luhmann, 2005a, p. 65). This scheme was intended for the observaton of systems, 
not as a scheme for the operations of systems. “This kind of approach is only usable only if we 
are prepared to accept its anti-Aristotelian premise that social systems, and even psychic systems, 
are not living systems” (Luhmann, 2005a, p. 65). In this study,  I will substitute the expression 
“psychic” with “psychological” where possible to avoid any unintended, mystical connotations 
the word psychic might convey. 
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 Figure 1. Typology of self-referential autopoietic systems. Adapted from Luhmann (1990, p. 2) 
The clear distinction Luhmann makes between social and psychological systems, and as a 
consequence, social and pscyhological phenomena, is “the most striking” of his conceptual 
achievements, according to Seidl and Becker (2005a, p. 9). People do not make up an 
organization. People constitute the environment for organizations and vice versa. Constructs like 
intrinsic motivation, psychological safety, and the intent of an individual, cannot be employed to 
explain the system dynamics of an organization. These are constructs that apply to a specific 
individual’s psychological system. The psychological system’s operations are completely closed 
off from an organizaton’s system, and cannot contribute any element in its operations. Perhaps 
even more counterintuitive but nevertheless important to note, is that the notion of a “person” or 
a “human being” does not exist as a systemic unity under Luhmann (Seidl, 2005a, p. 31). A 
person, in the world of Luhmann, is a “conglomerate” of psychological and organic systems. “In 
other words, ‘persons’ do not exist as such: they are not systems, but a construct of the social 
system” (pp. 31-32). 
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The advantage of this conceptualization is that we can analyze the logic of social systems 
“in its own right, thereby shedding light on the genuine dynamics that social phenomena possess, 
independent of individual psychic processes” (Seidl & Becker, 2005a, p. 9). This is especially 
useful in analyzing the dynamics of an AI summit because we can begin to unpack the impact of 
positivity. The effect of positive psychology is limited exclusively to individual participants of a 
summit, and cannot apply to the organization or interaction system. Seidl and Becker (2005a) 
have cautioned: 
That does not mean, however—and this is where the controversy started—that the human 
being is irrelevant to the social system; on the contrary, as Luhmann stressed over and 
over again, it only underlines the relevance of the two systems for each other. (p. 9) 
 
One of the reasons why Luhmann’s work has “received comparatively little serious 
attention within the international field of organizational studies” (Seidl and Becker, p. 10) is the 
complexity of the theory itself. It is based on autopoietic theory, which is a radical departure 
from the open systems theory many organizational scholars are used to. The “distinctive 
terminology” (p. 10) Luhmann used for the concepts he used is another barrier. Common words 
like “communication” and “knowledge” are defined and used in unconventional ways. This is 
somewhat unavoidable when new theory that is based on a paradigmatic shift is introduced. 
Finally, Luhmann’s social systems theory essentially “brackets out” individuals from the 
organizational picture; this has been a source of both contention and confusion. Despite such 
limitations, there has been a marked uptick in the application of Luhmann in the organizational 
literature. These studies are highly informative in viewing AI summit from a social systems 
perspective and will provide the launching ground for developing an alternative view of AI 
summits. These will be covered in Chapter 6. At this point, I will briefly go over some of the 
core concepts in Luhmann’s social systems theory that are particularly relevant to this study.  
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Social systems 
Communication as elemental unit. 
Luhmann’s innovation in applying autopoietic theory to social systems was to specify 
what they reproduce. Luhmann posited that social systems maintain their unity through an 
ongoing production of communication. In doing so, Luhmann rejected the notion that social 
systems are constituted by action. “It is not action but rather communication that is an 
unavoidably social operation and at the same time an operation that necessarily comes into play 
whenever social situations arise” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 252). This has significant implications for 
organization theory. It implies that all organizational issues are fundamentally issues of 
communication. 
Luhmann’s conceptualization of communication is sophisticated and unconventional, 
which I will subsequently explain in more detail. At the current point in our discussion, I would 
like to point out a few key points in Luhmann’s notion of communications. In his view, “only 
communication can communicate and that only within such a network of communication is what 
we understand as action created” (Emphasis in the original, p. 251). Luhmann was saying that 
only social systems have the ability to communicate. People do not and cannot communicate. 
This sounds like a wild proposition. It only makes sense in the context of Luhmann’s definition 
of what a communication is, and what it is not. According to Luhmann, communication is an 
inherently social phenomenon requiring the social coupling of at least two people. A person’s 
utterance becomes a communication only when it is perceived and understood (or 
misunderstood) by another. The concept of communication that we are used to, was developed 
by information theorists of the late 20th century who essentially stripped out the meaning 
contained in communication to advance theorizing using mathematical models. Luhmann broke 
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from tradition to include understanding as a key component that is part and parcel of 
communication. When meaning is brought back into the picture, communication can only be 
defined as a social event. 
People make their thoughts known through language. A soliloquy becomes a 
communication only when there is someone else there to perceive it. At that point, the soliloquy 
becomes a social phenomenon produced by the social system. The production and reproduction 
of communication, is therefore confined exclusively to social systems. A distinction must be 
made between communicating and what Maturana and Varela called languaging. This fine 
distinction allows us to study the dynamics of communication in and of themselves. 
All social systems maintain their unity by reproducing communication. There are three 
basic types of social systems in Luhmann’s classification of systems (Figure 1): societies, 
organizations, and interactions. Luhmann described them as:   
(1) interactions, the smallest and most elusive form of social gatherings on the 
microlevel; (2) organizations as more formalized and stable social systems on the 
mesolevel; and finally, (3) society as a whole, which encompasses all forms of social 
systems on the macrolevel and can be further differentiated into various functional 
subsystems such as the political system, economic system, legal system, and so on. 
(Luhmann, 1986, p. 173)  
 
It is extremely important to remember that Luhmann classified social systems into these levels 
for observational purposes only. They do not describe their operations. Social systems are 
autopoietic. That means that individual systems are always operatively closed from another. We 
must put aside conventional notions of interactions as elements of an organization, and 
organizations as elements of society. Each type of social system is constituted by the ongoing 
production of communications specific to that type. Societies produce societal communications, 
organizations produce decision communications, and interaction systems produce interactional 
communications among people that are present (Luhmann, 1995). 
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Both social systems and psychological systems (i.e. the cognitive systems of people) use 
meaning as part of their autopoiesis. “Meaning systems are completely closed to the extent that 
only meaning can refer to meaning and that only meaning can change meaning” (p. 37). People 
and social systems are dependent on each other to emerge and to continue to exist (p. 59). They 
have co-evolved and are bound together. Meaning, in Luhmann’s view, is the “evolutionary 
achievement” (p. 59) of this structural coupling. Meaning is a broader concept than behaviorism. 
Luhmann did not define meaning, but gave a complicated phenomenological description beyond 
the scope of this overview. In short, Luhmann described meaning as “processing according to 
differences” (p. 71). If information is the difference that a difference makes, then what difference 
that difference makes can be considered meaning. I will return to this in the discussion on 
communications.  
Structural coupling and interpenetration. 
Structural coupling is the mechanism by which two or more closed systems co-evolve 
and adapt their internal structures through mutual perturbations. Luhmann did not fully specify 
the relationship between organization, interaction and psychological systems. Guided by 
Luhmann’s work on societal systems, Seidl (2005c) suggested that the organization is coupled to 
interactions and individuals by a special type of structural coupling called interpenetration. 
Luhmann developed the concept of interpenetration to define the relationship between human 
beings (the conglomerate of organic and psychological systems) and social systems (Luhmann, 
1995, pp. 210-254). In social systems theory, human beings are part of the environment of 
society and vice versa. When a system’s environment makes its complexity (such as the system’s 
“indeterminacy, contingency and the pressure to select”) available for building another system, 
this is called penetration (p. 213). The penetrating system’s behavior is co-determined by the 
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receiving system. Interpenetration happens when two systems make their complexity available 
for one another. The two systems become much more interdependent as a result of 
interpenetration. It also means that with increased levels of complexity comes a greater variation 
of possibilities that can be exploited (p. 239). 
Interpenetration is undoubtedly a very abstract concept. A more accessible description is 
the notion of intimacy, which is what Luhmann called the relationship of interhuman 
interpenetration. “Intimacy comes into being when more and more domains of personal 
experience and bodily behavior become accessible and relevant to another human being and vice 
versa” (p. 224). Social systems must be formed for intimacy to happen, because interhuman 
interpenetration is “indisputably possible only by communication” (p. 228). Intimacy exceeds the 
possibilities of communication, both through language and bodily contact. It includes the 
experience of not being able to find the means to communicate. “Each one knows each other so 
well that they cannot conceal themselves because this would be another act that would have to be 
answered. The rest is silence” (p. 228). Interpenetration is not to be confused or exchanged for 
intersubjectivity or shared meaning. In closed, self-referential systems, meaning can never be 
shared. “What is social cannot be traced back to the conscious performances of a monadic 
subject” (p. 81) and thus, intersubjectivity raises issues that cannot be resolved (p. 146).  
 The coupling between an organization and its associated interaction systems can be 
considered one of interpenetration. Seidl (2005c) explained:  
Interactional communications orient themselves not only according to their interactional 
structures but also according to organizational structures, that is to say, their 
environment…. The interaction observes its own communications with regard to their 
significance for the interaction and the organization.” (p. 150) 
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An AI summit can be characterized as the particular interaction system of a particular 
organization attended by hundreds of psychological systems. It will therefore be important in 
applying a social systems perspective, to identify how these systems interpenetrate one another. 
Concept of communications 
Luhmann’s second innovation in developing a theory of social systems was his 
unconventional definition of communication (1992, 1995). He defined communication as a unity 
of utterance, information, and understanding. These three units combined form communication. 
Communication can be deconstructed into the three units for observation, but in its operation, 
only the three together can be called a communication in Luhmann’s social systems theory. 
This formulation is a radical departure from how we understand communication today. 
The rapid development of information technologies owes a great deal to the communication 
theories developed by Shannon, a mathematician and an engineer (Gleick, 2011). In the 1940s, 
Shannon developed a mathematical theory of information for encoding information. His theory 
basically stripped out the semantic content of messages, and reduced information to bits and 
bytes subject to statistical analysis. For Shannon, information represented uncertainty, 
probabilities, difficulty of transmission and entropy (Gleick, 2011, p. 219). The resulting 
Shannon-Weaver model implied a transmission of information from a sender to a receiver 
through a channel. It represented a giant leap forward in the development of computers and 
networks. Without Shannon, there could not have been an Internet. 
“The birth of information theory came with its ruthless sacrifice of meaning—the very 
quality that gives information its value and its purpose” (2011, p. 416) wrote Gleick in the book, 
The Information, a chronicle of communication theory. He referred to von Foerster complaining 
at a cybernetics conference “only when understanding begins, in the human brain, ‘then 
97 
 
information is born—it’s not in the beeps” (p. 417). Gleick wrote that in information theory, 
“meaning, as ever, remained hard to pin down” (p. 417). He quoted a historian of cybernetics, 
Dupuy: “Ours is a world about which we pretend to have more and more information but which 
seems to us increasingly devoid of meaning” (p. 418). Luhmann was bringing meaning back into 
communication theory.  
Luhmann (1992) insisted that the conventional concept of communication is incomplete. 
The commonly used metaphor of transmission was problematic, he wrote. An act of transmission 
“directs attention and demands for skillfulness onto the one who makes the utterance” even 
though an utterance is nothing but a proposal to the receiver of the information to make a 
selection. As Drucker said, communication makes demands. The metaphor of transmission, 
however, does not account for how the communication is understood (or misunderstood). 
Communication happens only when there is a reply.  
Similar to Shannon, Luhmann’s (1992) concept of communication strips it of the 
psychological and cognitive aspects. He did so by conceptualizing communication as a product 
of social systems. He cautioned that he is not saying that it is possible to have communication 
without life or consciousness. He is in essence, bracketing people out of the picture in order to 
maintain the contours and clarity necessary for a concept to be useful in the construction of 
theory. And in his formulation of communication, meaning played a central role. 
According to Luhmann (1992), communication is a selection. It synthesizes three 
different units of selection: “selection of information, selection of the utterance of this 
information, and a selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance” (p. 252). None 
of the three can stand alone and must be united to establish communication. 
Communication occurs only when a difference of utterance and information is 
understood. That distinguishes it from the mere perception of the behavior of others. In 
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understanding, communication grasps a distinction between the information value of its 
content and the reasons for which the content was uttered. (p. 252) 
 
The distinction of the three units, Luhmann wrote, was borrowed from the speech theories of 
Bühler (1934). Luhmann’s conceptualization differed because he did not view communication in 
terms of action. He did not see it as a transmission of messages being transmitted successfully or 
in error. Communication is a selection and synthesis of the three units. Luhmann defined 
information drawing from Bateson (1979) as the “difference that makes a difference” (Luhmann, 
2003, p. 43). In accordance with Shannon and Weaver’s model (Gleick, 2011), information is “a 
selection from a repertoire of possibilities” (Seidl, 2005a, , p. 28). A communication selects what 
is being communicated from a range of possible communications. Utterance refers to how (the 
form) and why (the reason) something is being said (Seidl, 2005 #1041, p. 28).  
The most important element of Luhmann’s conceptualization of communication is the 
inclusion of understanding. Understanding refers to the grasping of “a distinction between the 
information value of its content and the reasons for which the content was uttered” (Luhmann, 
1992, p. 252). In making the distinction, the content of the communication might be emphasized 
over how it was expressed, or vice versa. What matters is that the both aspects must be 
experienced to make such a distinction. If such a distinction is note made, the communication is 
“a mere perception” (p. 252).  
Communication is not perception. Perception is a psychological phenomenon that 
belongs to the domain of cognitive systems, not social systems. It has no “communicative 
existence” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 252). Perception cannot immediately or directly connect to a 
perception in someone else’s mind. “What another has perceived can neither be confirmed nor 
repudiated, neither questioned nor answered. It remains closed within consciousness” (p. 252). A 
perception can be externalized through language, whether bodily or through words. Individual 
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perceptions must accord to the laws of communication system. “Communication leads to a 
decision whether the uttered and understood information is to be accepted or rejected” (p. 255). 
All communication, thus carries risk (p. 256). It bifurcates reality: 
[Communication] creates two versions—a yes version and a no version—and thereby 
forces a selection. And it is precisely in the fact that something must happen (even if this 
is an explicitly communicated break-off of communication) that autopoiesis of the system 
resides, guaranteeing for itself its own continuability. (p. 255) 
 
Luhmann wrote that communication was “an emergent reality” (p. 252). This is highly consistent 
with the social constructionist roots of AI. Explained Mohe and Seidl (2011) referring to 
Luhmann (1995):         
People might utter words or make particular gestures but they have no control over the 
way in which these are understood, i.e. what communication is ultimately realized. For 
example, an uttered ‘yes’ might be understood as expressing a confirmation, a doubt or a 
negation (ironically). Thus, the meaning of a message, i.e. the concrete communication, is 
not produced by the speaker but by the listener, or more precisely: by the connecting 
communications. (Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 8)  
A social system is a system of communications. “Whatever the participants may 
understand in their own self-referentially closed consciousnesses, the communication system 
works out its own understanding or misunderstanding. And to this purpose it creates its own 
processes of self-observation and self-control” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 253).  
In summary, under Luhmann’s conceptualization, communication is not a transfer of 
information. Communication cannot be broken up into separate elements without losing its 
structural unity. “Information has its identity as something occurring at a particular point in time 
and not as something that endures in time and is able to be transferred” (Luhmann, 1990, p. 32). 
One of the key points of Luhmann’s social systems theory is drawing a distinction between 
meaning and information. The concept of information must always “be understood relative to an 
actually given, constantly changing state of knowledge” (p. 31). The concept of meaning, 
transcends information and “refers to the way human experience is ordered and not, for example, 
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to some particular fact or matter in the world” (p. 25). Information loses value when repeated, 
but its meaning does not.  
Organizations 
Decision communications constitute organizations. 
According to Luhmann, organizations are an organized form of social systems, and 
therefore, are constituted by communication. Other organizational scholars including Weick 
(1995), Kuhn (2008), and Taylor (2000) have posited that organizing is a communicative activity. 
The body of literature around “communication as constitutive of organization” or CCO is 
relatively obscure yet growing (For an overview, see Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011). 
Like Luhmann, the CCO perspective rejects March and Simon’s (1993) notion that 
“organizations are assemblages of interacting human beings” that resemble something of “a 
central coordinative system” (p. 23). Rather, “organizations are built, maintained, and activated 
through the medium of communication” wrote Weick (2001, p. 136), hence sensemaking is a 
central aspect of organizational life. Taylor (2000) proposed that organizations emerge out of 
episodes of conversations, and that the essence of communication is the transfer of intent from 
one actor to another. While scholars agree that organizations can emerge from communication, 
Schoeneborn (2011) noted that the debate on how communication constitutes organizations is far 
from settled. He suggested that Luhmann’s social systems theory is a “prominent example” (p. 
663) of CCO, and may help clear up the ambiguities surrounding the processes and minimal 
conditions of how communication constitutes organization.  
Luhmann’s perspective on organizations is unique in several ways. First, he defined 
organizations as a social system that reproduces itself through a specific form of communication: 
decision communications (Luhmann, 1995, 2003). Organizations are systems made of decisions. 
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Organizations differentiate themselves by decision making, and “by doing so, recognizes what it 
is doing” (Luhmann, 2005c, p. 85). The organizational system is autopoietic, meaning that these 
decisions are produced from the decisions that make up the organization. It is self-referential, 
meaning that there can be no outside authority that decides what the organization does. All 
external references are understood as the organization’s internal operations (Luhmann, 2003, p. 
32).  
Organizations are operatively closed. “An organization may only be defined based on its 
own decisions. It can only learn by itself” (p. 33). Here again, Luhmann strictly distinguished 
decision making from the psychological event engaging people. Decisions in and of themselves 
have no intent because decisions in the Luhmannian sense are strictly “a matter of 
communication” (p. 32). Therefore, they are ephemeral and vanish as soon as they appear. The 
implication for organizations is such that so little can be changed—its elements are so fleeting. 
Paradoxically though, the fact that an organization “cannot be changed may provide a cause for 
new decisions to surface” (p. 36).  
Organizations are complex. They have a wide range of options at their disposal. All 
autopoietic systems try to limit their options by establishing structures. This is a necessary 
condition for maintaining their autopoiesis (p. 39). An organization distinguishes itself from 
others by specifying its structures. “Insofar as a decision serves as the basis for another decision” 
either in retrospect or in expectation, “a structure is formed” (p. 40). The structure may be 
momentary. But so long as they “somehow limit and thus enable a decision concerning how 
decisions are taken” (p. 40) they are deemed relevant. “It will draw upon the very structures it 
has organized in order to specify expectations that ensure that acts…may be dealt with as 
decisions by the system” (p. 33).  
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The paradox of decision making. 
One of the important features of Luhmann’s theory of organizations is his recognition 
that decisions and therefore organizations, are rooted in paradox (Luhmann, 2003, 2005c). The 
paradox of decision making lies at the heart of organizations. “It is not that decisions are first 
made and then communicated; decisions are communications” (Seidl, 2005a, p. 39). Since 
decisions are communication events that do not last, they are constituted by paradox. A selection 
always has to be made because in complex systems, the possibilities always exceed what can 
actually be realized. Decisions are different from ordinary communications in that they imply 
that the decision could have been made differently. They are self-contradictory. Seidl borrowed 
Ruesch and Bateson’s distinction of the “report” aspect and “command” aspect of language to 
explain this contradiction. “The more clearly the decision is communicated as a selection among 
alternatives (report aspect), the less the decision will be accepted by later communications as a 
decision (command aspect)” (p. 40). In Luhmann’s words, “the decision conceals what is 
decisive” (Luhmann, 2005, p. 85).  
Another paradox is the undecidability of decisions. “Something that has already been 
determined in all respects cannot be decided. Therefore, a decision involves some degree of 
unpredictability, even irrationality, which is precisely why people are tempted to exert influence” 
(Luhmann, 2005c, p. 85). If objective analysis yields a certain result, this is not a decision—it is 
simply a matter of deductions and calculations (Andersen, 2003). According to Luhmann, von 
Foerster made the point most clearly: “Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, we 
can decide” (Citing von Foerster, 1992, p.14 in Luhmann, 2005c, p. 86). The paradox is further 
complicated in that “the decision itself is neither something in the past nor something in the 
future, and it is neither the one side nor the other side of the alternative” (p. 88), as I noted earlier. 
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Before a particular decision is made, several possibilities exist. Once the decision is made, 
although a second-order observer sees there were other possibilities which have been excluded, 
the contingencies are now fixed and are contingent upon the decision made. Decision making in 
essence, is a form of limiting contingency. 
An organization is not operationally crippled by the paradox of decision making because 
it cannot observe the paradox. “It does not see that it does not see what it does not see” (p. 91). 
The function of an organization is to unfold this paradox of decision.  
To unfold a paradox is simply to shift the observer’s blind spot to a place where it is less 
troublesome (in family therapy, which is based on constructivism, we say: to a less 
painful place). Against one’s better judgment new, stable identities are introduced, which 
can be maintained more easily. (p. 92) 
I will now introduce two methods Luhmann proposed for unfolding the paradox of decision 
making that are relevant to this study: decision premises and uncertainty absorption.  
Decision premises. 
Decision premises enable organizations to reduce the complexity of decision making, 
while simultaneously opening up the horizon for subsequent decisions (Luhmann, 2005c, p. 95). 
“The system constantly oscillates between constraining and extending decision possibilities and 
in this way secures its own autopoiesis” (p. 95). There may be some overarching objectives—a 
company’s vision statement, for example—that serve as a self-description for guiding decisions. 
However, these can never be so narrow that the decisions funnel down towards an inevitable end. 
If it were so, Luhmann wrote, they would not be organizations but projects. 
Luhmann identified three (Seidl, 2005b) organizational decision premises. These are 
programs, personnel, and communication channels. Programs pre-determine how a correct 
decision is made. They come in the form of “if-then” conditional scenarios, or in the form of 
goals to be achieved. Programs are often interchangeable with plans. Decision premises related 
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to personnel determine the criteria for selecting and allocating personnel. Communication 
channels determine how communication is structured within an organization. The channels only 
run vertically in a classic hierarchical structure, whereas in a matrix organization they could run 
horizontally. The three decision premises converge in the form of positions. A position is guided 
by a certain program, filled by certain personnel and equipped with certain communication 
channels. These positions serve to constrain the possibilities for organizational change in the 
status quo. A position enables variation but also binds reality within certain conditions: “One can 
change the incumbent, the job profile or the reporting relationship—but not all at the same time” 
(p. 94).  
A decision on decision premises is made “on the level of second-order observation” (p. 
95). A manager decides on a position based on their observations of the situation at hand. 
Luhmann noted: 
As a rule, we associate terms such as planning and steering with the notion that this is 
done from above and is thus justifiable on the basis of a better overview, though without 
precise knowledge of details. This may be the case in some instances. However, the 
theory of the second-order observer is not dependent on the mystifications of the 
hierarchy. It emphasizes that this is a very specific observation in very specific situations; 
and of course, an observation which has to base itself on upon what it cannot see. We 
cannot evade this fundamental paradox. (p. 96) 
 
Uncertainty absorption. 
A second mode for unfolding the paradox of decision making is through uncertainty 
absorption. It is a concept originating with March and Simon (1993). “Uncertainty absorption 
takes place when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the 
evidence itself, are then communicated” (p. 186). Uncertainty is absorbed “when decisions are 
accepted as decision premises and taken as the basis for subsequent decisions. …And the whole 
point is: it is not the decision operation itself, but a process that connects decisions” (Luhmann, 
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2005c, p. 96). It is analogous to Weick’s (1979) reduction of equivocality in the sensemaking 
process between individuals in an organization. Uncertainty absorption is the mechanism by 
which organizations bring forth a reality. Wrote Luhmann (2005c): 
Every organization operates in a world that it cannot know. This world is transformed 
through uncertainty absorption into a known world; it is replaced by a known world. This 
requires in retrospect a first decision, which inscribes a distinction into the world, for 
example, by defining a purpose, by forming a “coalition” of (future) members with a 
corresponding clientele as environment, or simply by establishing another organization. 
(p. 99, footnote omitted) 
 
According to Seidl (2005b), an organization pulsates between the reduction and production of 
uncertainty. “Every decision produces new decisions; on the one hand, by reducing uncertainty, 
and on the other hand, by producing new uncertainty, which brings forth the need for a further 
reduction of uncertainty in the form of a further decision” (p. 43). When too much uncertainty is 
absorbed, organizational structures can ossify and result in core capabilities turning into “core 
rigidities” (Leonard‐Barton, 2007).  
Relationship between organization and environment 
One of the confusing aspects of Luhmann’s theorizing in particular and autopoiesis in 
general is the relationship between a system and its environment. Autopoietic systems are closed 
in their operations, but they cannot “operate without having an impact on and through the 
environment” (Luhmann, 2003, p. 40). An environment irritates a system. Such irritations 
become meaningful to an organization when it “can recognize the difference this will make for 
its decision-making activity, when the environment in some way or other is changed or not” (pp. 
40-41). Information is always produced by the system. There is no “fact existing independently 
from observation and evaluation” (p. 41) and the system will tend to produce information 
according to its internal preferences.  
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There are two structural limitations on the decision-making context, however. The first is 
the concept of redundancy. “Redundancy achieves its highest value when one piece of 
information suffices for a definition of the system” (p. 41). On the other hand, redundancy 
decreases when a “decision provides less and less insight into what has been decide before and 
what might be decided ahead” (p. 41). The other limitation is called variety. Variety describes 
the range of decisions it makes. If all the decisions are similar, variety is small. When the range 
expands, variety is greater.  
Redundancy and variety are closely intertwined. The general tendency of organizations in 
relation to its environment is to increase the system’s redundancy. This is due in part to 
uncertainty absorption. Structures are condensed, and as a result, “an improved overview of what 
still remains possible within the system is achieved” (p. 42). This is why aging organizations 
tend to have more rigid structures, Luhmann noted. But an organization may also increase the 
variety of its decisions in reaction to noise: turbulent changes in its environment. Luhmann 
cautioned, “the variety of decisions may well increase unnoticed, with the question of a structural 
adaptation appearing as a secondary matter and only in connection with the already changed 
decision-making situation” (p. 42). Luhmann imagined organizations “as continuously 
oscillating between acceptance and rejection of noise [from the environment] and between loss 
and reconstitution of redundancy [within the organization]” (p. 43).    
Organizational knowledge and nonknowledge 
The social systems lens imposes a processual view of organization. For the organization 
to maintain its identity and existence, it must constantly reproduce a ceaseless stream of decision 
communication events connected to future decision communication events. The specific mode of 
reproduction is uncertainty absorption, often through the use of decision premises. Organizations 
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are always transforming in a state of flux like Heraclitus’ river (Morgan, 1997). Given this 
conceptualization, what then is organizational knowledge?  Plato’s notion of knowledge as 
justified true belief cannot apply to the Luhmannian organization, because social systems cannot 
think; only individuals can. Neither can individual knowledge ever be directly transferred to an 
organization, because they are two separate, autonomous systems that are operationally closed to 
each other. This is the point at which social systems theory diverges from Nonaka’s (1994) 
organizational knowledge creation theory. Nonaka’s theory hinges on the transferability of 
knowledge between individuals and organizations. It also assumes that knowledge is a resource 
that can be accumulated, managed, and shared. Luhmann’s theory forces us to challenge this 
assumption.  
Based on his interpretation of social systems theory, Seidl (2007) conceptualized 
knowledge as structures that determine how an organization deals with information. Knowledge 
orients a system’s observations. It guides it in where to draw the distinction between noise and 
information (p. 17). Observations are structured according to two questions. First, does the 
difference make a difference? Second, what difference does the difference make? Both are a 
form of selection. The first distinction is a selection of what to observe and where to pay 
attention. Language plays a significant role by providing a schema for observation. The specific 
context of concrete observations such as time and space can be stripped away and “condensed” 
(Spencer-Brown, 1979, cited p. 17) into a generalized distinction like “dog” and “fast” (p. 17). 
These distinctions can be applied as a heuristic in concrete situations. The second distinction is a 
selection of the meaning of the observation. This regulates how one observation connects to 
other observations, both actual and potential (p.17). Seidl gave the following example: 
Organizations might observe repeatedly that companies that put down the prices of their 
very high-priced luxury goods leads to a loss of customers. From this, one might 
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condense the “knowledge” that putting down the price the very high-priced luxury goods 
leads to a loss of customers. (p. 18) 
 
Broadly defined, knowledge represents all the structures of an organization. Seidl 
proposed that organizational knowledge can therefore be described as decision structures. An 
organization has two types of decision structures. The first are formal decision structures that are 
“the explicit product of earlier decisions” (p. 21). When an operation deviates from those 
structures, the expectation is that the system changes its structure. The second are decision 
structures based on organizational culture. These are undecidable decision premises that are not 
explicitly decided. Structures are expected to be retained in the case of deviating operations. 
Decision premises related to the values of an organization are hard to change because they are 
stabilized by norms not cognition.  
According to Seidl, the purpose of knowledge is to both reduce and increase complexity. 
Complexity pressures a system to select, for a system has far more possibilities of operations 
than it can actualize (p. 19). Overtaxing the selection at each moment endangers the reproduction 
of the system (Luhmann, 1995). Knowledge pre-selects the possibilities available to the system 
by excluding and eliminating others, thereby relieving some of the pressure to select. “Structures 
draw a distinction within the possibilities—creating two different sets of possibilities—and 
indicate one of the sets, making it the subset of available possibilities” (Seidl, 2007, p. 19). The 
system is blind to the possibilities that have not been indicated. When knowledge is produced, it 
simultaneously produces what Seidl calls nonknowledge—the set of possibilities that were not 
indicated and lies beyond the boundary of the distinction (p.19). One might think of it also as 
latent knowledge. This mechanism is rooted in another paradox. Knowledge limits the available 
possibilities and reduces complexity. But the same mechanism serves to increase complexity 
because new possibilities open up by reducing the original possibilities (p. 20). 
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The idea of nonknowledge is important for organizations, due to an organization’s 
specific mode of operation, namely uncertainty absorption. “During the succession of decisions, 
he uncertainty involved in earlier decisions is absorbed; in the communication of decisions, the 
uncertainty involved in earlier decision making is not communicated” (p. 21). An individual 
might remember the uncertainty. A face-to-face interaction can question an earlier 
communication, recall the uncertainty, and select differently from the structural selection. But an 
organization is structured such that it forgets. Therefore, the unobservability of nonknowledge is 
made extreme.  
“For a system, intelligence means that it orients its observation not only according to its 
knowledge but also according to representations of its nonknowledge” (p. 23). While a system 
cannot directly access its nonknowledge, its internal operations can make representations of the 
nonknowledge. In this sense, an AI summit is an interaction system that forces its participants to 
explicitly communicate about the organization’s nonknowledge. It does so through self-
descriptions of the organization and its operations. It also overcomes organizational blindness 
through interactions with external stakeholders. External stakeholders, such as customers, can 
illuminate what the organization doesn’t know by talking about their relationship. In either case, 
the information presented as nonknowledge is not the nonknowledge itself but the 
representations and interpretations of nonknowledge.  
Organizational interactions 
The interaction system is where people interact through face-to-face contact (Luhmann, 
1995). It reproduces communication based on the interactions of the people present. This marks a 
point of differentiation to Nonaka’s notion of ba or shared context, which is neither bound by 
space nor time (Nonaka et al., 2000). Luhmann’s interaction systems are bounded. “They include 
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everything that can be treated as present and are able, if need be, to decide who, among those 
who happen to be present, is to be present and who not” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 412). For example, 
in a meeting, if a participant is texting on their phone, the interaction system may mark that 
person is absent. If it were the CEO texting though, the system may mark her as present, and 
interpret her texting as an interaction—the other participants may understand this as an utterance 
containing the information “the CEO is ignoring us.” The latter would be an example of 
interpenetration between the organization and interaction systems. The interaction system is 
penetrating the organization’s system, effectively borrowing from the organization’s decision 
making structure (the CEO’s position) in making the distinction between present/absent.  
The same event (the CEO texting) would be observed and interpreted differently by the 
organization and the interaction system, because each system is operatively closed and produce 
different kinds of communications. In other words, the meaning and significance would differ. 
“Not everything that is communicated in the interaction has to be put in the form of a decision 
and thus made available to the organization” (Seidl, 2005, p. 160). If a participant wants to 
explicitly make a connection to the organization’s decision making, they may articulate the 
communication as a declaration (p. 161). Recording the minutes of a meeting, for example, is a 
strong signal to the organization “that the communication lends itself to being treated as an 
organizational decision” (p. 161). Some interactions may be explicitly kept “off the record” to 
prevent being interpreted as a decision. Often, no decisions are made at all (p. 149). 
Seidl conceptualized four types of interactions that can be deemed organizational based 
on empirical observation. Deciding interactions, decision-preparatory interactions, semi-
detached interactions, and unrelated interactions (pp. 149-150). Of these four, the first two will 
be significant in analyzing an AI summit. A deciding interaction produces “interactional 
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communications that can be treated by the organization as (organizational) decisions” (p. 155). 
In other words, a deciding interaction contributes to the organization’s autopoiesis. Decision-
preparatory interactions are interactions that lay down the conditions for later decisions, for 
example, by exchanging relevant information, but fall short of making a decision. Semi-detached 
interactions are interactions that “communicate about decisions without focusing directly on 
influencing decision making” (p. 150) such as gossip. Unrelated interactions are those that are 
not related to the organization at all. 
Towards a social systems perspective of AI summits 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems is vast and complex. It is impossible to condense his 
theorizing into such a brief overview. Seidl and Becker (2005a) remarked “it is often said that 
when starting to read Luhmann it takes a hundred to two hundred pages before one actually 
understands anything” (p. 10). The purpose of this chapter was to distill Luhmann’s ideas and 
focus only on those concepts that are relevant to the study of AI summits as a forum for 
knowledge creation. In summary, I would like to reiterate some of the key points of social 
systems theory that are important to the theorizing ahead. Luhmann posited that social systems, 
such as organizations and interaction systems, are autopoietic. They maintain their autopoiesis 
through an ongoing production of communications. Communication, according to Luhmann is a 
synthesis of information, utterance and understanding and is defined as an event that vanishes as 
soon as it is produced. Organizations reproduce decision communications. Interaction systems 
reproduce interactional communications. People belong to a separate autopoietic system, a 
conglomerate of an organic system and a psychological system.  
In accordance with the biological theory of autopoiesis, all autopoietic systems in 
Luhmann’s social systems theory are operatively closed systems. They can only refer to 
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themselves, so no outside authority can directly change their structures. However, organizations 
have a special relationship with the interaction and psychological systems they associate with. 
They are structurally coupled in such a way that the systems can penetrate each other and access 
the complexity of their respective structures. This is analogous to a relationship of intimacy 
between people. An analysis of the social dynamics of such structural coupling between the 
component systems of an AI summit will be the primary focus of this study. 
Organizations do not have the ability to think; they can only communicate. Therefore, 
knowledge cannot be defined as an organizational version of “justified true belief” as Nonaka 
and others previously proposed. For this study, I am guided by Seidl’s (2007) definition of 
knowledge. He proposed that knowledge in social systems theory should be considered the 
equivalent of organizational structures. Organizational knowledge determines how an 
organization deals with information. They orient how an organization observes itself. Decision 
premises, defined by Luhmann as personnel, communication channels and programs, are a form 
of organizational knowledge. They are what we conventionally refer to as an organization’s 
structure. Seidl further proposed the concept of organizational nonknowledge, the knowledge 
that an organization can potentially access, but does not currently distinguish as information for 
making a decision. Organizational intelligence is increased when an organization has the ability 
to orient its observation towards such nonknowledge. An AI summit may be one method that 
enables such observations to happen. 
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Chapter 7 A Social Systems View of AI Summits 
Introduction 
An appreciative inquiry (AI) summit brings together hundreds of stakeholders both inside 
and outside the organization to engage in intensive strategizing activities over several days. I 
concluded from a review of the existing literature that one aspect of AI that has not yet been fully 
explored is the capacity for large group methods such as the AI summit format to generate 
organizational knowledge. AI is deeply grounded in social constructionism. Of the various AI 
methods, the AI summit format evolved from research developments in group dynamics that 
eventually converged with systems theory. I then introduced the theory of autopoiesis, which not 
only provides a biological basis for the social construction of knowledge, but also extended 
systems theory beyond open systems. The notion of systems as interactionally open, but 
operatively closed, is an idea so radical that some scholars, such as Luhmann, consider it a 
paradigm shift in systems theory. Luhmann took the principles of autopoiesis, and applied it to 
social systems. The goal of this study is to apply a social systems lens to the practice of AI 
summits, to identify some of the systems dynamics and structures that differentiate it from other 
strategizing practices. 
Recently, management scholars such as Seidl have begun studying organizational 
dynamics through the lens of Luhmann’s social systems theory. While critics of Luhmann have 
objected to the extension of a biological theory to social systems, Seidl and his colleagues have 
shown that social systems theory is nevertheless a useful lens with which to analyze 
organizations. Seidl is a major contributor to an emerging research program in strategic 
management that focuses on strategizing activities and practice (SAP). In trying to understand 
how and why an AI summit as a whole functions the way it does, I situate the summit first and 
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foremost as a strategizing practice rather than a change intervention. I posit that the purpose of 
an AI summit is to generate and accelerate the creation of organizational knowledge. This turns 
away from the conventional view that AI aims to generate transformational change.  
Two streams of research by Luhmann scholars in the field of strategy are particularly 
relevant in applying a social systems lens to AI summits. The first is an extension of Luhmann’s 
study of the communication problems inherent in management consulting. Mohe and Seidl used 
social systems theory to explore the communications dynamics of a consulting project. They 
looked at the relationship between the consultants, the organization and the contact system 
through which the consultants and their clients interact. Most AI summits are facilitated by 
external consultants who specialize in AI. An AI summit can therefore be conceptualized as a 
management consulting engagement. Building on Mohe and Seidl’s work, I develop a conceptual 
model of an AI summit that incorporate Luhmann’s system types and structural coupling 
mechanisms.  
The second line of research expands Luhmann’s concept of episodes to the routine 
strategizing practices of an organization. Their concept of strategic episodes is quite consistent 
with the findings of a study of AI summits reviewed in Chapter 3 that described an AI summit as 
a space that allows the temporary suspension of hierarchy and command-control type decision 
making (Powley et al., 2011). An AI summit, therefore, can also be conceptualized as an 
extended strategic episode that consists of a series of strategic episodes that unfold over multiple 
days. The degrees to which organizational routines are suspended differ quite substantially over 
the course of the 4D cycle. The constant oscillation between strategic and operational contexts 
appears to be a key dynamic that is unique to an AI summit. I conclude this chapter by proposing 
a topology of episodes that can be used to analyze such systems dynamics.   
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AI as management consulting 
Most organizations do not have the expertise or capacity to run an AI summit entirely on 
their own. The AI summit method is well documented (Ludema et al., 2003) and there are many 
resources available on how to conduct a summit. However, even those companies that use the AI 
approach as a routine practice in their business operations often choose to contract with an 
external AI consultant. AI summits, similar to most OD interventions, can be framed as a form of 
management consulting. An AI summit requires a significant investment in time, money and 
labor. The Brazillian company, Nutrimental, for example, shut down its entire operations for a 
few days so that all of their employees and major external stakeholders can attend. The resulting 
summit had 700 participants (Barros & Cooperrider, 2000). Such an endeavor can be risky, 
especially if leadership is reluctant to allow lower-level employees into the inner circle of 
strategy (Powley et al., 2011). Contracting with an AI consultant can spread the risk somewhat. 
If an intervention fails, the company can always blame the consultant.  
AI summits require months of planning. Cooperrider and Whitney (2005) wrote that the 
AI consultant supports the AI process in four ways: 
• Introduce AI to the organization and train people as internal agents of inquiry, 
interviewers, and facilitators. 
• Design the overall project flow through the AI 4-D cycle, providing guidance about when 
and how to involve the optimum number of stakeholders. 
• Facilitate AI activities throughout the process. 
• Continually seek ways to give the process away, to support organizational members in 
making it their own. (p. 46) 
In an AI summit project, the consultant would facilitate pre-summit activities including 
training and planning meetings. They may also facilitate the actual summit conference. Although 
the overall consulting project for an AI summit is similar to other management consulting 
engagements, the AI summit itself has some very unique characteristics when compared to 
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conventional off-site strategy workshops. I am guided by a recent theoretical study by Mohe and 
Seidl (2011) in developing conceptual model of AI summits using social systems theory that can 
highlight what those points of differentiation may be. 
Mohe and Seidl published an article in the journal Organization, theorizing the client-
consultant relationship in management consulting using social systems theory. They were guided 
by insights made by Luhmann in a case study first published in German in 1989 (published in 
English in 2005) on the problems underlying management consulting engagements. Luhmann 
argued that in any relationship between consultants and their clients, there is a fundamental 
communication barrier. Regardless of the discipline the consultant draws from, Luhmann 
claimed that the basis for consulting usually consists of a specialized competence that comes 
from generalizations that are derived from empirical research.  
Known statistical probabilities are applied to each individual case, even though they are 
meaningless in individual cases. One makes such mistakes discreetly, only to compensate 
for them by means of detailed analyses of the object in question. In certain rare cases, 
these analyses are subsequently evaluated for the purpose of controlling and correcting 
the scholarly hypothesis. (Luhmann, 2005b, p. 351) 
 
In such a client-consultant relationship, Luhmann wrote, “there are no deep-seated problems of 
communication” (p. 351). 
A social systems perspective shows a different picture. The thrust of Luhmann’s  
argument was that communication barriers are inevitable because the consultants are 
operationally closed from the client company’s organizational system. Consultants constitute the 
environment in which the client company operates. Luhmann emphasized that “no system can 
communicate with its environment” (p. 353). The typical consulting engagement masks a 
fundamental problem grounded in communication, the impossibility of direct communication 
and knowledge transfer between consultant and client (Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 14). 
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A Luhmannian perspective “directs the attention of the researcher towards specific issues, 
which have not been properly acknowledged before” (p. 18). Mohe and Seidl (2011) extended 
Luhmann’s work, and developed a conceptual model of the client-consultant relationship (Figure 
1) using social systems theory. The relationship is defined by the coupling of three social 
systems: the client organization, the consultant organization, and the contact system. The contact 
system is where the consultant interacts with their clients. Mohe and Seidl chose to bracket out 
the coupling of individual people to social systems, and narrowed their model to the 
interdependencies between the various social systems. Mohe and Seidl offered three 
methodological steps in examining client-consultant relationships empirically. First, the 
researcher must identify the different communication systems in the relationship and 
“reconstruct their respective communication logics” (p. 18). Second, identify the specific 
mechanisms of structurally coupling between the systems. Third, examine how the structurally 
coupled systems’ “mutual perturbations are internally (re) constructed” (p. 18).  
In a conventional consulting engagement, members from the consulting firm come in 
contact with members of the client company to meet a specific need, such as strategy 
development. The consulting firm and client are two different, autopoietic systems that are 
structurally coupled to each other through an interaction system that Mohe and Seidl (2011) 
called a “contact system” (p.13). Communication barriers are an issue because the consultants 
bring their idiosyncratic communication logics to the client company, which has its own set of 
idiosyncratic communication logics, further confounded by the idiosyncratic communication 
logics of the contact system.  
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 Figure 1. Mohe and Seidl’s (2011) conceptual model of a consulting intervention (p. 14).  
In developing the “right” strategy for the company, the consultants inquire into the 
company’s operations to gather and analyze data according to the consulting firm’s proprietary 
methodologies and frameworks. Already, there is room for misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation by the consultants, as they are observing the organizational system as second-
order observers. A strategy workshop is often the forum in which the consultants present their 
findings to top management and the board. Seen through a social systems perspective, this is 
what is really happening: 
The description of the client’s problem and the consultant’s methods for solving the 
problem are constructs of the contact system—they are themselves necessarily based on 
“productive misunderstandings.”  In other words, the “solution” presented by the contact 
system to the client system is not a solution to the problem as perceived by the client 
system. Consequently, rather than constituting input from the contact system into the 
client system, the “solution” constitutes an unspecific perturbation that the client system 
processes according to its own logic. The structural coupling between the systems merely 
ensures that the client system takes some form of action as a result of that perturbation. 
(Mohe and Seidl, p.13) 
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Yet as Luhmann (2005b) noted, “For whatever reasons, the consultants may be inclined to 
present their knowledge as certain and their proposals as based on careful work” (p. 351). 
Communication problems are assumed away.  
It is interesting to recall that OD consultants began experimenting with large group 
methods like the AI summit out of frustration with conventional methods for strategic change 
consulting. The Luhmannian perspective suggests that a core issue is one of communication 
barriers. One of the core characteristics of an AI summit is that sets it apart from conventional 
contact systems is in the way it puts the whole system in the room to engage in strategizing 
activities. This suggests that the dynamics of an AI summit is radically different from the contact 
system of a strategy development meeting comprised of a handful of consultants and core 
executives from the client company. I will now apply Mohe and Seidl’s three step methodology 
to examine the contact system of an AI summit from a social systems perspective. 
A social systems model of an AI summit 
The first step in Mohe and Seidl’s methodology is to identify the communication systems 
in the client-consultant relationship. I modify this to enable us to model large group methods of 
strategizing. As I will argue later, large group methods are essentially strategy development 
workshops facilitated by an external consultant. I will limit the conceptualization of the method 
to the actual conference itself and exclude any planning and post-conference activities and 
meetings. What I am trying to model, therefore, is the relationships in a contact system during a 
strategy meeting. Although Mohe and Seidl only modeled the social systems of a contact system, 
I have chosen to incorporate the psychological systems of individual participants into the model. 
This is because the notion of “the whole system in the room” in AI implies that who is present 
and who is absent has implications on the outcome. I will also cover step two of the process, 
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which is to identify the mechanisms of structural couplings between the systems. I will defer step 
three to Chapter 8.  
Generic strategy meeting model. 
I start with a model of a generic strategy meeting (Figure 2). The systems involved are 
the organizational system of the client, the interaction system, and the psychological systems of 
the participants of the meeting. Each system is operatively closed from one another; however, 
each can trigger perturbations in one another through interactional communications. The same 
event can trigger different perturbations in different systems, because each system operates 
according to their own internal logic. The purpose of the meeting is to develop strategy for the 
client organization. Therefore, I exclude the external consultant’s organizational system from 
this model. In some special client-consulting relationships in which the consulting company has 
a deep and intimate relation with the client company, it may be necessary to include the 
consulting company system. 
 
Figure 2 Social systems model of a generic strategy meeting 
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A strategy meeting is usually considered highly confidential. It is an internal meeting, 
with participation is limited to the “inner circle” such as the top management team, board 
members and external advisors such as a consultant. The interaction system is structurally 
coupled to the organizational system as a strategic episode. The company temporarily suspends 
its operational routines so that it can reflect upon itself strategically. The interactions that take 
place at the meeting are organizational interactions. Since this is a strategy meeting, decision 
interactions and pre-decision interactions will tend to dominate. 
The nature of the relationship between individual participants and the organizational 
system is governed by their positions. Only the top management team is present and therefore, 
any decisions they make during the meeting must connect back to the rest of the organization 
after the meeting. The decision may cascade down the organization, but the possibility of a 
decision not connecting to another somewhere down the line always remains. In other words, 
there are potential internal communication barriers. This problem is often referred to as problem 
of execution or implementation of the decided strategy. However, in Luhmann’s framework, an 
organization only produces decisions—not actions—and therefore, an execution problem is 
really a breakdown of the decision production process in which a certain decision fails to 
produce another. The consultant and all the communication barriers Mohe and Seidl identified in 
the client-consultant relationship are all present as well. The relationship between the 
participants and the interaction system will depend on historical precedents of the company. 
Participants will conform to the meeting practices that are expected, in terms of turn-taking, 
voting, rituals etc. 
Large group method model. 
I now expand this generic model to a large group method in Figure 3.  
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 Figure 3 Social systems model of a large group methods conference 
There are two major differences from the generic model: the composition of the 
participants, and the strategizing activities that take place during the strategic episode. More of 
the organizational members are present. Thus, the structural coupling between the participants 
and the organization is much tighter, as represented by the increased number of positions. 
Having lots of organizational members present should have the effect of reducing some internal 
communications barriers, as the level of redundancy decreases and variety increases. 
Furthermore, external stakeholders such as customers and suppliers are also participating. When 
a customer talks about their experiences with the company, they are perturbing the company’s 
system in a manner that is likely consistent with the logic of the organization that the customer 
represents. Such perturbations may have consequences on the decision making interactions that 
take place. The consultant’s role is that of a facilitator. They are not there to provide expert 
knowledge on strategy. Their role is to structure the interactions of the conference so that the 
participants can conduct their own data collection and analysis through the strategizing activities 
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in order to develop and make strategic decisions. In this sense, if the methods are effective, the 
communication barriers between the consultant and client become a non-issue, because the 
organizational members themselves are the strategists. 
AI summit format. 
Finally, I further expand the model to a specific large group method, the AI summit 
format in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 Social systems model of an AI summit 
An AI summit differs from most of its large group peers in two major ways. First, the 
method adheres to the principle of positivity and focuses exclusively on strengths and 
opportunities. Second, the scale of the conference is much larger than most other methods. Using 
virtual conferencing technologies, for example, World Vision conducted a summit which had 
several thousand participants. How do these two points affect the dynamics of the conference 
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compared to the two models I described above?   Before doing so, let me reiterate the key 
components and relationships in the model for clarity. 
I conceptualize an AI summit as a strategic episode comprised of three different types of 
autopoietic systems: an interaction system, an organizational system, and psychological systems. 
The interaction system is the actual proceedings of the strategizing conference. There is only one 
organizational system that is structurally coupled to the interaction system: the company hosting 
the summit. Organizations external to the company such as customers and consulting firms, are 
only indirectly coupled to the conference by virtue of the individual representing them. Every 
individual participating in the summit is a separate psychological system—closed, self-
referential and autonomous. For the sake of simplicity, the psychological system in the diagram 
in shows one system, but in reality, there is no “collective” psychological system. There are as 
many different psychological systems as there are participants. Furthermore, the composition of 
participants usually fluctuates as the conference proceeds, as not all participants are present 
throughout the entire conference.  
Each system is self-referential and operationally closed. Each operates under 
idiosyncratic logics and assumptions. The interaction system is the environment for the 
organization and the individual participant. Systems can interact with one another, but cannot 
directly change what lies inside the other system’s boundaries. Systems can merely perturb the 
other system, and the perturbed system selects its response based on its own logic, not that of a 
second-order observer.  
As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Seidl has posited that the structural coupling of the 
organization with the associated interaction and psychological systems takes a special form 
called interpenetration. When systems interpenetrate one another, they become more 
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interdependent. Each system makes its complexity available to the other, hence increasing the 
variety of possibilities that can be exploited in any given situation. An employee of an 
organization is structurally coupled to their organization system in a very special way. The 
relationship between the two systems constitutes interpenetration. An employee is an insider who 
knows their organization much more intimately than an outsider. An employee can make finer 
distinctions regarding an organization and its decisions, because they grasp the complexities of 
the organization. Activists may call for Nike to stop producing sneakers in factories that employ 
child labor, to which a Nike employee might respond, “It’s not that simple.” The Nike employee 
may fully agree with the activists, but they also know of the barriers that prevent Nike from 
immediately making that decision.  
Like other strategy meetings, psychological systems—the participants—are each 
individually coupled to the organizational system through their positions. Organizational 
members in particular, unlike external stakeholders, can penetrate into the organizational system 
and vice versa. The sheer number and variety of the organizational members present at an AI 
summit, means that in the gross, the web of couplings between the organization and the 
participants is extremely tightly and finely woven. But at the same time, the strategic context of 
the conference also temporarily releases the participants from the existing structures, such that 
ordinary channels of communication, programs, operational routines are suspended. Internal 
communication barriers can therefore be substantially lowered. AI’s emphasis on positivity may 
have an additional impact on the participant’s psychological systems through the effects of 
positive emotions. Positive emotions may have a role in further lowering communication barriers 
by broadening cognition (Johnson, Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010) and enhancing psychological 
safety (Edmondson, 1999). Emotional contagion seen in large groups can stimulate the levels of 
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positive emotions even higher. Such positive emotions could have a priming effect that carries 
over to some of the activities later in the 4D cycle that are more conventional forms of 
strategizing that do not necessarily emphasize the positive. 
The relationship between the interaction system (i.e. the actual summit proceedings) and 
the organizational system is also moderated by the AI method, but in a different manner. In the 
case of individual participants, the interaction system can penetrate the complexities related to 
human psychology and their bodily functions. People produce thoughts in order to maintain their 
autopoiesis. They are subject to their biological makeup, such as the physical embodiment of 
emotions and feelings for example. This suggests that the principle of positivity will impact 
people mostly in terms of positive psychology. AI’s deliberate focus on the future and on 
strengths may orient their thoughts on experiences that they have forgotten or had not even 
imagined.  
The events of an AI summit influence the organizational system differently. First, the 
principle of positivity orients an organization to deliberately develop self-descriptions that draw 
on the positive dimensions of an organization. An organization maintains its autopoiesis by 
producing decisions that try to absorb uncertainty. Consequently, an organization tends to ignore 
the historical details leading to a particular decision. Decisions are further condensed into 
decision premises relating to roles, personnel and communication channels. An organization, 
therefore, is forgetful.  
The working assumption of AI is that people have a tendency to pay attention to 
problems. If this is so, then the organization’s operational routines are conditioned to deal with 
problems. Drucker has suggested otherwise: to starve the problems and feed the opportunities. 
An AI summit affords an organization the opportunity to reflect upon a blind spot—areas of 
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strengths and opportunities that may have been relegated to an organization’s nonknowledge 
(Seidl, 2007). For example, an entrepreneurial company that is growing rapidly runs the risk of 
forgetting the core competencies and values upon which it was founded as it adds new layers of 
management and hires new people. An established company that is stuck in a rut may be able to 
reassess its portfolio by purposefully seeking pockets of innovation that are hidden in 
organizational nooks and crannies. In both cases, such information may have been either taken 
for granted, or overlooked and pushed into the dark side of knowledge. AI’s positivity principle 
affects the organization in large part, because of the novelty and rarity of orienting its attentions 
to areas of strengths. 
The AI summit format adds a crucial dimension to the strategic episode: the impact of a 
democratic form of strategizing. It is the combination of a positive orientation with participative 
decision making that is at the heart of AI summits. It is possibly the source of the “positive 
energy” that so many AI practitioners and participants talk about in their descriptions of an AI 
summit. In my opinion, the metaphor of energy unwittingly masks the underlying social 
dynamics that are driving the summit. Luhmann’s social systems lens draws our attention to the 
structural coupling between the organization, the interaction and psychological systems, enabling 
a more nuanced view of what is going on. Individual participants are coupled to the organization 
system through their positions in a special way—through interpenetration. AI summits can 
therefore take advantage of the fact that hundreds of its employees are present.  
The AI summit effectively establishes a web of temporary communication channels 
among its organizational members that enable decisions to be produced and connected in novel 
ways. One would expect that the sheer volume of decision-making and pre-decision making 
interactions would be significantly higher than a traditional strategy meeting. It is also significant 
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that the summit is heavily oriented towards decision-making interactions, not just pre-decision 
making interactions. This is possible because of the intense structural coupling between the 
hundreds of organizational members to the organization system through their positions. Having 
the whole system in the room is the equivalent of having the organization’s structure physically 
present in the room through the presence of the vast number of participants. The organization can 
tap into the complexities of its participants, including institutional history, subject matter 
expertise, transactive memory (Wegner, 1987), skills, cognitive biases, personalities and 
subjective experiences, that are accessible by the participant but to which the organization is 
blinded. Not only does the interaction system structure interactions to facilitate strategic 
reflection, but it also provides an opportunity for decisions to be produced in real time while the 
strategic episode is ongoing. I expand on this in the next section, drawing on literature about 
strategic episodes.  
Strategic episodes 
Luhmann’s social systems theory compels us to see organizations and other social 
systems as an intricate intertwining of processes. It is consistent with a growing body of 
literature in strategic management that emphasizes the study of strategy process. In 1992, van de 
Ven made some suggestions for “understanding how organizational strategies are formulated and 
implemented and the processes of strategic change” (p. 169). Of the four types of theories of 
process that van de Ven identified—life cycle, teleology, dialectics, and evolution (p. 176)—
Luhmann’s theory would loosely fall under evolution, as it draws on a theory of biology in 
which “change proceeds in a continuous process of variation, selection, and retention” (p. 179). 
Such factors like timing, the sequence of events, the variety of options available, the premises for 
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selection and changes in structure, play a crucial role in understanding how strategy is 
formulated in an organization. 
As in any evolutionary approach, temporality is of crucial significance in Luhmann’s 
theory. To facilitate his theorizing of societal change, Luhmann developed a concept he called 
episodes. An episode is a sequence of communication marked by a beginning and an end. At first 
sound, this seems trivial. But the notion of episodes is vital in explaining how a closed, self-
referential system can achieve structural change. Luhmann developed the concept of episodes in 
reference to societal change. Hendry and Seidl (2003) extended it to the context of organizational 
change. “Episodes provide opportunities for the normal constraints of communicative practice to 
be suspended and alternative communicative practices explored” (p. 180). They defined a 
strategic episode as the mechanism by which organizations can temporarily suspend its operating 
structure to reflect upon and change those structures. It allows for an organization to reflect upon 
its nonknowledge, the blind spots in its knowledge. 
Here, we must once again, jump into the rabbit hole of Luhmann’s theorizing. The 
original concept of episodes captured the temporal aspect of the relationship between the societal 
system and its associated interaction systems. In the context of the greater society, Luhmann 
(1995) explained that episodes are possible because of our “certainty that societal 
communication has been going on before the episode begins” (p. 407) and that we presuppose 
that there will be “sediments of earlier communication” in the episode. Episodes “are possible 
only because one knows that societal communication will still be possible after the episode 
concludes” (p. 407). Episodes “serve to achieve structures that cannot be made congruent with 
society and yet equip it with complexity by building in differences” (p. 407). Noted Luhmann, 
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“Complex societies are stable precisely because they can be broken down; they acquire 
permanence because their composition can change” (p. 407). 
Luhmann’s concept of societal episodes can be extrapolated to organizations. It is 
through episodes that an organization can be relieved of the stress of being an organization—the 
constant stress of absorbing uncertainty—to explore its nonknowledge, and possibly change its 
existing structures and decision premises—its organizational knowledge.  
A strategic episode is an episode in which the context of the participants’ conversations 
temporarily switches over from an operational context to a strategic one. From an organizational 
systems perspective, this switch is not about a change in mindsets. Mindsets belong to the 
cognitive domain and, as such, are confined to psychological systems. An organization is a social 
system and cannot have a mindset of its own. What changes in a strategic episode is the context 
in which the organization observes itself. It temporarily suspends the decision making premises 
of the organization, so that it can make modifications to those premises if necessary. It can do so 
because of the temporal and special nature of strategic episodes. “The episodic strategic 
communications are marked as exceptional and take into account that they will come to an end at 
some point, after which a switch back into the established (operational) context, with its 
established structures, will take place” (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 184).  
The way in which interactional communications during a strategic episode are structured 
will clearly have consequences for the outcome of the episode. Noted Seidl and Hendry, “If all 
those involved are allowed to voice their concerns, a specific topic will be discussed differently 
from when only the more senior staff are allowed to voice any criticisms” (p. 184). The selection 
of who gets to participate and how will be an important factor to consider when analyzing 
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strategic episodes. Hendry and Seidl suggested an analytical framework for studying strategizing 
by attending to three critical aspects of episodes:  
(1) the ways in which they are set up, within which the focus is on the determination of 
which structures are or are not suspended and on the necessary ‘decoupling’ of the 
episode from the organization as a whole;  
(2) the ways in which they are terminated, within which the focus is on the mechanisms 
for ‘re-coupling’ the strategic reflection with the organization; and  
(3) the ways in which they are conducted, within which the focus is on the discourses 
generated and the types of reflection achieved. (p. 189) 
 
An AI summit can be conceptualized as an interaction system which functions as a 
strategic episode for the organization. The organization decides who participates in the episode 
according to the principles prescribed by AI, such as whole system participation. The conduct of 
the episode is constrained by the processes prescribed by the AI summit format, including the 
expectation of pre-defined deliverables at the end of the strategic episode. The episode 
terminates when the summit ends. The end time is decided by the organizers before the summit. 
Situating the AI summit as a strategic episode has the advantage of enabling a more systematic 
comparison with other strategy workshops. An AI summit can be further conceptualized as a 
special type of strategic episode which consists of a series of back-to-back strategic episodes 
over multiple days. This surely has implications for the outcome of an AI summit compared to a 
regular strategy workshop. For example, the cumulative amount of man-hours devoted to 
collective strategizing during an AI summit is exponentially higher than a typical strategy 
meeting. Other characteristics can be observed as well by analyzing each individual episode. 
Later in this chapter, I introduce a typology that can aid such an analysis. Before doing so, I 
would like to diverge slightly to make an important point, namely that strategic episodes are 
valid not only as a method for changing strategies, but also for stabilizing and reinforcing 
existing ones.  
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Jarzabkowski and Seidl (2008) used the Luhmannian framework in their study of strategy 
meetings at a university in the UK. An interesting finding was that in a “loosely coupled” (Weick, 
1976) professional organization like a university, strategic episodes serve to stabilize and steady 
its strategic orientation. A loosely coupled organization is one that is flatter and more autocratic. 
The suspension of structures during strategic episodes in such an organization appear to have 
different connotations relative to “the traditional tightly structured machine bureaucracy implied 
by Hendry and Seidl” (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008, p. 1417). A strategy meeting at a university 
enables its participants to relinquish departmental and/or professional interests. Powerful faculty 
members, for example, may be more willing to accept the “authority structures implicit in a 
meeting” (p. 1418). This raises the profile of administrators and top managers whose authority 
tend to be corroded in the day-to-day reality of university life (Citing Cohen and March 1974 and 
Denis et al. 1996, 2001 in Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). The authors speculated: “Given the 
fragmented, goal-divergent, pluralistic interests within universities, meeting practices might 
serve an important function in stabilizing the university’s overarching orientations and giving 
authority to one group to shape the university in particular directions” (p. 1418). This implies 
that the effect of suspending the everyday assumptions of an organization will depend on the 
context of each organization.  
Many case studies of successful AI interventions deal with organizations and 
communities that are “tightly coupled.”  If a company is seeking transformational change, the 
implicit assumption is that it is stuck in its past, unable to adapt to the turbulent changes in its 
external environment. Internal conflict, bureaucracy, and/or a command-and-control culture, may 
be the barriers to change. AI can provide the means for the organization to suspend those 
realities by temporarily uncoupling the organization from its everyday operations to discuss and 
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create an alternative future. More recently, AI summits have been successfully deployed in more 
loosely coupled environments. The City of Cleveland, for example, has been conducting annual 
AI summits since 2009 to galvanize a scattered community toward a common purpose. Their 
goal is to generate concrete projects aligned to the mission of building “a green city on a blue 
lake” (Jackson, 2009). This is an intra-organizational effort in which the organizations involved 
are coupled very loosely, if at all. Such initiatives suggest that an AI summit can be useful in 
various contexts.  
Typology of strategic episodes 
Not all strategic episodes are created equal. The context, participants, and activities will 
differ from episode to episode. Moreover, the nature of the coupling relationship between the 
organization and the interaction system needs to be considered, as this will influence whether 
decisions made during the episode can reconnect back to the ordinary operations of the 
organization. A strategic episode marks a temporary suspension of existing structures, routines 
and assumptions. Put another way, it is a temporary suspension of organizational knowledge. 
Each dimension of an episode can be coded according to the degree of suspension it 
achieves ranging from extremely high suspension (strategic) to no suspension (status quo). I 
conceptualize the AI summit as a strategic episode that is made up of a series of episodes. Each 
episode will vary in the degree to which existing structures are decoupled. Sometimes, 
organizations will conduct routine business during the AI summit—after all, it is rare for so 
many of its organizational members to be present at the same time in the same place. I posit that 
one of the unique social dynamics of an AI summit is the constant oscillation between strategic 
and operational contexts. I suspect that such oscillations may play a role in how decisions 
produced during the episodes connect back to the autopoiesis of the organization.   
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I would like to point out the intended unit of analysis in this typology is episodes, and not 
individual participants. An alternative approach would be to code each individual participant 
separately. The strategic orientation of the action planning exercise in the Destiny phase will 
differ widely from individual to individual. For middle managers, strategic planning may be a 
routine activity that is not much different from what they do on a day-to-day basis. While they 
may be more inclined to think strategically due to the nature of the overall context of the 
conference, they nevertheless will be prone to ground themselves in reality, especially if they are 
to be held accountable for future results. In contrast, for employees at the fringes of the 
organization as well as external stakeholders, the exercise is so out of the ordinary that they may 
be better able to think out of the box. Conflict, gridlock or breakthroughs may ensue, depending 
on the dynamics of the group. Luhmann’s theory is not very helpful in understanding the 
dynamics between individuals, however. Other theories drawing from social psychology, 
behavioral economics and philosophy (e.g. critical systems heuristics, W. Ulrich, 2005) may 
have more utility when the unit of analysis is the individual.           
In this typology, I categorize episodes according to the strategic orientation of the overall 
episode, group composition, the nature of the activities and the degree of structural coupling 
between the interaction system and organizational system (Figure 5). Figure 5 shows the overall 
picture of the typology I am proposing. An individual episode can be broken down into at least 
four components: overall strategic orientation of the episode, activities, diversity of the group, 
and the degree of decoupling from the organization’s existing structures. One can imagine a dial 
that increases or decreases the degree to which the status quo is suspended1. Each component has 
its own dial that controls the level of suspension. The components in concert produce the 
1 The image of a dial was inspired by Scott Page in his lectures on complexity in The Great 
Courses. 
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episodes of the interaction system. Over time, these episodes produce interactions that perturb 
the organization system, which may respond by producing decisions. Some of these decisions 
may have an effect on existing organizational structures—namely the organization’s knowledge 
base.  
 
Figure 5 Topology of episodes 
Strategic context. 
An individual episode can be described by the overall degree to which the episode expect 
its participants to suspend organizational routines and reality. A sliding scale ranging from high 
suspension to no suspension can characterize the strategic orientation of the episode. I propose 
the following four point scale in descending order of suspension: strategic, somewhat strategic, 
business-as-usual, and ritual. Detailed coding criteria would be required for an empirical study. 
This scale is useful in showing how a series of episodes oscillate between the two extremes over 
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time. Many of the episodes in the Discovery phase could be coded as “strategic” as the 
participants engage themselves in activities like appreciative interviews, which focus their 
attention specifically on the organization’s strengths. In contrast, a presentation by the CEO on 
industry trends can range anywhere from “strategic” to “ritual” depending on the content and 
context. It could be coded as “somewhat strategic” if the majority of the participants were front-
line employees. For them, receiving such information from the CEO is not a routine event. If this 
were a smaller strategy workshop involving only the top management, the episode could be 
coded as “business-as usual.” An award ceremony during the summer recognizing high 
performers can be characterized as a “ritual” that reinforces the existing incentive structure. 
Diversity. 
The composition of groups changes quite dramatically during the course of the summit, 
creating another level of oscillation between the strategic and the routine. This has implications 
because heterogeneous and diverse groups—the so-called “max-mix” groups—will inevitably 
produce new communication channels. If those temporary channels become permanent, then it 
opens up the potential for novel decisions to be produced. A homogenous group does have the 
potential to produce new pathways, if the topic of discussion during the episode is highly 
strategic in nature. Otherwise, a min-mix group is more likely to gear towards the routine. 
In this typology, group configurations are categorized along the degree of suspension of 
existing functional roles within the organization. Four categories are proposed: diverse, self-
selected but mostly diverse, self-selected but mostly routine roles, and routine roles. The plenary, 
large group session in which every participant is present would likely represent the highest level 
of diversity in the room. In contrast, an episode that divides the participants up into groups 
according to their corporate functions could be coded “routine.”  In the second half of the 4D 
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cycle, Design and Deploy, participants often self-select themselves into groups. Some groups 
may be skewed more towards routine than diverse or vice versa.  
Diversity indices that are used in biology can be applied in the analysis to quantify the 
different levels of diversity of groups. The Simpson Index (Simpson, 1949) calculates the degree 
of concentration of certain species in a given population. This diversity index takes into account 
both the richness of species and the evenness with which individuals are spread out among 
species. Statistical software packages such as PAST (which was developed for paleontologists) 
can be used to compare the diversity indices of different populations. I will give an example of 
how the index can be used in Chapter 8. 
These diversity indices only show the level of diversity and not the qualitative difference 
between groups that are more or less in alignment with existing functional roles and positions in 
the organization. These would have to be coded separately. Care is needed in the unit of analysis. 
One of the hallmarks of large group methods is the use of small groups in large group 
configurations. Comparing the large group session against other small group activities may be 
comparing apples to oranges. Luhmann’s theories give no guidance for analyzing group or 
individual dynamics on such a micro-level. I defer to future studies that may better describe and 
explain the different impacts of group composition on the knowledge creation process.  
Activities. 
The actual strategizing activities of an AI summit episode are decided by the organizers. 
Most if not all are strategizing activities that conclude with a particular deliverable. Common 
activities include discussions, interviewing, cognitive mapping, presentations, prototyping, 
strategic planning, and brainstorming. These activities can be coded according to a scale 
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developed corresponding to the relative creativeness and unusualness of the activity, such as 
creative, somewhat unusual, normal, and ritual.  
Some summit activities are unique to the AI methodology. Appreciative interviews, 
positive core mapping, and creative dreaming (Ludema et al., 2003, p. 33) are hallmarks of AI. 
These strategizing activities focus attention on strengths and opportunities in a format that is out-
of-the-ordinary for most participants, and could be coded as “creative.” Others, such as 
brainstorming, practical tactical planning (Ludema et al., 2003, pp. 197-198) and the formation 
of innovation teams (Ludema et al., 2003, pp. 193-196) are more traditional planning exercises. 
It is the context in which such exercises are conducted—the unconventional setting and unusual 
combination of the individuals who are participating—that makes them creative, not the 
activities themselves. These could be coded as “somewhat unusual” or “normal” depending on 
the organizational context.  
Decoupling. 
The final dimension I identify is the degree to which the organizational system is tightly 
coupled to the interaction system. The tighter the coupling, the more likely a decision may 
endure and produce further decisions, because the decision can enact existing decision premises. 
If the coupling is loose, a decision may vanish for lack of communication pathways that can 
produce more decisions. The level of coupling affects how a system selects decisions and 
interactions for further consideration. An interaction system that is not coupled to the 
organization system at all will have great potential for working with innovative ideas. The 
community summit on sustainability organized by the City of Cleveland is an example of a 
summit with little coupling to any one organization system, due to the wide variety of 
organizations participating. On the other end of the spectrum, if the two systems are structurally 
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coupled (e.g. a summit in which all of organizational members are participating), then the 
decision making premises of the organization likely to carry over to the summit and vice versa.  
The consequences for such coupling on organizational knowledge creation depends on 
the structural rigidity of the organization engaged in the summit. At a summit of a highly rigid, 
bureaucratic organization, a decision by a person in a certain position during the strategic 
reflections at an AI summit will automatically connect back to the existing organization and 
become an organizational decision, if the summit is structurally coupled to the organization’s 
system. If the CEO seems wildly in favor of an innovative idea, then it is more likely that the 
middle managers who can execute the idea will align themselves around it, and subsequently 
involve themselves in a project team. Conversely, a disruptive, innovative idea may have less 
chance of being selected during the summit if a high-ranking executive who feels threatened by 
the idea shoots it down, and as a result, prevents any further decisions related to the idea from 
being produced. Furthermore, if some key decision makers who yield significant power over a 
bureaucratic organization are missing from the summit, the coupling between the organization 
and interaction system could be characterized as loose. What happens at the summit may have 
little bearing on the organization because of the absence of those decision makers. An innovative 
idea might have legs during the summit, only to lose momentum after the summit concludes. The 
absence of front-line employees could have similar consequences. 
The impact of decoupling in the context of organizations that are loosely structured is less 
clear. Having all the organizational members present at a summit (i.e. structurally coupled) may 
serve to temporarily tighten the couplings within a loosely structured entrepreneurial startup. The 
summit can help stabilize organizational knowledge in this case. The flipside is that if the 
summit is only loosely coupled to the organizational system, then the conference might not have 
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much impact on the knowledge base of the organization. One could speculate that positive 
momentum would not be enough to produce changes in organizational knowledge in this 
scenario. There is relatively little research on the impact of AI interventions on entrepreneurial 
companies. Luhmann’s theory guides us to study the nature of the coupling between the 
interaction and organization system. Further theoretical and empirical studies are necessary to 
develop frameworks for understanding the consequences of these couplings on the outcome of 
AI summits, especially on entrepreneurial companies.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I drew on research by Seidl and his colleagues to begin developing some 
conceptual frameworks for viewing AI summits through a social systems lens. An AI summit 
can be observed as a strategic episode which allows an organization to suspend its existing 
structures to reflect upon itself in a strategic context. The social dynamics of the episode are 
driven by the structural coupling of three types of autopoietic systems, the organizational system 
(the AI summit’s host organization), an interaction system (the AI conference proceedings) and 
hundreds of psychological systems (individual participants of the AI summit). The structural 
couplings of the three systems are special. Not only can they trigger mutual perturbations in their 
respective systems, they can penetrate the system and leverage the internal complexities of the 
other system. Employees of an organization come to know their organization so intimately, that 
they will take into account the complexities of organizational life when performing their 
organizational duties. For example, employees might anticipate the subtle but inevitable internal 
power struggles that could result from a certain decision, and adjust their actions accordingly.  
I posit that this coupling mechanism reduces both external and internal communication 
barriers in developing and executing strategy. As a consequence, the organization is also better 
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able to access knowledge that is ordinarily inaccessible—its nonknowledge—and use this 
knowledge as the basis for producing decisions. The coupling mechanism also serves to orient 
the interactions such that decision interactions are produced while the strategic episode is 
ongoing, condensing the time required to execute a chosen strategy.  
In order to further identify some of the signature social dynamics of an AI summit, I 
develop a typology for comparing different episodes. I focus on the strategic orientation of the 
episode, the degree to which the episode requires a suspension of the organization’s existing 
structures. I identified four dimensions of an episode: the general context, diversity of 
participants, creativity of activities, and the degree to which the interaction system is decoupled 
from the organization. Compared to other practices of strategizing, the AI summit is 
differentiated by the variety and number of episodes that occur during the course of the overall 
strategic episode. Each episode can be coded by these dimensions along a scale that denotes the 
degree to which organizational routines are suspended. More detailed coding criteria need to be 
defined for an empirical study. Based on how an AI summit is typically conducted, an AI summit 
can be conceptualized as a series of interlocking episodes that together, systematically comprise 
a strategic episode. As the summit progresses, the episodes oscillate between varying degrees of 
suspension that create a dynamic that is unique to the format. In the next chapter, I develop these 
ideas further and connect them to how an AI summit might generate organizational knowledge.  
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Chapter 8 The AI Summit as a Knowledge Creation System: An Illustrative Case 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore in more detail the third step in Mohe and Seidl’s (2011) 
proposed methodology for analyzing the “contact system” of a consulting project, as it applies to 
an AI summit. A contact system is where consultants and their clients meet during the course of 
a consulting engagement, often to discuss and develop strategy. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, the AI summit can be viewed as an OD consulting project, as there is usually an external 
AI consultant involved during various stages of the AI summit project lifecycle. For this study, I 
limit the analysis to the actual AI summit conference itself. It is a part of the overall contact 
system in the client-consultant relationship.  
In Chapter 7, I conceptualized the AI summit as a contact system that consists of the 
hosting company’s organization system, the conference proceeding’s interaction system, and the 
hundreds of psychological systems belonging to the individual participants. These systems 
interpenetrate one another, enabling not only mutual perturbations in their structures, but also 
giving them an ability to take advantage of each system’s internal complexities. To borrow a 
term Luhmann used for interpersonal relationships, the structural coupling between the systems 
is intimate. The principles and activities of the AI approach influence and serve to structure the 
interactional communications that take place at the strategy conference.  
Having identified the component system and the relationship between the systems, I 
move onto the third step: “examine how their mutual perturbations are internally (re)constructed” 
(Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 18). By now, the concept of mutual perturbations and closed but 
simultaneously open systems is hopefully familiar. All three components of the contact system 
are autopioetic. They also share a common feature in that they are meaning-making systems. 
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Each system operates using different modes of production. An organization produces decision 
communications, an interaction system produces interactional communications, and a 
psychological system produces thoughts. They are closed from each other in terms of how they 
produce meaning. Nevertheless, the systems are structurally coupled. This means that the same 
event can simultaneously trigger mutual perturbations in their internal structures in such a way 
that they are able to co-evolve. 
Mohe and Seidl (2011) concluded in their theoretical study that a consulting project can 
be described by a third-order observer (such as a researcher) as processes of “co-evolutionary 
knowledge creation…between the client, consultant and contact system” (p. 18). The word co-
evolutionary should not be taken lightly. Mohe and Seidl’s controversial argument was that 
under Luhmann’s theory, knowledge transfer between the consultant and client is “entirely 
impossible because these [systems] are operatively closed” (p. 17). All a consultant can hope for 
is that the misunderstandings with their clients “be productive to some degree” (p.17). Clegg and 
his colleagues (Clegg, Kornberger, & Rhodes, 2004) described the parasitical role of 
management consultants “as a source of ‘noise’ that disrupts established ways of doing and being 
by introducing interruptive action into the space between organizational order and chaos” (p. 31). 
What is noteworthy about an AI summit is that the social dynamics of the contact system 
differ significantly from a typical consulting project by design. The origins of AI lie in action 
research, a mode of inquiry where the ideal state is a partnership between scholar/consultant and 
practitioner/client in building theory. Large group methods evolved, in part, in response to the 
deep-seated communications problems that Luhmann identified. That the consultant’s role 
drastically diminished in AI is only one of the points of differentiation. More significant is the 
active engagement of hundreds of organizational members who are traditionally excluded from 
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the inner circle of strategy. Not only are they present, but they are also expected to contribute to 
the organizational outcome.  
This brings me back to my original research question: How and why does an AI summit, 
as a whole, create organizational knowledge?  The question implies that one of the purposes of 
an AI summit is to create organizational knowledge. I use examples from a case study of an AI 
summit I attended in 2008 to examine in more detail the co-evolutionary processes of knowledge 
creation. But first, I would like to clarify what organizational knowledge creation means in social 
systems theory, and how it might be created at an AI summit.  
Knowledge creation at an AI summit  
Some scholars have situated AI as an incubator for innovative ideas. Richer and her 
colleagues looked at an AI intervention at a hospital in terms of how the participants generated 
innovative ideas that might transform the workplace. They drew on Nonaka’s knowledge 
creation theory to explain how AI created a shared context from which organizational knowledge 
emerged. If we are to accept Mohe and Seidl’s argument regarding the impossibility of 
knowledge transfer, however, this has detrimental consequences for knowledge management in 
general, and Nonaka’s theory in particular. Luhmann essentially made the case that knowledge is 
not a resource that can be transferred, shared, controlled and managed. If so, then the resource-
based view of the firm (Barney, 1996), upon which Nonaka’s theory is based, can not apply to 
knowledge. 
According to Seidl’s interpretation, knowledge, in the Luhmannian sense, is defined as 
how systems deal with information, not the information itself. This is an important distinction. 
As Spender (Spender, 2007) noted, theories of knowledge often implicitly or explicitly use a 
schema that distinguishes between data, information, knowledge and wisdom. According to 
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Spender, this is known as the DIKW model, proposed by Ackoff in a 1989 paper (p.183). The 
model is like a ladder “of increasing cognitive power” (p. 189). The bottom rung is data which 
has no meaning. A step up is information—meaning added to data. Knowledge is “useful 
aggregations of information.” At the pinnacle is wisdom, “bringing understanding into the 
context of the human condition” (p.189). Spender wrote that this widely-used model “may be 
more popular than useful since its axiomatic differences remain submerged beneath poorly 
defined terms” (p.189).  
In social systems theory, knowledge is analogous to a lens. How the system sees will 
depend on the type of lens it uses. The same object will look wildly different through a telephoto 
lens than through a fisheye. “Observation is not knowledge. Rather, knowledge is something that 
guides observation” (Seidl, 2007, p. 16). Each lens is constructed using a particular structure. 
The structure of a fisheye lens, for example, creates an image that widens what the camera can 
see. The camera can see more of what is in the frame, but with a price: fisheye lenses strongly 
distort vision in such a way that the object looks as though it is curved. In this analogy, 
knowledge is not the image that the camera sees. Knowledge is the lens itself. Knowledge is 
therefore structure. And it follows that organizational knowledge is the equivalent of 
organizational structure. 
Organizational knowledge determines the organization system’s evolutionary path and 
process. The system’s structure—that is its knowledge—determines and selects whether the 
difference makes a difference, and if it does, what difference it makes. “From the infinite number 
of possible observations, [knowledge] selects certain possibilities of observations and excludes 
the remaining possibilities” (p. 18). Since knowledge is the system’s internal structure itself, it is 
not a resource that can be transferred in and out of the system. An organization’s internal 
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structure determines how it selects and produces decision communications. This is what decision 
premises do, and thus, decision premises are an important element of organizational knowledge.  
Taking a Luhmannian view of knowledge does not mean we ought to discard Nonaka’s 
theories and other theories drawing on a resource based view of organizations. On the contrary, 
the SECI model is extremely useful in understanding how organizations can fully leverage the 
collective knowledge of its individual members both inside and outside the organization. 
Operationalizing tacit knowledge through cognitive mapping (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001), for 
example, is a technique that is often used in an AI summit to identify strengths and opportunities. 
Viewing knowledge as structure fixes our gaze onto a different part of the organizational 
landscape. We are simply transforming one side of the equation into another form. The concept 
of knowledge as cognition is only possible for systems with a cognitive system, in other words, a 
psychological system in Luhmann terms. For organizations, knowledge is the equivalent of its 
organizational structure that determines how it deals with information in order to select and 
produce decisions. 
 In this brief illustrative case study, I limit my observations to one type of organizational 
knowledge/structure, decision premises. Structure, broadly defined, can extend to an 
organization’s culture, including its normative values. These are typically harder to change and 
more difficult to observe. Structural changes in the cultural domain might happen during the 
course of an AI summit, but it would be a stretch to attribute such changes only to the summit. 
Decision premises on the other hand are malleable. New decision premises are much easier to 
create than a new value system. Decision premises are decidable. The structures are changed if 
the operations/observations are inconsistent with the structures (Seidl, 2007).   
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To recap, Luhmann (1995) defined decision premises as consisting of a combination of 
personnel, communication channels and programs. These are often bundled into positions. In an 
AI summit, individual participants (i.e. psychological systems) are structurally coupled to the 
organization through the positions they hold. An essential element of an AI summit is that 
hundreds of organizational positions are coupled to the interaction system by virtue of the 
presence of so many employees. The summit is not an exact replica of the organization. An AI 
summit is in essence, a strategic episode in which existing structures (i.e. knowledge) are 
temporarily suspended (Hendry & Seidl, 2003). But it comes close to simulating the 
organizational system because of the intimate connection participants have with their 
organization through their positions. 
An AI summit allows an organization to not only modify, stabilize or reinforce existing 
decision premises (i.e. knowledge), it also opens up opportunities to generate new ones. The 
most obvious is the production of new channels of communication. Temporary communication 
channels are established that are expected to last until at least the end of the strategic episode. At 
the very beginning of a summit, table groups are usually deliberately set up for maximum 
diversity. A marketing executive may be placed next to a truck driver for example. Some 
channels may persist beyond the strategic episode. At the U.S. Navy, informal communication 
networks emerged after the summit (Powley et al., 2011). This would be an example of a mutual 
perturbation—a perturbation in the internal structures of the organization and psychological 
systems—that facilitate the production of more decision communications and thoughts into the 
future. 
The summit is designed to stimulate reflections on the blind spots within the organization, 
especially an organization’s positive aspects. Knowledge that lies outside an organization’s field 
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of vision—its nonknowledge—is made temporarily available through the strategizing activities 
that take place. Areas of strengths and opportunities that were mere potentialities prior to the 
summit can be made explicit, and become the object of decisions. New programs and initiatives 
are generated as a result. Figure 1 is a visualization of this process.  
 
Figure 1. The translation of nonknowledge into knowledge enables new positions to emerge 
during the strategic episode, often in the form of self-organized project teams. 
Time 0 represents the decision premises and organizational knowledge base at the 
beginning of the summit. The distinction between knowledge and nonknowledge shifts as a 
consequence of strategic reflection. Some personnel may self-assign themselves to a particular 
new initiative. Communication may happen through new channels. Such emerging positions, 
however, are tentative arrangements. Only when they can carry over to the organization’s regular 
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operations after the summit, will the dotted lines of the emerging organizational structure (i.e. 
knowledge) become solid. This is why the self-organizing project teams that often emerge from 
the strategizing activities are so crucial to a summit’s success. These are the vehicles through 
which an organization can continue to produce decisions long after the summit continues. This 
suggests that maintaining a positive “momentum” after the summit is not enough. The key to an 
AI summit’s success may be dependent on whether the organization decides to convert these 
tentative arrangements into more permanent structures. If the knowledge structures stick, they 
would form the basis for producing new options for decisions, allowing the organization to 
follow a different evolutionary path. 
A social systems view of an AI summit requires one to focus on how decisions connect to 
decisions that produce decisions about its decision premises. It begs us to pay more attention to 
the relative fragility or robustness of connections between decisions. Depending on the resiliency 
of the connections between communications, any tentative changes made to existing decision 
premises during the AI summit will vanish when the strategic episode ends, and the status quo is 
restored.  
Diffusion of innovation theory (Rogers, 2003) suggests that decisions related to 
disruptive, innovative ideas, are fragile. As Schumpeter put it, innovation is creative destruction. 
Those who are on the receiving end of destruction will likely resist. Some people may be 
supportive of the innovation, but may not have the means nor the knowledge to adopt it. The 
structures and premises needed for the innovation to diffuse may conflict with existing ones. 
New communication channels, programs, and people will most likely need to emerge. This is 
why Drucker (1993) advised companies to set up entrepreneurial ventures outside and beyond 
the reach of the organization’s normal operations.  
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Given the social dynamics I identified earlier, an organization wide strategic episode like 
an AI summit, may function to make more robust, the pathways for connecting decisions relating 
to fledgling, innovative ideas that would otherwise disrupt the existing organizational structures. 
This is achieved through a temporary suspension of the status quo to enable strategic reflection. 
The more disruptive an idea, the greater the requisite degree of suspension. An incremental 
improvement would not require as much suspension, and hence, the connections between 
decisions will not be as fragile as a novel innovation. Nevertheless, existing decision premises 
may still need to be modified to accommodate the incremental improvement. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between the degree of suspension and the impact on existing structures. 
 
 
Figure 2 The degree of suspension differs leads to different impacts on existing 
organizational structures. 
 In the subsequent section, I draw on my own experience of attending a corporate AI 
summit to illustrate some of the points I have made above and in the previous chapter.  
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The TireCo AI sales summit—an illustrative case 
Case background. 
In February 2011, I was given the opportunity to participate in a corporate AI summit of 
a tire company in the mid-west. Many of the most famous case studies of AI interventions 
involve established companies that were seeking transformational change. This company, which 
I will call TireCo in this study, was very different. The US automotive industry had been hit hard 
by the financial crisis. The US government had to bail out GM. Yet this small, young tire 
company in Ohio was growing at nearly 40% a year. About 10 years earlier, the privately-held 
company introduced a new business model for selling tires. Most tires in the US were sold 
through retailers in the aftermarket for cars. Few consumers considered car dealers as a point of 
purchase for tires. TireCo saw this as an opportunity. Their mission was simple: find ways to 
help car dealers sell more tires. TireCo began as a niche player catering to the tire needs of car 
dealerships. Despite the bleak state of the auto market, TireCo’s business grew at a tremendous 
clip. By 2011, TireCo had grown its reputation in the tire market and had contracts with many of 
the auto industry’s largest players including Mercedes Benz and Toyota. 
About five years after its founding, TireCo brought in a team of executives who had 
previously worked for a Fortune 500 company that had used AI in their strategic business 
planning process. TireCo’s top management team decided to incorporate AI into its business in 
order to manage their next stage of growth. Among them was the Chief Sales and Marketing 
Officer (CSMO), who Cooperrider (Personal communication, 2011) regarded as among the most 
seasoned practitioners of AI summit. In her capacity as an executive in HR and OD, she had 
overseen dozens of AI summits at her previous company. She had been working with 
Cooperrider for over 10 years. By 2010, TireCo had been conducting AI summits on a regular 
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basis, usually once a year. Each summit focused on a different challenge that reflected the 
company’s phase in their lifecycle. For example, two years prior, TireCo developed its core 
values and guiding principles using the AI summit format. This was followed by the 
development of a roadmap for the future—a mid-range strategic plan. 
In order to keep up with their double-digit growth in revenues, TireCo found itself in a 
hiring frenzy. New personnel came on board on a weekly basis. By 2011, the company’s head 
count had risen to about 700. The past year’s AI summit was attended by 80% of its employees. 
However, with the growth spurt in headcount, there were no local hotels that had the capacity to 
hold a corporate-wide AI summit. Management made the decision to conduct two, back-to-back 
summits, one focused on sales, the other on the supply chain. Cooperrider was the external 
consultant for TireCo. He introduced me to the CSMO, who invited me to participate in their 
four day summit as an external stakeholder. 
Methodology. 
The reflexivity of the observer is an important consideration in adopting a social systems 
view. I will therefore briefly describe my involvement in the summit. Less than a year before 
TireCo’s summit, I took an MBA course on AI under the instruction of Cooperrider. I had been 
interested in AI for several years, having come across a book on AI (Fry, Barrett, Seiling, & 
Whitney, 2002) in 2007 while doing informal research on grassroots leadership. As part of the 
course requirement, I worked on a group project to design a community AI summit that could 
bring stakeholders together to discuss and develop plans to alleviate the transportation challenges 
of Los Angeles. That same year, I entered the doctoral program. My original research plan was 
to investigate the effects of positive psychology on the outcomes of an AI summit. I was 
particularly interested in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of flow, the psychological state of 
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being completely immersed in the task at hand. Previous accounts of AI summits, including 
video footage from the US Navy summits, suggested that participants may be experiencing flow 
during the conference. In January 2011, I proposed a pilot study to Cooperrider that could help 
me gauge the feasibility of measuring participants’ flow states during an AI summit using a 
method called experience sampling (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007).  
When I initially proposed the study to Cooperrider, I was planning to be a detached, 
neutral observer of a summit. He told me that he was facilitating a major AI summit of a tire 
company, and that he would be happy to refer me to their CSMO under one condition: I would 
fully participate as an external stakeholder. This made me slightly nervous. Most of the research 
methods I had studied as a graduate student emphasized the importance of the independence and 
neutrality of the researcher. I am trained as a journalist, a field that takes a similar approach. 
Participant observation is tricky, and can take years to master. On top of this, I was not sure that I 
could contribute much to the sales summit, given that I knew next to nothing about tires. I was 
skeptical as to what value a complete outsider with no vested interest in the company could bring. 
TireCo’s CSMO however, saw no issues at all, and immediately extended me an invitation. I 
would pay for my own travel expenses. TireCo would cover all conference expenses, in 
exchange for a post-summit writeup I would submit to the company later that spring. 
Attending TireCo’s summit for four days straight, morning to evening, as a second-order 
observer (i.e. participant-observer) completely changed my perspective of what an AI summit 
was about. So much of the literature on AI focused on the positive and transformational aspects 
of AI. But at a summit in the context of a corporate setting such as TireCo, I observed (and also 
experienced) negativity and conflict during the activities, especially in the second half of the 4D 
cycle, Design and Deploy. Such conflict though did not appear to have a detrimental effect on 
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the outcome of the summit. At the end of four days, the summit delivered 15 business plans that 
promised to enhance its competitive edge in tire distribution. Prior to going back to graduate 
school, I spent nearly 10 years as a conference interpreter specializing in meetings and 
conferences in the business sector. I have participated in hundreds of meetings at many different 
companies ranging from routine business meetings to highly sensitive board meetings. Often, 
these meetings were related to strategic planning. I was therefore in a position from which I 
could compare TireCo with other companies’ practices. Indeed, I did leave the summit with 
positive energy and a general sense of excitement. What I had not anticipated was the practical 
utility of the AI summit format as a generic strategizing tool. Three things struck me about the 15 
business plans that were presented at the end of TireCo’s summit: the speed with which they 
were produced, their quality, and the organic formation of implementation teams.  
 At the same time, I found issues with my original research agenda. It was not clear to me 
how the psychological states of an individual could be aggregated to the meso (group) and macro 
(organization) levels over the course of the four day summit. Flow is a construct developed to 
measure individual states. While there is some research suggesting evidence of flow contagion 
(Bakker, 2005), the study of flow in groups and its impact on organizational performance is 
underdeveloped. The social dynamics that the summit generated were extremely complex on 
many different levels. For example, I had not considered the level of impact different group 
configurations have on the conduct of activities, emotions, and outcome. Personalities, positions, 
and the types of activities seemed so interdependent, that it would be challenging to develop a 
useful model. In fact, this same issue would apply to other psychological constructs as well. I felt 
at the time that there was just so much going on during the conference on a macro level that 
deconstructing it into observable elements may be counterproductive. 
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I decided to change my research focus. I went to TireCo’s summit with literally no 
knowledge of the company, beyond a few news articles and what little information they had 
available on their website. The company was financed through venture capital. It was still at a 
stage where they were laying low, consciously staying under the radar as they ramped up their 
business. After four days of participating in intense and strategic planning activities, I left the 
summit with the sense that I had an intimate understanding of the inner workings of TireCo, 
which would have taken me months, perhaps years to accumulate had I been working as a 
journalist or interpreter. No amount of reading reports and articles could have given me what I 
felt I knew about the company after the summit. It was the experience of being in a microcosm 
of the organization in which results mattered and people were held accountable to those results 
that was the source of this knowledge.  
Summit overview. 
Annual sales conferences are a common business practice for many companies. Once a 
year, sales people from different geographies assemble in a conference room to listen to their 
executives present the sales strategy and business plan for the upcoming year. This was what 
TireCo’s Chief Sales and Marketing Officer was referring to in her opening remarks: “We’re not 
here to present you a business plan.” She talked about how TireCo’s conference was different. 
“We are asking you to create the plan,” she emphasized. The summit was taking place in the 
ballroom of a luxury hotel, about a 10 minute drive from TireCo’s corporate headquarters. 
Roughly half of the entire company was present in the room. The entire selling organization was 
there. There were also 40 customers in the room—mostly dealerships and representatives of auto 
makers. The fact that customers were also part of the strategizing activities was emphasized 
several times during the day by both executives and the facilitator. The topic statement guiding 
156 
 
the work for the entire three and a half days had been formulated by the pre-summit steering 
committee. “Efficiency. Effectiveness. Execution. Accelerating leadership at every level to drive 
dealer solutions which will positively shift the consumer experience.”  The statement was also 
printed in a 41 page handbook, which we used throughout the conference.  
The sales summit is conceptualized as a strategic episode in which existing decision 
premises, such as positions and rank, are temporarily suspended so that participants can reflect 
upon and describe TireCo from a strategic point of view. Following the social systems model 
developed in Chapter 6, the organization system was TireCo. The interaction system was the 
conference proceedings of the AI sales summit. According to the scheduled participant list, just 
over 360 people were registered to attend at least part of the conference. For the remainder of 
this case study, I will be using the scheduled participants list as the basis for analyzing 
participation. At any given point in time during the summit, the number of participants ranged 
from about 280 and 330 for the strategizing sessions. Participation was lower for social events. 
Each individual represents a separate and operatively closed psychological system. They are 
closed because one cannot directly access the thoughts of another. Of the registered participants, 
315 were TireCo employees, executives or board members. This means that 315 psychological 
systems were structurally coupled to TireCo’s organizational system through 315 positions. 
Roughly two thirds (66%) of the participants belonged to TireCo’s sales departments, 20%  were 
other TireCo employees, executives and board members, and just over 10% were customers.  
For the purpose of the present study, I define an episode as a block of time that the 
summit organizers have distinguished as a distinct session. In the TireCo case, the organizers 
drafted a timed agenda that listed all the planned activities at the summit. There were over 50 
episodes throughout the summit, including scheduled breaks. These episodes varied dramatically 
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in strategic context, group configuration, type of activity, and the degree to which the 
interactions were decoupled from the organization system. While the majority of participants 
attended all the episodes, there was a conspicuous absence of customers and executives during 
the action planning activities of Day 3 and Day 4 in the Design and Deploy phases of the 4D 
cycle. Furthermore, there was a dramatic contrast between the group activities in the second D of 
the 4D cycle, the Dream phase, and the business planning exercise in the final D, the Deploy 
phase, in terms of positivity and the creative nature of the exercise. In terms of a strategy episode, 
creating and presenting images of the future through group skits required high degrees of 
suspension of existing structures. Developing actionable business plans, on the other hand, was 
an activity that is much closer to a routine activity, not necessarily for the individuals involved, 
but from the organization system’s perspective. Existing structures and the social dynamics that 
come with it appeared to play a greater role in the Deploy phase. The upside in terms of 
knowledge creation is that when people in positions to make changes in existing premises for 
decision making, the changes are more likely, thereby increasing the possibility of the 
interactions during that episode to connect back to the organizational system. 
Some episodes were unrelated to the AI methodology and could be considered more a 
routine business practice than a strategic episode. For example, the morning of Day 2 was 
devoted to training and professional development sessions. There were also various social events 
such as a team-building social, employee recognition ceremonies, and divisional dinners. Since it 
was rare for so many sales employees to be in one place at one time, a fair amount of regular 
business was also conducted in between sessions, especially over breakfast and dinner. Therefore, 
conversations would constantly shift from the purely strategic, to straight business talk, and 
sometimes to topics completely unrelated to TireCo. 
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The explicit goal of the summit was to produce 15 business plans that would help achieve 
the three goals in the topic statement: develop leadership at all levels, create solutions for dealers, 
and improve the consumer experience of buying tires. The CSMO further clarified the task by 
translating them into the language of sales. She identified six goals:  
1. Help dealers and OEMs be more profitable   
2. Retain customers in the face of declining units in operation 
3. Provide dealers innovative solutions 
4. Respond to new OEMs 
5. Expand current service offerings to OEMs 
6. Make it easier for dealer and OEM customers to be in the maintenance and light 
repair business 
The summit covered all four Ds and for the most part, and incorporated activities that 
were considered standard for an AI summit. Each group activity was followed by a report-out or 
presentation to the large group. Sandwiched between these strategizing episodes were 
presentations by key executives, which would not be considered a typical AI summit activity. 
These presentations appeared to have a vital effect on the activities that followed. Customers 
were allocated extra time to report-out to the large group on Day 1 (60 minutes for customers, 45 
minutes for internal stakeholders). While internal stakeholder groups reported by table with some 
tables not presenting at all, every single customer was asked to present their comments at least 
once. This implied that their voice carried considerable weight. The literature on AI tends to 
focus on the democratic and participatory nature of the summit format. But the presence of key 
executives and customers and the form in which they participate nevertheless do much to shape 
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and frame the conversations that take place. AI summits draw on the experiences, the memories 
and complexities of all participants, but not necessarily in equal proportions.  
Presentations by the top management team provided context and information for the 
subsequent discussions. TireCo’s co-founder and CEO gave a 45 minute presentation in which 
he elaborated on the industry trends that he regarded as having a significant impact on TireCo’s 
business. He was describing what he envisioned were the near term strategic challenges for 
TireCo. Using Seidl’s typology, such a presentation would qualify as a decision-preparation 
interaction. All the information was being presented directly from the CEO to the employees and 
external stakeholders, thereby alleviating the problems of internal communication barriers. Many 
of the questions from the floor came from customers, which provided some insight into what the 
customers cared and worried about. The CEO’s presentation came after the customers’ report 
outs on Day 1. It served as important background information in developing ideas and business 
plans. Sensitive and strategic details were reserved for Day 4, the final day. Right before groups 
went to finalize their action plans in the Deploy phase, the CSMO provided detailed financials to 
the participants including current revenues, profitability and other key indicators. Again, these 
numbers set the stage for the discussions that followed in developing actionable business plans 
that aligned with the goals of the summit. Without disclosing such information, participants may 
end up creating plans that did not reflect the realities of the business and are therefore less likely 
to be executed. 
TireCo’s top executives take a lot of pride in practicing a policy of open book 
management. Providing detailed, strategic, confidential, proprietary information to everyone 
present at the summit might be considered a substantial risk at some companies. But it is also 
clear that sharing such information is critical if the expectation is to generate strategic plans that 
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can be executed. Top management’s perceptions about the company’s future heavily influence 
the decision premises of an organization. Their primary job is to engage in interactions that 
produce of decision communications. TireCo had been using AI as a routine business practice for 
nearly half of its life at that point. Top management clearly recognized that positivity alone will 
not get results. They were also willing to be transparent about the company’s financial and 
competitive data. Such information can be considered one type of self-description of the 
organization, a crucially important description by top executives incorporating their personal 
knowledge, expectations and images of the future. 
I will now provide examples illustrating the main elements of organizational knowledge 
creation during an AI summit. 
System intelligence. 
Seidl (2007) defined organizational intelligence as the ability of an organization to access 
and leverage its nonknowledge—information and structures that are potentially accessible, but 
lie hidden from view, completely outside the organization’s field of vision. Seidl also called it 
the dark side of knowledge. Although the organization is functionally blind to its nonknowledge 
during the normal course of its ongoing production of decisions, there are ways to bring that 
knowledge back into its field of vision. An organization actively forgets the premises and history 
that went into a particular decision, in order to absorb uncertainty. This is one way an 
organization system deals with complexity. Following Ashby’s law, the environment is 
exponentially more complex than the system. The system can either reduce the complexity by 
making simplifications about its environment (e.g. condensing premises to absorb uncertainty), 
or it can increase the complexity of its system by adding more variety. An organization system 
161 
 
can achieve the latter by purposefully orienting its vision towards areas of nonknowledge. 
Examples of this were plentiful at TireCo’s summit. 
One of the first episodes of TireCo’s summit was a presentation by three partners about 
the early days of the company’s existence. As Seidl (2007) and Schoeneborn and his colleagues 
(2011) have noted, organizations have a tendency to forget its history of decision making in 
order to absorb uncertainty. Although TireCo was a young company, it was adding employees at 
a feverish pace. The President and co-founder described what it was like when TireCo was little 
more than a business idea and a handful of employees. “Our job is to kind of walk you down 
memory lane and talk about where we came from and how everything is changed yet nothing 
really hasn't,” he said. He pulled up the PowerPoint slides that TireCo used in pitching the first 
tire program, which became the deal that launched the company. The Chief Supply Chain Officer 
recalled her shock when she was recruited to the company in 2000. The Chief Supply Chain 
Officer talked about how she was given a great sales pitch by a co-founder when she came to 
TireCo in 2000. “A couple of mistakes that I learned. One, make sure you see the warehouse 
before you take the job. Two, ask about the computer system,” she said. “We had no computer 
systems for the warehouses. None. It was unbelievable. I knew I had to be mistaken.” The 
company went on to implement a complicated ERP software package called J. D. Edwards. 
TireCo defied the experts who claimed it would take them two years. “We were able to do it over 
the weekend—all the warehouses went live. And it was fantastic. So that same energy, that same 
passion that we had then, we still have today” she said. The CFO talked about “how we made 
ends meet” and the tradeoffs the company had to make in order to secure equity financing right 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. TireCo had to guarantee a 35% compounded rate on return in 
exchange for equity financing. Such stories provided a rich layer of information and context, 
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especially for those of us who were new to the company. We were hearing about the 
complexities of the business, sensing the nuances of the organizational culture and its core values 
of innovation, fairness, accountability and playing-to-win (TireCo, 2011).  
The positive orientation of the AI methodology also played a role at TireCo’s summit in 
bringing attention to its nonknowledge. I offer two examples, one that highlights its effect on an 
individual’s psychological system, the other on the interaction and organization system. 
Positivity and individuals. 
A psychological system reproduces thoughts. Positivity affects individual thoughts 
through psychology, specifically positive psychology. AI summits are structured to stimulate 
conversations that lift emotions and positive affect. Theories of positive emotions suggest that 
they help broaden cognition to allow individuals to see the forest from the trees. In the context of 
a strategizing conference, positive emotions may broaden the perspective of the individual 
participants so that they are better able to see the macro issues facing the company. If an 
employee can see how they fit within the greater organizational context, they may be more likely 
to adjust their perspective so that they seek solutions that further the organizational goals rather 
than their own self-interest. Studies have shown that the physical act of smiling appears to reduce 
own-race biases in facial recognition (Johnson, Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2010). When people 
smile authentically, they are better able to make finer distinctions in the facial expressions of 
people of a different race than one’s own. The authors concluded that facially expressed positive 
emotions broadened attention. On an individual level, this might translate into a heightened 
ability to empathize with people in a different department.  
If an individual’s interests are in direct conflict with organizational ones, positive 
emotions, therefore, would increase the likelihood that the individual changes how they think 
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about an issue. If I am an outstanding sales person, and have cultivated best practices through 
experience, would I be willing to share those practices with others? If I do, it could reduce my 
relative competitiveness against my peers, and may even result in a lower bonus. Given the 
theory of positive emotions, if I were overwhelmed by negative emotions, my cognition would 
zoom in on my self-interests; I would want to preserve and protect them. Conversely, if I were 
filled with positive emotions, my cognition would broaden. I might see how sharing my 
experiences could benefit others, and in the long term, benefit me. Losada and Heaphy (2004) 
demonstrated that business teams with higher levels of positivity had better outcomes than those 
that were negative. 
AI summits are designed to build up tremendous positive emotions at the very beginning 
of the conference. The first major activity of an AI summit is the sharing of high-point 
experiences through paired interviews. High point interviews are a hallmark method of AI in 
general. But they are taken to greater heights when literally hundreds of these interviews are 
conducted simultaneously in the same room.  
Cooperrider served as the facilitator of TireCo’s summit. Shortly after the conference 
began, he gave a 25 minute presentation on the AI approach. He began with the concept of 
appreciation. “The word appreciation comes from the dictionary and I love the dictionary 
definition; it has a double meaning. To appreciate means to see value,” said Cooperrider as he 
began to explain the AI approach, about 30 minutes into the conference. “But it also means to 
increase in value…. So there's an interesting double relationship here between what we take time 
to appreciate and the process of further appreciation or development of greater value.”   
About an hour into the conference, the participants began conducting their paired 
interviews. Due to the limitation of time (20 minutes per person), many pairs, including mine, 
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did not cover all four questions in the workbook. My partner and I spent most of our time on the 
first question, which asked:  
Think about a time that stands out to you as a high point – a time when you felt most 
energized and passionate about your work, when you were really proud to be a part of the 
TireCo selling organization or proud to work with the TireCo selling organization. 
(TireCo, 2011, p. 15) 
 
The conversations bring back some of the positive emotions felt during a high-point 
experience. My interview partner talked about her recent performance evaluation. It was her first 
evaluation since she took a sales position at TireCo’s corporate headquarters. She recounted how 
she was overwhelmed with emotion when her supervisor gave her a glowing evaluation. For her, 
this was a great accomplishment. Previously, she was in the restaurant business; she had no 
experience selling tires. She joined TireCo because the recruiter had sent her a one page fact 
sheet summarizing the core values and guiding principles of the company. Those values 
convinced her that TireCo was a good fit. With 330 people participating in the activity, 115 
conversations were unfolding simultaneously in the ballroom of the Intercontinental Hotel. One 
had to talk extremely loudly to be heard, further enhancing the perception of the high energy 
levels in the room. Theories of emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) and 
mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) might also explain the heightened levels of 
positive emotions. Emotional contagion is “the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize 
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures and movements with those of another person” 
(Hatfield et al., 1994, p. 5). It is a multidimensional package of “psychophysiological, behavioral, 
and social phenomena” (p. 4). The mirror neuron system in our brains is thought “to play a 
fundamental role in both action understanding and imitation” (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
Mirror neurons partly explain the phenomena of emotional contagion. 
165 
 
The positive emotions generated at the initial stages of the conference through the paired 
interview process, may also have a priming effect (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) on the participants 
that influences the subsequent strategizing activities. Priming is “a nonconscious form of human 
memory, which is concerned with perceptual identification of words” (p. 301) that functions 
independently of other memory systems. Whether or not positive emotions increase the cognitive 
ability of participants at an AI summit is open to further empirical research.  
During the TireCo summit, the level of positive affect during the course of the conference 
appeared to fluctuate. My own emotional level dipped markedly around Day 3, the beginning of 
the Design phase. After two full days of strategizing from 8am to 5pm, participants were 
noticeably fatigued. Furthermore, the activities of the last two days—Design and Deploy in the 
4D cycle—are not as differentiated from conventional strategic planning meetings as the 
activities in the first two days. While the underlying positive approach is still there, there are no 
provocative positive questions to guide the design of an executable plan. The three main 
activities of the last two days are brainstorming, rapid prototyping, and business plan 
development. The final deliverables for TireCo’s summit were 15 business cases that could 
potentially be presented to the board. There was no formal facilitation or structure, and the usual 
dilemmas of discussing in larger groups outlined in the literature section—dilemmas of voice, 
egocentrism etc.—crept back in. In my group of 17 people, a senior sales executive assumed the 
role of moderator. Some people chose to stay on the sidelines while others dominated the 
discussions. The exercise felt very different from the “images of the future” activity in the Dream 
phase on the second day. What participants were being asked to do was to develop business 
proposals to which people will be held accountable. The pressure to deliver was palpable.  
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Positivity and social systems. 
Despite the decreased levels of positive affect, however, positivity still played a role in 
shaping the conversations that took place. Positivity in this context is differentiated from its 
effect on psychological systems. Positivity increases the degree of suspension of an interaction 
system during a strategic episode. This is simply because organizations tend to orient its 
communication (and attention) towards problem areas. The dominance of deficit-based thinking 
is one of the core assumptions of AI. People are not used to analyzing the root causes of success. 
Organizations obviously cannot think though, so the organizational consequence of a deficit-
based orientation is that its decision premises are more sensitive to decisions and communicative 
events around problems rather than opportunities. This may inhibit an organization’s potential 
for entrepreneurship, innovation and growth. Drucker (1993) noted that entrepreneurship is about 
shifting resources to areas of opportunity. A deliberate focus on opportunity areas during a 
strategic episode encourages interactions and decisions that are generative and more likely to 
lead to the production of more interactions and decisions.  
 One of the groups at TireCo’s summit had a breakthrough on the last day, as they 
struggled to develop measures to increase the effectiveness of each and every dealer visit. When 
they presented their “prototype” during the Design phase on Day 3, the group identified time as 
their key constraint. “Those things that we are doing in the dealership are very effective,” said 
the group 4’s presenter. “We just really need more time.”  Their idea was to hire administrative 
assistants who could help them with “activities that take away from our time at the dealership,” 
such as updating reports. The group received feedback from other participants that they ought to 
look at what is possible—the opportunities—rather than the constraints. “We actually took a step 
back today and regrouped a little bit,” said the presenter of group 4 on the final day. They asked 
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themselves: “What does it look like now when we do a fantastic job with that, and what pieces 
are we missing if time was not an obstacle?”  Of the 18 members of the group, 10 represented 
TireCo’s outside sales force, and 3 were upper level account managers.  
The group scrutinized its best practices, and articulated immediate and longer term action 
items for five tactical areas such as commitment and awareness, inventory, and inspection. 
Action items in the “immediate” category were very specific and specialized: e.g. physical touch 
of inventory, availability of a strategic elevator speech, weekly emails to general managers. In 
Nonaka’s organizational knowledge creation theory, these would be examples of 
“externalization,” in which tacit knowledge is made explicit. A social systems perspective would 
suggest that these ideas were made explicit because the reflections were taking place during a 
strategic episode, and in addition, participants oriented their thinking towards the positive. The 
resulting conversations are more likely to revolve around areas of strengths and opportunities. 
Such conversations open up new pathways for decisions that could not have emerged otherwise, 
and can trigger changes in the organization’s knowledge structures. 
Diversity and the production of decisions. 
Next, I explore the implications of participant diversity and its effect on producing 
decisions while the AI summit is still ongoing. A defining characteristic of an AI summit as a 
strategic episode is the large number of participants representing different stakes and interests. 
The organizers of TireCo’s summit would consistently describe the summit as having about 400 
participants, of which 40 were customers. This description masks the subtle shifts in the 
composition of people who are actually present in particular episodes. The composition of 
groups changes quite dramatically during the course of the summit. Individual participants are 
structurally coupled to both the interaction system (the conference proceedings) and the 
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organization system (TireCo) during the course of an entire strategic episode (sales summit). 
Since the coupling between the individual and their organization is special—one of 
interpenetration, a deeper form of structural coupling—who is present and absent will affect 
what structures can be mutually perturbed. Put another way, decision interactions that lead to a 
change in an organization’s internal structure, triggered by a change in how an individual thinks, 
are more or less likely to happen depending on who is present in the interaction system.  
In order to show how the composition of groups changed from one episode to another, I 
calculated the diversity indices for the report-out for appreciative interviews on Day 1, the report 
out for the action planning session on Day 4. Both episodes were among the most diverse in 
terms of group composition because they are plenary sessions involving all participants. 
However, the Day 4 report-out had both fewer people and stakeholder groups, as there were no 
customers scheduled to be present on Day 4. The Simpson Index (Simpson, 1949) is a measure 
of diversity used in biology to study ecological systems. It calculates the degree of concentration 
of certain species in a given population. This diversity index takes into account both the richness 
of species and the evenness with which individuals are spread out among species. Statistical 
software packages such as PAST (which was developed for paleontologists) can be used to 
compare the diversity indices of different populations. Using PAST, the Simpson index (1-D) for 
Day 1 was 0.58 for Day 1, compared to 0.45 for Day 4. The difference was significant (p=0.004). 
The diversity was measured across five “species” for which I arbitrarily used affiliation 
according to the following five categories: Sales, Supply Chain, Corporate, Canada and Others. 
Customers fall in the category “others.” How these categories are chosen will have an impact on 
the index, but this is beyond the scope of this study. The limitation of the Simpson Index is that it 
does not take into account how different one category is from another, in other words the 
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distance between the categories. The qualitative difference between customers and internal sales 
people is far greater than that between sales people and corporate employees. Other indices may 
be applied depending on the nature of the research question.  
The Simpson Index is useful only when there are enough data points in the population, 
such as the large group report-outs. It cannot measure the changes in group composition during 
the strategizing activities, which can have a dramatic effect on social dynamics.  
At TireCo’s summit, the highest level of diversity was achieved at the plenary session, 
where every participant is present. The min-mix groups were grouped according to stakeholder 
groups including corporate roles such as inside sales and external stakeholder groups such as 
Dealers. These groups would be characterized as routine. The action planning groups in the last 
two days were self-selected. The level of diversity varied from group to group. Some had 
representatives from many stakeholder groups in roughly equal proportions. Others skewed 
towards the routine, such as one group which was almost completely made up of outside sales 
and account representatives.  
The dynamics of an AI summit are such that its decision making capacity is temporarily 
expanded, while simultaneously cutting the time required to produce decisions. Hundreds of 
personnel—chosen specifically to cover as much of the decision premises of the organization as 
possible—participate in the strategizing activities. Ashby’s law says that  a system is better able 
to compensate for the variety of perturbations from the environment when there is a large variety 
of actions available to it. Interaction systems are severely constrained by time and space. The 
variety of its participants is usually limited. Putting the whole system in the room means that the 
interaction system’s level of complexity is raised almost to the level of the organization’s 
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complexity. The presence of external stakeholders has the effect of temporarily enhancing the 
organization’s complexity to better match the complexity in its environment. 
In addition, the organization has the ability to make decisions during the summit. At a 
typical strategy workshop, the re-coupling of self-reflections to everyday operations can occur 
only after the strategic episode. If top management decides on a new strategy for the company 
during a strategy workshop, the change in strategy has yet to be communicated to the vast 
majority of the company’s personnel. Although the individuals in the top management team may 
think they have decided on behalf of the company, it does not constitute an organizational 
decision event until their decision produces other decisions. This explains why a strategy decided 
by top management may take on a life of its own during its execution, leading to unintended 
consequences. 
If an idea emerges during the summit to change the way the company is marketing itself 
to its customers, the idea is presented to the whole system at once because many of those people 
affected by the idea are physically present. For items that are immediately executable, decisions 
can be made on the spot whether or not to implement that idea. A group at TireCo’s summit 
developed a business case to ensure that the General Manager of a car dealer understands and 
can articulate the value of TireCo and its offerings. All 12 people in the group were subject 
matter experts—mostly account managers who talk to General Managers on a regular basis. One 
of the deliverables presented by the group was a one-page spreadsheet which aggregated the key 
pieces of information that clearly and concisely represented the value TireCo was adding to that 
dealership. The group mentioned that they had added some metrics based on feedback they had 
received on Day 3 from one of the group member’s customers. “He really wanted to see those 
key metrics that we at TireCo want to affect change in, like service absorption” said the group’s 
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presenter. “I'm actually going to start using this when I get back to work. It's fully functional,” 
she said. Enough information was provided for other account managers at the conference to 
decide whether or not they would like to use the one-pager.  
What is important in the context of a strategic episode is that the decision to create a one-
pager for the company’s customers produced subsequent decisions, namely the decision to use or 
not to use the spreadsheet. The decision to put all the key metrics valued by the customer onto 
one page was produced from the decision to develop ideas that enable dealers to understand and 
articulate the value of TireCo. This decision was a result of the organization’s self-reflection in 
the early days of the conference. The development of the one-page spreadsheet during the 
conference is an example of self-reflections connecting back to the organization while the 
strategic episode is still ongoing. Decisions are made in vivo so to speak. The time required 
between decision-preparation interactions and subsequent decision making interactions is 
significantly reduced, thereby accelerating the pace at which a decision premise—organizational 
knowledge—is modified or in some cases created from scratch. 
Dreaming the ideal future. 
I now describe an episode guided by the typology of episodes I introduced in Chapter 6. 
Of the many episodes during the summit, one of the most unconventional activities took place on 
Day 2 in the Dream phase. I have excerpted portions of the post-summit report I wrote for 
TireCo, which describe the group activities and the presentation to the large group. These two 
episodes are representative of an episode that is characterized by a high degree of suspension in 
nearly all of the dimensions of the proposed typology. The excerpt has been edited for clarity and 
to preserve anonymity. Following the excerpt, I will discuss the case in light of the typology of 
episodes. 
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The main event of Day 2 was to visualize what the future of TireCo looked like. 
In Dr. Cooperrider’s classes, I had watched video clips showing skits, pictures, and other 
outcomes of such futuring and visioning exercises. So I had a sense for what the best of 
these outcomes looked like. But I had also assumed this type of amazing output was 
possible due to a special, creative spark that I did not possess. In addition, there were 18 
people in our extended group. How could we possibly put together a skit or other creative 
way of presenting the envisioned future of TireCo with such a large group of diverse 
individuals?   
I decided to trust the process and find ways to make as much of a contribution as 
possible. Our task was to visualize the TireCo selling organization in three years’ time. 
How are we driving dealer solutions that positively shift the consumer experience? What 
is TireCo’s competitive advantage? We could portray our vision in any form we liked.  
Our first challenge was a logistical one. More than 20 other groups were doing the 
same exercise. Finding a quiet space to discuss became a priority. We wandered out of 
the conference hall and eventually took over a small enclave where pay phones used to be, 
the booths still there but serving no purpose. It was a subtle reminder of the effect of 
technological obsolescence. For the next hour or so, we were to hole ourselves up in this 
enclave, bouncing off one idea after another with the goal of performing a skit in which 
all 18 of us had a part.  
At first, we could not come to much agreement over the content of the skit. We 
shared a vague sense that developments in technology would play an important part of 
TireCo’s future. But our group was comprised of people from very different backgrounds, 
age groups, affiliation and technical expertise. I tried to listen more than speak. But as we 
struggled to look for common ground, I could not help feeling a little discouraged about 
whether we can come together as a group, let alone develop and perform a skit. Some of 
the themes we were trying to work with were how mobile phone apps would change the 
consumer experience.  
At some point in the conversation, I spoke up. I couldn’t help it. What specific 
question I asked, I honestly cannot remember. I remember feeling slightly frustrated that 
we were not thinking through what the app would do for the consumer. Soon, we began 
talking about what the ultimate consumer’s experience would look like if they 
unexpectedly had to change their tires. Why not contrast that experience with a Walmart 
or Costco? Someone pointed out how we had some shiny heads in the room. We had four 
people with varying degrees of hair loss. Couldn’t we use these heads to represent the 
wear and tear of tires?  
Two of us in the group had brought an iPad to the summit, one person from 
marketing and myself. Tablet computing was an important development in technology. In 
three years’ time, there were bound to be corporate applications of tablets. So I suggested 
taking photos of the shiny heads and putting them on the iPad. An engineer at the dealer 
can look at the iPad to diagnose wear and tear. Soon, I was snapping away on my digital 
camera, taking photos of bald heads which I uploaded onto my iPad. My conversation 
partner from Day 1 would play the part of the field engineer diagnosing the tires, utilizing 
her knowledge of tires gained through her position in inside sales. In the meantime, a 
field trainer was making props. We decided on Walmart as our competitor. One of our 
group members was a dealer in Cleveland so naturally, we decided it would be his dealer 
that appeared in the skit. 
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A college student and his date are driving on the freeway when the car’s system 
alerts them to tire problems. “There’s an app for that,” says the student. They pull over, 
and the app walks them through the process. His girlfriend takes pictures of each tire and 
sends it to the dealer. They are then directed to “Take 3, Route 3” to the dealership. On 
another part of the stage, friends of the student are at Walmart getting their tires changed. 
The tire change at the dealership is quick, easy and professional, and his girlfriend is 
impressed. Over at Walmart, his friends are still waiting. 
Everything came together extraordinarily quickly. We even had time for a dry-run. 
All of us were psyched at the prospect of performing and were quite confident it would 
be very funny. Luck was on our side. The randomizer had chosen our table to perform. I 
would be playing the part of the app. We played to the audience as professional 
improvisers would. The thunderous laughter when my conversation partner pulled out my 
iPad with the shiny, bald heads made the performance memorable for all of us on stage. 
(Makino, 2011) 
 
The creative dreaming activity took place in the afternoon of Day 2. The morning was 
devoted to training and education. I spent the morning with other external stakeholders learning 
about the AI method from Cooperrider and staff from TireCo’s human resources department. 
Employees of TireCo trained in topics of their choice, ranging from career development to a 
maintenance program for a global auto manufacturer. After lunch, employees gave feedback on 
the morning’s programs. Then, Cooperrider gave a presentation titled “Positive Image, Positive 
Action,” an overview of the theory and research underpinning the AI methodology. So for the 
TireCo’s employees, the day had proceeded with episodes that leaned toward the routine in that 
all the activities had been tied to corporate education, including Cooperrider’s presentation. 
Cooperrider introduced the activity around 2:30pm. The groups began work at 2:40pm and 
returned to the ballroom for a report-out just over an hour later at 3:45pm, according to the video 
transcripts. 
After lunch, participants were seated at their table groups in the max-mix condition. 
There were about 40 table groups in all. TireCo’s master planning document shows 309 people 
scheduled to take part in the creative dreaming activity. Of these, 198 scheduled participants 
were in sales, 15 in supply chain, 52 in corporate (including partners), 12 from Canada, and 32 
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external stakeholders of which 24 were customers and one was a board member. The Simpson 
index (1-D) as calculated using the software PAST, was 0.55 for the plenary group compared to 
0.58 for Day 1 and 0.45 on Day 4. The difference between Day 2 and Day 4 was statistically 
significant (p=0.04) while that of Day 1 and Day 2 were not (p=0.33). The composition of the 
plenary group on Day 2 was slightly different from Day 1 some of the customers only attended 
Day 1. Day 2 was significantly different from Day 4 mostly because there were at least 24 
customers participating versus none on Day 4. 
In terms of the plenary group then, the group configuration could be categorized as 
diverse. The max-mix table groups were combined to form a larger group of up to 20 participants 
each. In my report, I mention that our combined group had 18 people, but in the master planning 
document I could account for only 15. There may have been some people who were added to the 
table group after the conference began. The planning document shows that by combining the two 
table groups, the group added diversity. The master plan had 34 categories for affiliation that 
aligned with internal divisions for employees and stakeholder affiliations for external 
stakeholders. Our table group had 7 categories represented, which expanded to 11 after 
combining with another, including a customer. 
The overall episode required a high level of suspension in terms of existing 
organizational structures. We were being asked to depict an ideal future based on TireCo’s 
strengths and on industry trends. Our group assumed that TireCo had the capacity to develop 
apps. We also assumed that dealers would want an app like the one we presented. The skit was 
grounded in our assumption that TireCo can provide value to its dealer customers by offering a 
better solution than other tire retailers. These were extrapolations from TireCo’s current situation 
that were strategic in nature. 
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The activity was highly creative. The rules required us to have every single group 
member play some kind of role in the skit. What worked well for our group was that we tried to 
entertain every idea, and to incorporate them in some way into the skit. In her book Bossypants, 
the comedian Fey (2011) wrote that the first rule of improvisation in comedy is to always agree 
to what your partner says. We seemed to implicitly follow this rule. It appeared that for most of 
us, including myself, this was an unusual and slightly awkward exercise, given we knew 
practically nothing about each other. The creative element of the exercise raised the level of 
psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) for the participants, lowering the barrier for people to 
make contributions. As a result, I was able to contribute my idea of using an iPad. For many in 
the group, tablet computing was not very familiar to them. Similarly, I was clueless in gauging 
the degree of tire wear by looking at tire treads. For TireCo as a whole, tire related information is 
an integral part of their working knowledge. However, newer IT trends like tablet and mobile 
computing, was likely still a part of its nonknowledge. The organization had the potential to tap 
into their nonknowledge base, but cannot easily access except through a strategic episode. 
The coupling of the interaction system to the organizational system, at least during this 
particular episode, was loose. Although the group was diverse, there were only 18 people 
representing different parts of the organization. The highest ranking person in terms of title, 
would have been the customer in the group, who was the president of a local dealership and 
therefore an external stakeholder. Most were mid-level and frontline employees. We did not have 
any senior executives in our group. Some people were very familiar with IT including 
smartphones and apps while others were not. 
Our group was fortunate to have the opportunity to present our skit to the large group in 
the subsequent episode: the report-out. The interaction system of the report-out is far more 
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tightly coupled to the organization because of the vast number of positions represented. Our skit 
showed how technology might be leveraged in the future through a story acted out using props, 
including a real iPad. In the previous session, other participants had referred to the use of 
technology as one of TireCo’s strengths. Our skit connected to those interactions and 
extrapolated them into the future. Tablet computing may have been part of TireCo’s 
nonknowledge prior to the summit, especially if it had no concrete plans to develop an app. A 
concept that was still abstract for many people at the time—tablet computing—may have gained 
more meaning by linking it to TireCo’s operations. The insights of early adopters were presented 
to the organization in a non-threatening manner: a funny skit. In the subsequent action planning 
activities, plans to develop mobile apps was a recurring theme, suggesting that the organization 
was producing decisions in the forms of new initiatives and teams to pursue this opportunity. 
Conceiving new programs and initiatives. 
At an AI summit, the presence of so many organizational members at the same time in 
the same room engaged in the same activities temporarily increases the nonknowledge available 
to the organization. The redundancy of positions that are coupled to the organization system 
reduces the risk of particular individuals blocking access to strategic, nonknowledge. At the 
same time, the temporal constraints of the interaction system—such as the need to break for 
lunch, or for the conference to end—enforces some discipline on the interactions so that 
conversations do not verge onto an extreme tangent. The topic statement also guides the 
discussions towards a specific goal. Unless an idea (in the form of an interaction) resonates and 
triggers a selection by either the individuals or the organizational system as relevant to the goal, 
no new interactions on that idea will be produced. 
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One of the common themes that emerged over and over again at TireCo’s summit was the 
relevance of mobile apps and social media to TireCo’s business. Many of the images of the 
future presented by the groups incorporated some kind of smartphone or tablet app. Our group, 
for example, presented a skit in which a car owner snapped photos of their tires using an app on 
their phone. The app sent the photos to the dealership, where a technician diagnosed the varying 
degrees of each tire’s wear and tear on an Apple iPad. The underlying idea was that this would 
reduce the time the car owner would have to wait for a new set of tires. This was February 2011, 
one year after the iPad had launched. Smartphone and tablet use, while already prevalent at the 
time, was not nearly as pervasive as it would become only a year later. For non-users, apps and 
social media are situated in their nonknowledge; it is difficult to imagine a future around such 
technology. TireCo had embraced LinkedIn and Twitter for its recruiting practices, but there 
were key personnel at the summit who were openly ambivalent about leveraging social media for 
internal communications. Many aspects of apps and social media were therefore hidden from 
TireCo’s organizational line-of-sight. Such information resided in its organizational 
nonknowledge. TireCo had no specific plans for app development at the time, and therefore, the 
decision premises related to such an effort remained in their nonknowledge—as a potentiality not 
an actuality. 
The business plan presentations on the last day of the summit reinforced the idea that 
apps and social media were trends that TireCo must begin to grapple with. So many of the plans 
incorporated these new technologies that one participant remarked to me, “They all look the 
same.”  One group’s entire plan was around developing a specialized app for dealers. Another 
group tasked with recruiting strategies showed a video clip from the internet titled “What the 
HELL is social media - in 2 minutes” (timetogetsocial, 2010). The video gave 10 reasons why 
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we should care about social media, including not so trivial information such as “reason #6: 
Because the next 3 billion consumers will access the internet from a mobile device” and “reason 
#7: If Facebook were a country it would be bigger than the USA and 3rd largest in the World” as 
Facebook adds 0.5 million users a day and users spend 5 billion minutes a day there. These 
statistics were at least one year old—the video had been uploaded in February 2010. 
Nevertheless, they were a stark reminder to the summit participants of how rapidly the world was 
evolving. 
Similar information may have presented itself in a small group strategy workshop. The 
dynamics would be different, however. Depending on who was present, changing the decision 
making premises of the organization based on these trends can easily be met with resistance or 
euphoria. At an AI summit, information coming from an organization’s nonknowledge reservoir 
can be tested to some extent. This lowers the risk that an organization overweights or 
underweights the impact of a specific piece of information. A piece of information is 
incorporated into the communication and interactions of a summit, and if that information is a 
difference that makes a difference to the social system, then the system will produce more 
decisions and more interactions related to that information. If an important decision maker shoots 
down an idea to use Twitter at the corporate level, this may be cause enough for experienced 
Twitter users in that group to refrain from contributing their strategic knowledge to the 
organization. However, those same users may be encouraged to speak up, if they see that another 
group at the summit is pushing for strategic Twitter use, opening up new pathways for 
interactions and decisions. At a smaller meeting, such pathways would have closed as soon as 
the idea was shot down.  
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In the previous example of the one-page fact sheet for dealers, feedback from the 
customer was used to make changes to the final deliverable. Getting such customer feedback was 
extremely easy for TireCo, given that the conference’s purpose was to generate strategic plans 
that would benefit solutions for its customers. Moreover, the customer was right there at the 
conference, ready and willing to answer questions. The accessibility of customers and other 
external stakeholders at the summit lowers the threshold in obtaining information that would 
have otherwise been confined in the organization’s nonknowledge.  
Self-organizing project teams. 
I will now explore a phenomenon that is arguably the most important outcome of an AI 
summit: the emergence of self-organizing project teams. Given the nature of innovation as 
“creative destruction,” an innovative idea is disruptive to the existing organizational structure. In 
the context of social systems theory, an innovative idea can only be implemented if an 
organization can continuously produce a stream of decisions regarding the innovation. But the 
innovation will likely disrupt the organizational structure. The organization is faced with a 
choice. It can select decisions to change its structures and its organizational knowledge to adapt 
to the disruptions, or it can make the decision not to change. The stream of decisions regarding 
the innovation would be blocked from producing further decisions, if it decides not to modify its 
organizational knowledge. In summary, when an organizational system decides to adopt an 
innovation, it must modify its decision premises so that they are consistent with the innovative 
idea. If the idea is highly disruptive, the organization may need to create new positions, filling 
them with new personnel, incorporating new communication channels and deploying new 
initiatives. 
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The social systems view of organizational innovation is consistent with Rogers’ diffusion 
of innovation theory. Diffusion is a “process by which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated 
through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 2003, 
p. 11). In the previous section, I argued that AI summits can accelerate changes in organizational 
knowledge because it creates new communication channels, produces decisions while the 
strategic episode is still ongoing, and therefore, condenses the time required for self-reflections 
to connect back to the day-to-day operations of the organization. If the emerging idea is an 
innovation, an AI summit can significantly accelerate its diffusion. 
That said, the benefits for diffusing innovative ideas may last only as long as the 
interaction system is in place. Once the conference—namely the strategic episode—comes to an 
end, all the members of that social system—the interaction system—inevitably return to their 
routine operations. There is no guarantee that the stream of decisions produced at the conference 
will over time, actually continue. This risk is especially acute for innovative ideas, but is equally 
applicable to incremental improvements. Incremental improvements are not as disruptive, but 
nevertheless require some modifications to an organization’s structures and knowledge. Whether 
it be an innovation or an incremental improvement, if the decisions made during the strategic   
episodes are subsequently rejected by the organization at a later time, this may have the 
unintended effect of reinforcing and fortifying the existing structures, making it more difficult 
for decisions regarding the innovation or improvement to be produced.  
In Luhmann’s social systems, systems reproduce themselves based on ephemeral 
communication events that vanish as soon as they appear. New ideas are particularly fragile in an 
organization because the decision premises to back them up may not exist. Each time a decision 
related to the idea produces another decision to carry it forward, the connections and pathways 
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required to produce more decisions are made durable. At an AI summit, new communication 
channels are always created, simply by virtue of the multiple configurations of groups. The 
problem is that these channels may be temporary and not survive beyond the conference.  
This is why one of the most important outcomes of an AI summit is the emergence of 
self-organizing project teams. These teams become a vehicle for which the decisions produced at 
the conference can produce more decisions after the conference ends. These teams are crucial for 
an AI summit’s success. Without them, the novel connections and pathways for organizational 
knowledge cannot be made permanent. The design and deployment phase is a hotbed for project 
teams to form organically. If the idea is novel and innovative, the self-organized project team 
represents a brand new set of decision premises. The positions on a project team are filled with 
existing personnel in new roles, communicating through new channels about a new initiative. If 
there is great excitement about the idea, these project groups may evolve into hot groups 
(Lipman-Blumen & Leavitt, 1999), an “impassioned collective state of mind” (p. 15) that can 
ignite organizational change and innovation.  
Self-organized project teams emerged at TireCo’s summit on the fourth and final day of 
the conference. This was the Deployment phase of the 4D cycle. Of the 15 action planning 
groups, several mentioned in their final presentations that they had already formed or will be 
forming a “task force” or a “team” or a “steering committee” to facilitate the implementation of 
the plans generated at the summit. These teams were conceived through a two-step selection 
process. At the beginning of Day 3, participants were asked to join one of 15 groups. Each group 
had a specific task. Although the reasons for selecting one group over another no doubt varied 
from individual to individual, the important point is that it was a matter of self-selection.  
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By this point of the conference, customers were no longer officially present. The number 
of scheduled participants had dipped to 280. Of that number, only 210 participants were 
represented by name in the final PowerPoint slides that were submitted to the summit organizers. 
About 15 participants belonged to a group that did not put their names on their slides. It is not 
clear why the remaining 50 or so participants apparently were not part of any action planning 
group. In my group, the senior executives who were active participants in our discussions were 
not named in the PowerPoint slides. It also appears that employees from some of the corporate 
divisions may not have taken part, perhaps because the 15 tasks were heavily oriented towards 
sales issues. None of the nine partners of the company appeared to take part either, although they 
were present at the report-outs. 
The second selection step happened during the action planning process. Since I could 
only observe one group, I have no direct observations on how the project teams formed except in 
my own. Our group had 17 members, and represented 12 different stakeholder groups/divisions. 
Our task was to find ways to ensure that the collaborative DNA of the company lived on. 
Participation and contribution varied greatly. Some people hardly spoke up. One participant 
remained mostly quiet until the final day, when she made it known that she was the program 
manager for an existing, online initiative designed to facilitate collaboration using the intranet. 
My personal perception of our group discussions was that they lacked the energy and enthusiasm 
of the group activities of the first two days. No specific project team formed during the 
conference. Instead, it was noted in the PowerPoint slides that “Team #10 will form a team (for 
the inaugural year) to move these ideas forward.”   
Other groups also talked about the formation of cross-functional project teams as the first 
step in implementation. The more committed these groups, the more likely that the decisions 
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produced during the summit will connect back to the organization’s existing system to produce 
more decisions, thereby strengthening the organization’s autopoiesis. Tracking the progress and 
development of these organic, self-organizing project teams beyond the summit should provide 
additional insight into why some initiatives succeed and others do not.  
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Chapter 9 Discussion of Findings 
Introduction 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I applied a social systems theoretical lens to describe the strategizing 
activities of an appreciative inquiry (AI) summit. Luhmann’s social systems theory assumes a 
very radical view of organizations and knowledge. The strength of Luhmann’s theoretical lens is 
the clarity with which one can delineate and identify the social dynamics of a complex system 
like an AI summit. The dynamics inherent to social systems are differentiated from the dynamics 
that belong to the domain of human psychology. Macro (organization) and micro (individual) 
level phenomenon are distinguished so as not to muddy the waters of analysis. The relationship 
between the macro and micro levels is kept squarely in view so that one level is not bracketed 
out at the expense of the other.  
This approach introduces a finer distinction between organizational knowledge and 
personal knowledge. Organizational knowledge includes decision premises such as 
communication channels, organizational roles and programs. It does not include thoughts or 
beliefs because these are personal knowledge. Knowledge in social systems theory is 
interchangeable with structure. Knowledge orients how the system deals with information. 
Human beings use mental models, schemas, emotions and other cognitive and physical structures 
as knowledge. Organizational knowledge in the broadest sense is any internal structure that 
guides how it observes itself. Organizational structures determine how an organization selects an 
appropriate response to a particular event from its portfolio of possible responses. Organizational 
knowledge is merely analogous to the mental structures of a cognizing individual. But they are 
not the same. Organizational knowledge therefore cannot be described as an extension of 
personal knowledge or as justified true belief.  
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New knowledge is created in an organization when new structures emerge through 
patterns of decision communications. I framed an AI summit as an extended strategic episode to 
examine how it changed or created organizational structures, specifically decision premises. An 
organization can modify existing structures, reinforce them by keeping them the same, or create 
new structures. I applied Luhmann’s social systems lens to an AI summit to identify the 
structural features of the conference that affect its organizational decision premises. The most 
obvious knowledge outcome of a summit is the establishment of new communication channels. 
Some may be formalized. Others may remain informal but nevertheless affect an organization’s 
decision making.   
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the key findings from Chapter 6 and 7. I then 
juxtapose the social systems perspective of AI summits against the five core principles of AI to 
highlight the contributions and limitations of a Luhmannian approach. I consider the relevance 
and implications of this study in the broader field of management studies, including possible 
research areas. Finally, I contemplate the future by looking back in history. I draw on work by a 
pioneer in management studies, Mary Parker Follett, who foresaw many of the ideas discussed in 
this study.  
Social systems model of an AI summit. 
 In Chapter 6, I developed a conceptual model of an AI summit based on social systems 
theory (Figure 1). There are three primary component systems: the organization system 
(company), the interaction system (AI summit conference), and the individual participants’ 
psychological systems (psychic systems in Luhmann’s terminology). Each system maintains its 
identity through different modes of production. The organization produces decision 
communications, the interaction system produces interactional communications, and the 
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psychological system produces thoughts and perceptions. It is extremely important to remember 
that in the context of this analysis, individuals do not make decisions. Individuals are not “agents” 
acting on behalf of the organization. Only an organization can produce decisions in the form of 
communication events that vanish as soon as they are produced. Simply documenting decisions 
in the form of memos and emails does not constitute a communication. Under Luhmann, such 
documents must be understood by someone and produce another decision to qualify as a 
communicative event. Decisions may be incorporated into processes, procedures, and programs, 
at which point they become structures—in other words, organizational knowledge. 
Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of this model. It is simplified because each individual 
participant is an autonomous, closed system that is coupled separately and independently to the 
organization and interaction system. So there should be as many recursive circles of 
psychological systems as there are participants. The double-headed arrows represent the systems’ 
structural couplings. The coupling between the organization and interaction systems is 
influenced by the nature of strategic episodes. The interactions take place in a strategic context in 
which existing structures are temporarily suspended. Participants are coupled to the organization 
through their positions. The coupling between the participants and the interaction system is 
moderated by AI’s emphasis on positivity. Effects from positive psychology are limited to this 
particular coupling.  
 
187 
 
 Figure 1: Social systems model of an appreciative inquiry summit 
The structural coupling between each of the systems in an AI summit is of a special type 
called interpenetration. Closed systems cannot directly access the internal structures of another 
system. A core principle in autopoietic theory is that a system can merely trigger a perturbation 
in another. A perturbation can be so great that it has catastrophic consequences for a system. A 
different system may respond differently to the same event, and thrive from the same 
perturbation. Over time, systems can become structurally coupled such that a particular event can 
trigger mutual perturbations in those systems. The social behavior of ants for example, is made 
possible through such structural couplings. In an interpenetrating relationship, the coupling is so 
tight and intimate that a system can penetrate the other system’s internal complexities. The 
penetrating system can use that complexity to its advantage in constructing its identity. The 
systems actually achieve greater degrees of freedom even though the interdependency between 
188 
 
the systems increases. At an AI summit, system interdependency is especially high because of 
the diversity and large numbers of people in the room. This increases the system’s complexity.  
Further empirical study is needed to determine exactly how much diversity and how many 
people are necessary. Complexity theorists are currently developing computational models to 
simulate diversity in systems and their impact on innovation (Page, 2010) and could serve as a 
guide to developing benchmarks. At an AI summit, the organization system essentially gets the 
best of both worlds—variety and redundancy—by virtue of having so many organizational 
positions physically represented at a summit. A summit temporarily boosts the ability of an 
organization to compensate for the complexities and uncertainties in its external, competitive 
environment. This gives the format an edge over its small group peers in its capacity to generate 
organizational knowledge.  
Key features of AI summits. 
An analysis of an AI summit using a Luhmannian lens yielded five features that 
differentiate an AI summit from conventional strategizing workshops and meetings.  They are 
summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Five key structural features of an AI summit identified by a social systems theoretical 
lens. 
Structural features of an AI summit 
 
1. Internal and external communication barriers are reduced 
2. Access to latent knowledge (nonknowledge) is enhanced 
3. Structural decisions are produced in vivo 
4. Decisions reconnect back to routine operations even before the strategic 
episode ends 
5. Episodes continuously oscillate between strategic and routine contexts 
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First, both internal and external communication barriers are significantly reduced by 
virtue of the large numbers of people participating in the conference at the same time and in the 
same place. The organization can adopt and apply the AI methodology to their internal strategy 
development process as it pleases and on its own terms. The AI consultant is more a guide than a 
strategy expert. The organization’s own members collect and analyze the data necessary for 
strategizing. Luhmann brazenly claimed that consultants and their clients cannot truly 
communicate or transfer meaning because they each operate using logic that is idiosyncratic to 
their respective organizations (Luhmann, 2005b; Mohe & Seidl, 2011). During an AI summit, 
the AI consultant’s role is diminished so much that the communication barriers inherent in a 
client-consultant relationship become essentially irrelevant. Furthermore, the presence of 
hundreds of internal stakeholders reduces internal communication barriers between different 
departments and hierarchical levels. 
The second feature I identified is increased levels of access to knowledge that an 
organization cannot normally access in its day-to-day operations—its organizational 
nonknowledge (Seidl, 2007). An organization has a tendency to forget its history of decision 
making (Luhmann, 1995). An organization is constituted by communication events. It does not 
have a memory system. People do have memories; lost history may be recalled by individuals 
who remember. For example, TireCo incorporated presentations by executives who had been at 
the company in its early years. The active participation of external stakeholders plays an 
additional function. Their presence allows an organization to incorporate into its decision making, 
information that usually lies outside its system boundary. Here again, the complexity an 
organization can handle gets a boost. 
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The third feature is that organizational decision communications (distinguished from a 
decision made by individuals) are produced during the strategic episode.  Importantly, those 
communications connect back to the organization’s routine operations during the episode as well. 
This is the fourth feature. Decision communications are both produced and reconnected in vivo 
so to say. The third and fourth features accelerate the production of decisions, and are the most 
striking aspects of an AI summit compared to traditional strategy meetings. A decision in the 
organizational sense is a special type of communication, not an action taken by an individual. A 
decision is only a decision when it produces and connects to another decision. It is the ongoing 
production of decisions that allows an autopoietic, organizational system to maintain its identity 
and existence. An utterance becomes a communication only when there is understanding (or 
misunderstanding) between two or more individuals. A typical strategy meeting rarely produces 
organizational decisions of the social systems variety, because the communication events of the 
meeting have yet to connect to the rest of the organization. A “communication rollout” is typical 
at organizations after an executive strategy meeting. At an AI summit, decision premises such as 
programs, communication channels and the people who fill positions, can change during the 
conference. The table groups at the beginning of an AI summit encourage the production of new 
communication channels by seating people next to someone they are likely not to know. Even 
though the episode is strategic in nature and existing structures are suspended, it is as if the 
organization in all its entirety and complexities is present at the summit in its operational context 
as well because so many stakeholders who are intimately coupled to the organization are present 
for an extended period of time, participating in the same activities. It is as though the summit is a 
simulation of organizational life. 
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This leads us to the fifth and final feature: the constant oscillation between strategic and 
routine contexts during the strategic episode. This social dynamic moderates the production and 
reconnection of decision communications at an AI summit. It makes the connections between 
decision communications more resilient and robust. I proposed a typology of episodes that is a 
point of departure for analyzing the impact of such oscillations on the summit outcome. I 
conceptualized an AI summit as a sequential series of episodes that unfold over multiple days. 
Episodes have a definite beginning and an end. They provide organizations relief from the 
constant stress of having to absorb uncertainty all the time. Episodes enable closed, self-
referential systems to change its internal structure and composition (Luhmann, 1995). TireCo’s 
summit was comprised of about 50 episodes or segments that the organizers had broken out in 
their planning documents.  
A central observation of this study is that the degree to which existing structures are 
suspended differs from episode to episode. The typology I proposed looks at four dimensions of 
an episode: the overall strategic context, the levels of diversity in group composition, the nature 
of the activities, and the level of decoupling from the organizational system (Figure 3). The level 
of suspension of existing structures can be depicted on a sliding scale from no suspension to high 
suspension. 
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 Figure 3:  Typology of episodes 
Certain configurations of episodes are more likely than others to lead to certain impacts 
on the organization’s structures. For example, diffusion of innovation theory would suggest that 
novel and destabilizing changes to an organization’s structure would require configurations that 
result in a higher degree of suspension and more decoupling from the organization’s existing 
structures. An innovative idea would require a higher degree of suspension in order to diffuse 
compared to an incremental improvement to existing processes. Innovation is disruptive. 
Existing decision premises may block its diffusion, and those structures may need to be modified 
for the innovation to take hold.  
An interesting feature of TireCo’s summit was that not all of the episodes had high 
degrees of suspension. Episodes that fell in the last D of the 4D cycle, Deploy, had lower degrees 
of suspension. This increased the likelihood that the decisions produced during the AI summit 
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would reconnect back to the organization’s routine. Participants were held accountable for the 
plans they were developing. This incentivizes people to think and act based on their positions 
within the organization. Some changes to decision premises were produced on the spot. For 
example, project teams that were formed during the action planning sessions qualify as new 
decision premises. These teams are an important vehicle through which the organization can 
connect decisions from the summit to potential decisions after the summit ends. Without such a 
mechanism, the plans and ideas from the summit degenerate into good intentions, not results.  
Discussion 
The AI summit is a highly complex phenomenon. In fact, its social dynamics suggest it is 
almost as complex as the organization itself. The summit is attended by hundreds of stakeholders 
representing different interests, roles, and responsibilities. A significant variety of organizational 
positions are represented, including those at the peripheral. Consequently, the dynamics that 
come into play at an AI summit are more likely to resemble the organizational dynamics that 
exist in its day-to-day operations. This is not so in more conventional styles of strategy 
development in which strategy meetings are confined to the inner circle of top management.  
I draw on an analogy with computing. Traditional strategy development is much like the 
early days of computing. Computers could only handle one application at a time. A spreadsheet 
application needed to close before one could write a report using a word processing application. 
Similar to such linear computing processes, strategic decisions in most organizations are 
produced sequentially. Executives might decide on a strategy at a strategy meeting, senior 
managers decide on how the strategy is implemented at the department level, front line 
employees decide how to execute in practice, and finally, the customers decide whether they like 
what they are being offered.  
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In contrast, the AI summit format can handle multi-tasking. Multiple applications can be 
open and running in parallel. The strategizing process of the AI summit allows multiple small 
groups to work on the same task. The groups operate like multiple processes running in the 
background. Their work is then consolidated at the large group session, much like the reporting 
function in an Enterprise Resource Planning system. In computing, parallel processing not only 
increased raw computing power; it also changed people’s thought and behavioral patterns. The 
introduction of multi-tasking in computing coupled with networking technology has profoundly 
affected how people deal with information, in other words, their personal knowledge. Evidence 
can be found in our working vocabulary. “You can Google that,” we casually remark when 
someone asks for information.  
The AI summit and other large group methods of strategizing represent a similar 
paradigm shift. The structural coupling between the organization and the vast number of 
members who are collectively strategizing in parallel, has implications for how an organization 
produces decisions, which will then influence how that organization deals with information, its 
decision premises and organizational knowledge. The AI summit is complex. So many of its 
parts are interdependent, it is very difficult to analyze using classic systems theory. Trying to 
model a summit using inputs and outputs can be overwhelming, given the massive number of 
variables to consider. Deconstructing the summit into more manageable parts, for example, 
group processes, brings challenges of its own. There is no way of determining whether the 
dynamics driving group processes can be useful for explaining the dynamics at an organizational 
level. A systems perspective assumes that the parts are different from the whole. Describing an 
AI summit from a systems perspective is rather like describing the inner dynamics of the current 
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generation of personal computers. One can get very quickly bogged down by the complexity of 
the system.  
This is why a Luhmannian perspective has utility. Although there are scholars who object 
to the application of autopoiesis to social systems, nevertheless, a theoretical framework that 
emphasizes the coupling mechanisms between interdependent but autonomous systems can shed 
light on the systemic dynamics that have a major impact on the overall system. At the heart of 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is communications. His take on communications is radical. It is 
hard to swallow on the first bite. Luhmann asks us to reconsider notions we have come to believe 
as common sense, such as the notion that people communicate. Communication cannot happen 
without people. Even Luhmann admitted that. Luhmann’s contribution was to bring meaning 
back into communication theory. Meaning is reduced to bits and bytes in the fundamental 
communication theories that gave birth to personal computing and the Internet. Luhmann adds 
understanding (and misunderstanding) to the definition of communication, and brought meaning 
back into play. When understanding becomes part of communication, communication leaves the 
domain of individuals. Communication is a social interaction, and therefore can only be 
produced by social systems. Luhmann also asks organizational scholars to question a commonly 
held assumption that organizations can have beliefs, perceptions, and knowledge in the cognitive 
sense of those words. Cognition belongs exclusively to the domain of individuals. Cognition in 
this context refers to embodied cognition, which includes emotions and motivations that an 
individual may or may not be aware of fully conscious of. 
Luhmann’s radical view of organizing and knowledge when applied to the dynamics of 
an AI summit, makes a distinction between decision communications and individual cognition. I 
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will now discuss the five principles of AI that underlie the AI summit format as seen through a 
social systems lens to highlight how this approach complements AI theory. 
AI principle 1: Constructionist. 
Social constructionism is fundamental to AI. Autopoiesis and social systems theory 
provide additional support to the notion that words create worlds (Cooperrider et al., 2008; 
Gergen, 2009). Autopoiesis in its original theoretical form under Maturana and Varela, explains 
how our minds are biologically wired to socially construct reality. Language allows cognitive 
systems to construct structures and mental models that orient how a person describes themselves 
(their self-identity) and their environment. Language shapes reality. If we are to take autopoiesis 
seriously, language can only be a social phenomenon, never a personal one. According to 
Maturana and Varela (1987), we exist in language. Language “cannot be used as a tool to reveal 
the world” (p. 234) they asserted. Language coordinates behavior, which brings forth a world. 
“We work out our lives in a mutual linguistic coupling, not because language permits ourselves 
to reveal ourselves but because we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming that we 
bring forth with others” (p. 234). This means that the world we see “is not the world but a world 
which we bring forth with others” (p. 244). This is fully consistent with the AI approach which 
aims to bring multiple realities together to co-create a future.  
Words do create worlds. The Luhmannian perspective demands more rigor in 
determining the implications of this notion. Social constructionism came out of the broader, 
postmodernism movement. Postmodernism in general seeks a reappraisal of widely held 
perceptions. It focuses on the role of language and power in the social construction of beliefs and 
values. Seen in the postmodernist light, AI can be viewed as a method for empowering those 
who have no voice. The emergence of alternative narratives and discourse during an AI summit 
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are of central concern. Luhmann draws a strict line between language and communication. 
People can language, but that does not constitute communication. When this line is drawn, 
narratives become confined to the domain of individuals. They only become relevant to an 
organization if it produces decisions such as a decision to change its existing structures. The 
durability and resilience of the connections between decisions gain greater significance. 
 The AI summit is a strategic episode that temporarily suspends existing organizational 
structures for the sake of strategic reflection. Participants engage in activities as if they are all 
equal. This does not mean that the existing structures do not matter. They do. They matter 
because participants are intimately coupled to the organization through their positions, which 
were defined by pre-existing programs and initiatives. The impact of existing organizational 
structures on an AI intervention tends to get buried in conventional descriptions of AI. The 
context of the specific organization such as its organizational culture, dictates the degree to 
which structural elements matter. Suspension of structures had an important impact at the 
summits conducted by the U.S. Navy (Powley et al., 2011). They may not be as significant at a 
loosely coupled, entrepreneurial company. Or, in the case of a university, the suspension might 
matter for different reasons—to tighten organizational controls (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008).  
It is naïve to think that the effects of hierarchical order, power, and culture are somehow 
moderated by the positive energy generated at a summit. In fact, a social systems perspective 
would deem that such a conclusion is wrong. Positive emotions and high levels of motivation do 
not influence organizational decisions because they belong to the domain of an individual’s 
behavior, not an organization’s. Such reasoning lends credence to concerns raised by Aldred 
(2009) of the possibility that ideas generated during an AI intervention by organizational 
members with lesser power could “become co-opted into a corporate agenda” (p. 69). 
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A suspension of existing structures increases the options from which the organization 
system can produce decisions. The potentiality of the organization is by definition outside the 
boundaries of the actuality of the existing organization. It resides in the organization’s 
nonknowledge, which can be accessed during a strategic episode. Potential decision making 
criteria and information can re-enter the system. Once they re-enters the organization system, the 
organization can utilize such information to produce decisions. The doors to an organization’s 
nonknowledge are open only temporarily. Inevitably, they close with a thud at the conclusion of 
the summit. Ideas that were generated from information that re-entered the system during the 
summit must produce decisions and reconnect to the organization. Otherwise, the organization 
has essentially de-selected that idea from its decision making considerations, and the idea will 
vanish. 
Richer et al. (2009) noted that not all of the innovative ideas initiated by nurses during 
the AI intervention subsequently received the support of management. “During management 
meetings, external context issues, and new emerging internal pressures, took precedence over 
discussions of ideas proposed in the action plan” (p. 952). In contrast, the ideas that were 
implemented “mainly involved the mobilized actions of individuals who participated in the AI 
process” (p. 952). The same situation can occur the other way around. It is the all-too familiar 
scenario in which management decides on a strategy that, for whatever reason, fails to get 
implemented in the field.  
A social systems perspective emphasizes the connections between decision 
communications. Ultimately, if a decision does not connect to another decision, then the game is 
over. New knowledge can emerge in the form of new or modified communication channels, 
programs or personnel. The changed organizational structure, though tentative and fragile, allows 
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decision communications during the summit to connect to decisions that will be made once 
everybody gets back to work. This is why the emergence of self-organizing project teams is so 
important. The team members become the vehicle through which decisions can connect back to 
the organization’s routine operations. Evolutionary theory would suggest that the emergence of 
such project teams is to some extent random. This does not rule out the possibility that the 
constant oscillation between strategic and operational contexts over an extended period of time 
might moderate the conception and incubation of such teams. Empowering those at the 
peripheral to create alternative narratives may tentatively change the existing organizational 
decision premises. Whether those changes carry forward and turn into more stable, robust and 
permanent structures depends largely on the durability and resilience of the decision 
communications that follow after the summit ends. Social constructionism in the AI literature 
emphasizes concepts such as collective narratives and the inner dialogue of an organization 
(Cooperrider et al., 2008). Social systems theory suggests that even if such narratives emerge 
during the interactions of an AI summit, they are prone to vanish as soon as they appear. 
Emerging narrative accounts must impact the organizational structure in such a way that they 
change the premises—communication channels, programs and personnel—for decision making. 
Otherwise, they will end up on the dark side of the organization’s field of vision to be forgotten.  
AI principle 2: Simultaneity. 
The principle of simultaneity assumes that change is generated the moment one asks 
questions. Inquiry and change go hand in hand. “One of the most important things a change 
agent or OD practitioner does is to articulate questions” (Cooperrider et al., 2008, p. 9). A social 
systems perspective distinguishes between individual and organizational change. A provocative 
question is effective because it is an unexpected one. It opens up options to which a system may 
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have been blind. More nonknowledge is accessed, increasing the system’s intelligence. This does 
not guarantee changes in an organization’s structure, however. A social systems perspective 
suggests that it is the intimate relationship between the individual participant’s psychological 
system and the organization’s decision communication system that triggers change. The 
conceptual model I propose shows that participants are structurally coupled to the organization 
through their positions.  
A participant’s position within the organization will frame how that person will think and 
act. Structural coupling is the mechanism by which systems co-evolve through mutual 
perturbations. An individual can penetrate the structural conditions of an organization in 
perceiving the events that unfold during a summit. Conversely, an organization can reach into the 
structural conditions of an individual to select what decision communications to produce. This 
special kind of structural coupling is called interpenetration (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 210-254). 
Interpenetration is “the contribution of complexity to the construction of emergent systems” (p. 
216). Luhmann drew on an empirical study by Stager (1967) on decision making in small groups. 
Groups whose members could conceptually deal with higher levels of complexity (high 
conceptual level) required less structure to make decisions. This led Luhmann to posit that 
“social systems that can enlist more complex psychic systems need less structure” (p. 217). Such 
systems can cope more effectively “with greater instabilities and quicker structural change” (p. 
217). 
In practice, this plays out as interpersonal conflict. I described how at TireCo’s summit, 
there was a noticeable shift in both emotional affect and strategic context as the conference 
entered the second half of the 4D cycle. The final two phases—Design and Deploy—were where 
the proverbial rubber hit the road. Participants were now being held accountable to results. An 
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account manager might work on a plan to increase the effectiveness of a customer visit because 
their performance evaluations may be directly linked to the outcomes of such a plan.  Rather than 
being suspended, existing structures may weigh heavily on the interactions that take place. There 
was a great deal of conflict during the breakout sessions. Suddenly, a person’s rank within the 
organization mattered. Several newer and younger employees chose to literally sit on the 
sidelines in my group. Descriptions of this kind of conflict have rarely made their way into the 
AI literature, perhaps because they run counter to AI’s principle of positivity. Stager’s (1967) 
research showed that interpersonal conflict was high in two of the four group compositions: the 
groups with the highest and lowest conceptual levels. The curvilinear relationship was significant 
(p < 0.01). Interestingly, the high conceptual level groups were much more likely to synthesize 
such conflict into their decisions compared to lower conceptual level groups. Observational 
ratings of conflict utilization increased linearly (p < 0.01), and the group composition effect on 
the use of generated conflict was also significant (p. < 0.01). 
The interaction system of an AI summit can also penetrate the organization and 
individual psychological systems. The interaction system can leverage the complexities of both 
the organization and individuals. A social systems perspective therefore suggests that it is the 
interpenetrating nature of the structural couplings that enable organizational structures such as 
decision premises to change more quickly. An extended strategizing session with hundreds of 
organizational members can enlist much more complexity than a meeting limited to the top 
management team. As a consequence, less structure is necessary to institute more rapid change. 
AI principle 3 & 4: Poetic and anticipatory. 
The poetic principle of AI emphasizes the notion of building new narratives (Bushe, 
2011). The anticipatory principle assumes that images inspire action. Organizational members 
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are free to choose what they want to study and how they frame the topic of inquiry. Metaphors 
and stories are used to describe an organization’s structures. The paired interviews on peak 
experiences are an innovative way for people to share stories that can make explicit some of the 
tacit assumptions they hold about the organization (Bushe, 2011). Cultural norms and values, for 
example, can be so deeply engrained in organizational structures that they are taken for granted. 
Normative structures are much more resistant to change than operational structures such as 
decision premises. In situations where the norms of an organization are mismatched to its 
operational realities, a strategic episode like an AI summit offers an opportunity for the 
organization to come to grips with its new realities. The organization can produce decisions to 
adapt its theory of business to better align with its norms and values. On rarer occasions, it may 
decide to change its norms and values. The topic choice need not be positive for such decisions 
to be produced, however. The organization simply needs to recognize that its internal structures 
and the environment are out of alignment. 
An AI summit can be a forum for aligning the inner dialogue of an organization to areas 
of growth and opportunity. I would point out that both these principles are grounded in human 
behavior. Narratives are a form of linguistic behavior. Actions in this context imply actions by 
people. Under a social systems framework, these principles cannot directly apply to social 
systems. Narratives and images structure the perceptions and actions of an individual.  
The analog of narratives for social systems is the AI summit process itself. The format 
and activities of an AI summit essentially structures the interactions generated during the 
strategic episode and the decisions produced by the organization. Storytelling and cognitive 
mapping exercises benefit individuals by facilitating tacit to explicit knowledge conversion, 
thereby increasing organizational intelligence. The structured group activities prevent the 
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interaction system from breaking down into chaos. The time-bound nature of strategic episodes 
provides pressure to get things done. The oscillation between strategic and operational contexts 
serves as added assurance that the interactions do not deviate too wildly and unrealistically from 
existing structures, while allowing room for strategic reflection. Such interactions may lead to 
the creation of new decision premises, or in some radical cases, novel self-descriptions of the 
organization that result in decisions to change the organization’s identity.  
AI principle 5: Positivity. 
 The principle of positivity assumes that change requires significant amounts of positive 
affect (Cooperrider et al., 2008). “Organizations, as human constructions, are largely affirmative 
systems and thus are responsive to positive thought and positive knowledge” (p. 10). This view 
is not consistent with social systems theory. Organizations are social systems that are constructed 
from communications. Whether or not social systems are more responsive to positive rather than 
negative thoughts that are uttered by people is an open question and beyond the scope of this 
study. Losada and Heaphy’s (2004) study of high performing teams offers some indication that 
at the meso-level, positivity is correlated to performance. I can only speculate that a social 
system’s responsiveness will largely depend on the context of the situation. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, positive psychology can only have an indirect effect on an organization’s 
structure because it operates independent of a human being’s cognitive and psychological 
systems. An organization’s identity is maintained through a different mode of production, 
namely the production of decision communications. This does not exclude the possibility that the 
organization can take advantage of a person’s broadened cognition and higher levels of intrinsic 
motivation that are stimulated by positive emotions during an AI summit. If the participant is an 
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organizational member, the organization can penetrate that person’s cognitive system and use it 
as a basis for selecting and connecting decision communications. 
 The bigger implication of positivity for organizations stems from the AI methodology’s 
insistence that we focus on opportunity areas. Drucker (2008) strongly advocated that for an 
organization to perform, it must consistently direct its attention to opportunities. “Of course, 
problems cannot be neglected. But the problem-focused organization is an organization on the 
defensive. It is an organization that feels that it has performed well if things do not get worse” (p. 
284). Other scholars have shown that in an age of global hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 1994), 
defensive strategies are unsustainable. An environment of hypercompetition is one where 
“advantages are rapidly created and eroded” (p. 2). Product cycles are compressed, and the pace 
of innovation increases. The fervent rise and fall of so many new ventures in Silicon Valley is a 
testament to how low barriers to entry have become. “Every advantage is eroded,” (p. 7) warned 
D’Aveni (1994). Trying to sustain an advantage distracts an organization from developing new 
advantages. “It is like shoveling sand against the tide rather than moving to higher ground” (p. 8). 
Drucker (2008) put it this way: 
One has got to face up to a very simple, very brutal, very harsh rule—one starves the 
problems and one feeds the opportunities. And above all, one puts the resources into 
tomorrow, where the results are, and not into yesterday, where the memories are. (p. 285) 
 
In a hypercompetitive environment, D’Aveni (1994) argued, cost and quality advantages 
in and of themselves are unsustainable. The only enduring advantage is “the skill of generating 
new cost and quality advantages” (p. 234). Painstaking planning processes are a luxury in a 
highly dynamic, ruthlessly competitive environment. “Strategy in the current environment is 
more a process of fine-tuning reflexes and searching out or creating temporary opportunities” (p. 
237). D’Aveni proposed a seven point framework to develop dynamic theories of business that 
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can deal with hypercompetition. They include superior stakeholder satisfaction, positioning for 
speed and surprise, and simultaneous and sequential strategic thrusts (pp. 243-244). These 
aspects can be accommodated by an AI summit when hundreds of stakeholders are made 
available to the organization for strategic reflection.  
An AI summit’s deliberate focus on positive aspects of organizing also compensates for 
the tendency of people to pay more attention to problems than opportunities. At a meeting 
attended by 45 executives from companies and major public institutions, Elliott (1999), a 
management scholar and consultant, asked the attendees to list 20 adjectives that most accurately 
reflect the flavor of their organizations. All of the executives were well integrated into their 
organizations. The results were astonishing. An overwhelming majority of the words (72%) were 
negative. Only 15% were positive. The negativity bias occurs at the level of people’s 
consciousness. Such biases at the psychological system level likely have implications in how an 
organization produces decisions. Without processes for systematically articulating strengths and 
opportunities, an organization risks producing decision premises that are systematically biased 
towards a defensive strategy. I conclude that an AI summit is an advanced form of strategy 
meeting particularly suited for developing dynamic strategies in a hypercompetitive world.  
Limitations of the study 
There are several limitations to this study. First, autopoietic theory in general, and 
Luhmann’s social systems theory in particular, have yet to be generally accepted by management 
scholars. Not only is autopoiesis a radical type of systems theory, it is also notoriously difficult 
to comprehend. Many of the concepts are counterintuitive for those of us who have grown up in 
a world dominated by open systems theory. The notion that an organization’s operations are 
closed to the environment sounds very misguided and downright wrong to an analyst used to the 
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conventions of open systems. On the surface, social systems theory looks as cold and impersonal 
as the frameworks developed using microeconomics, frameworks in which there is a curious 
absence of human actors. Reducing organizations to communications rather than people seems as 
offensive as reducing people into data points. And the conclusion Luhmann reached about 
management consulting—that consultants can never overcome the communication barriers 
inherent in the client-consultant relationship—would be vehemently opposed by those who 
practice consulting. 
I have argued in this study that it is precisely the radical nature of social systems theory 
that can shed light on the unique social dynamics of an AI summit. AI methodologies have, for 
the most part, defied evaluation. A Luhmannian perspective allows one to begin tackling the 
complexities embedded in an AI summit. Modeling an AI summit using an open systems 
approach is both complicated and wrought with challenges; there are just too many variables and 
different levels of analysis involved. A social systems perspective brings to the forefront the 
various system interdependencies between the organization, participants, and the conference 
proceedings. Although the theory itself is complex and unorthodox, it is relatively simple to 
apply. By analyzing episodes and structural couplings, a third-order observer can begin 
identifying the systems dynamics that matter to an AI summit which can then be compared with 
other strategizing formats. The emergence of self-organizing project teams, to which I will return 
later in this chapter, is an example of an outcome that is physically impossible in small group 
strategy meetings. 
A second limitation is that Luhmann’s theory does not adequately address dynamics at 
the group or meso-level. Large group methods such as the AI summit depend heavily on small 
group activities. In an AI summit, group activities are self-facilitated. The groups decide what 
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ideas ought to be presented to the larger group. The redundancy and variety of participants, as 
well as the oscillation between strategic and routine contexts, assure to some level that 
significant issues will bubble to the surface. However, this does not exclude the possibility that 
important issues get shoved under the carpet, whether arbitrarily or systematically at the group 
level. The role of positivity at the group level may be different from the individual or 
organizational levels. Theories from social psychology would be the more appropriate lens to 
analyze such group dynamics. How those dynamics affect the organization and interaction 
systems is another question this study is unable to address.  
Another major limitation of this study is its methodology. This study was exploratory and 
went through several iterations of theorizing and analysis conducted by a single researcher. 
While I have tried to make explicit my personal biases in this study, one is usually blind to such 
biases, as autopoietic theories of the mind would suggest. Here, I point out some obvious ones. I 
have had to rely heavily on the work of Seidl and his colleagues in interpreting Luhmann’s social 
systems theory and its application to organizations. Only a relatively small portion of Luhmann’s 
work has been translated into English. His work on organizations in particular, has yet to be fully 
translated. I made an effort to compensate for this through discussions with Schoeneborn and 
Seidl at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management in 2012. While I am confident that I 
have a working understanding of Luhmann’s theories, I am limited in the depth and breadth 
compared to scholars who are able to read his writings in German. My experience with AI 
summits is also limited to what I have read in the literature and what I experienced and observed 
at the one AI summit that I have ever attended: TireCo’s sales summit. I could physically only 
participate in one group—my own—during the summit, and therefore, cannot generalize what I 
observed in the group activities. The description of the skit my group performed during TireCo’s 
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summit is based on my personal experience and observations. Another participant may have 
described the same episode quite differently. Much of the intense theorizing was conducted more 
than a year after the summit. The video footage of the large group sessions was indispensable for 
both the theorizing and data analysis phases. I was limited in my analysis to what I observed in 
the video, as well as other notes and documents I had gathered during the data collection phase. 
This study was intended to be exploratory, and as such, I hope these limitations I have noted will 
be addressed and corrected through future research. 
Relevance and implications for research 
This study set out to examine alternative ways of evaluating the effectiveness of the AI 
summit format. My approach was to situate the AI summit as a strategizing practice that 
generated organizational knowledge. This marked a departure from existing studies on AI, which 
positioned the approach as an intervention for transformational change. I focused on 
organizational knowledge as an outcome variable because it is a recognized source of 
competitive advantage in the strategic management literature. Transformational change, in 
contrast, is harder to link to firm outcomes. Previous studies suggested AI interventions were a 
source of new knowledge (Bushe & Kassam, 2005) and innovative ideas (Richer et al., 2009). I 
reasoned that by understanding how and why an AI summit generates, and possibly accelerates 
knowledge creation in an organization, we can begin to identify what makes the AI summit an 
effective method of strategizing, and open up new avenues for evaluation. 
I adopted Luhmann’s social systems theory, which is grounded in the biological theory of 
autopoiesis. Use of this alternative lens provided a more granular and complex view of an AI 
summit, by delineating the macro-level social dynamics from the micro-level psychological and 
behavioral dynamics. A social systems perspective of AI summits contributes to the AI literature 
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in three primary ways. First, it identified five features that are unique to the AI summit 
strategizing process (Figure 2). These features demonstrate how an organization can produce 
intelligent decisions quickly as a result of the structural coupling mechanisms between the host 
organization, its stakeholders and the conference proceedings. They complement AI theory by 
providing a more detailed account of how and why having the whole system in the room 
generates organizational knowledge. In particular, the extended duration of an AI summit creates 
a dynamic in which the strategic context of an episode continually shifts. The constant oscillation 
between strategic and routine contexts is a dynamic that has not been explicitly recognized in the 
previous literature. 
Following Seidl (2007), knowledge is defined as the structures that orient how an 
organization deals with information. This definition seems like a sleight of hand. In one broad 
stroke, organizational knowledge is made interchangeable with organizational structure. 
Knowledge in the organizational sense is not about developing shared mindsets or beliefs or 
perceptions or strategic information; organizations are not cognitive systems and can never think. 
Knowledge creation is about changing the decision premises of an organization. It is about 
adapting organizational structures to select and produce responses that accommodate the 
uncertainties of the external environment. Ironically, I find myself in familiar territory: the 
notion that AI summits allow an organization to modify existing organizational structures and 
construct new ones. We have thus come full circle, but with a richer understanding of how and 
why this is so relative to other strategizing methods. It directs our attention away from changes 
in normative behavior (which can only be observed at the individual level), to changes in 
decision premises.  
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A social systems lens suggests that scholars and practitioners may be overlooking an 
important outcome of an AI summit:  the emergence of self-organizing project teams at a summit. 
These teams are vital for temporally connecting organizational decision communications from 
the AI summit to the organization’s operations, once the strategic episode ends. Under Luhmann, 
decisions are communication events. They vanish as soon as they are produced. Organizational 
structure is created when decisions produce other decisions and become premises for future 
decisions. While the AI summit system is capable of creating and modifying decision premises 
on the fly, they are quite tentative. Whether those premises gain permanence is contingent upon 
the premises’ ability to continue producing streams of decisions in the future.  
A project team is a temporary type of organizational structure. In Luhmann’s vocabulary, 
they constitute a new organizational decision premise comprised of personnel, an emerging 
initiative or program, and new communication channels. A new project team, therefore, 
represents new organizational knowledge. The AI summit seeds and incubates such project 
teams. People self-select themselves for these teams, usually by choosing the specific task or 
topic they want to work on during the Design and Deploy phases. At TireCo’s summit, each 
participant could choose only one group. People can make their selections based on subject 
matter expertise, their organizational responsibilities, their interests, or at random.  
Participants are encouraged by the organizers to choose what they are most passionate 
and enthusiastic about. The AI summit provides fertile ground for conceiving what Lipman-
Blumen and Leavitt (1999) named hot groups. Members of a hot group share a state of mind that 
is “task-obsessed and full of passion” (p. 3). It implies that its members are experiencing flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990); they are absorbed in their task, and their skills are capable of meeting 
the high challenge level. Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt claimed that organizational teams rarely 
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become hot groups because hot groups are mismatched to the nature of traditional organizations. 
They more often are bred in smaller, “not-yet-well-organized companies” (p. 20). The lack of 
organizational structure forces members of a hot group to “cling for security to the life raft of 
common purpose” (p. 20). To grow hot groups in a highly structured organization, “it first needs 
to relax its old rules and constraints” (p. 177). An AI summit temporarily suspends existing 
structures, providing that habitat. Not all self-organizing teams become hot groups. Some will 
run out of steam. Others may provide an organization with an impetus for driving innovation. 
Intrinsic motivation appears to play a major role in hot groups. Therefore, members of such 
groups cannot be forced to do one thing or another. Although some leaders may have a knack for 
seeding multiple hot groups, this is rare.  
An AI summit appears to be a systematic method for seeding hot groups. Therefore, the 
most promising area for future research is to empirically study the formation and impact of self-
organizing project teams that emerge from summits. To date, I could not identify any empirical 
study of an AI summit that tracked the progress of such self-organizing teams. Such teams 
appear to be taken for granted as a matter of course. It is hard to imagine that the ideas generated 
at a summit could be implemented without a these teams of people dedicated to delivering results. 
Practitioners of AI realize the importance of post-summit activities. At TireCo’s summit, 
members of the steering committee called on participants to join their post-summit committee 
several times during the conference. TireCo’s chief sales and marketing officer often remarked 
about the importance of maintaining post-summit positive energy and momentum. The social 
systems lens would suggest an emphasis on identifying ways in which the organization can 
nurture and promote the new project teams into something more substantial. These teams are of 
crucial importance to continue producing decision communications based on the interactions 
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from the strategic episode.  A new project team represents a new organizational decision premise. 
This has implications for existing decision premises and positions. A person can wear only so 
many hats. If the tentative team structure gains more permanence, the organization will be 
pressed to produce decisions about what to do with the existing positions that the team members 
are maintaining while they are working on the new project.  
Another contribution of this study is that it offers a starting point for comparative studies 
of AI methods. I was guided by Mohe and Seidl’s (2011) three step methodology for analyzing 
“contact systems” in management consulting to develop the conceptual model, and I believe that 
the method is generic enough to be applied to other forms of strategizing. The steps are to 
identify the different systems to reconstruct the communication logics, identify the structural 
coupling mechanisms, and then examine how mutual perturbations are internally (re)constructed 
(Mohe & Seidl, 2011, p. 18). 
The conceptual model I proposed is specific to AI summits hosted by organizations. It 
does not address AI summits hosted by communities. AI has a rich history of being used for 
community development around a common cause. Most recently, Cooperrider and Senge have 
been promoting a series of AI summits in cities across the United States in the field of 
sustainability. A social systems model of such summits will be more complex than the one I 
described. A community is made up of many organizations and institutions. Examining the 
structural coupling mechanisms may identify characteristics and dynamics that are different from 
an organizational summit. Such an analysis may yield insights into what key considerations need 
to be made for a community summit to deliver results. 
A qualitative study using the proposed conceptual model and typology of episodes could 
compare AI summits to other forms of democratic strategizing such as Future Search 
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conferences (Weisbord & Janoff, 2010) and crowdsourcing (Stieger, Matzler, Chatterjee, & 
Ladstaetter-Fussenegger, 2012). AI summits evolved from the Future Search format and share 
many of the same design principles and activities. However, there are notable differences. Future 
Search conferences are smaller in size and do not emphasize positivity. An empirical study could 
shed light on how the structural differences between these two formats affect the generation of 
organizational knowledge and changes in an organization’s structure.  
Crowdsourcing is another promising candidate for comparison. Crowdsourcing is a 
method for sourcing ideas and products from crowds of people (Howe, 2006). It is made possible 
by advances in computer networks. Stieger and his colleagues (2012) developed a framework for 
company-internal applications of crowdsourcing. They described a project at an Austrian 
company where a “dialogue platform” for strategizing was deployed to stimulate discussions on 
issues important to the company. Four conversation topics were chosen by top management: 
success factors, future customer solutions, process improvement, and innovation (p. 54). All 370 
employees were invited to discuss these issues on an online platform for four weeks. Comparing 
an AI summit with a crowdsourcing platform could show the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of face-to-face conference compared to a social networking model of communication. 
Luhmann’s concept of episodes might be extended to discussion threads in the dialogue platform, 
and then compared against the episodes of an AI summit.  
A method of applying network analysis to communication episodes can be particularly 
useful in such a comparison. Blaschke, Schoeneborn and Seidl (2012) demonstrated how 
network analysis can be used to model communication topics and their transitions over time. 
Social network analysis typically designates people as nodes. For example, gatekeepers of 
information can be identified by looking at the flow of information between people. In contrast, 
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Blaschke et al. turn this perspective inside out to accommodate a Luhmannian framework. 
Communication episodes are designated as nodes, while the edges represent people. 
Communication topics at a startup company initially showed a concentration around research and 
development, but subsequently shifted to marketing as the company grew. This kind of data 
visualization can quantify the relative importance of one topic over another.  
Finally, this study makes some contributions to organization theory. I extended 
Luhmann’s social systems theory to a new application area in strategizing activities. It 
complements findings from studies of strategy practices applying a social systems approach in a 
university setting (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008), management consulting (Mohe & Seidl, 2011), 
and strategic episodes (Hendry & Seidl, 2003). The typology of episodes I developed could be 
used to generate research questions related to strategy meetings. For example, the impact of 
temporary suspension of structures during strategy meetings could be compared in a variety of 
organizational contexts such as loosely coupled organizations versus tightly coupled ones.  
The study complements theories of organizational knowledge creation by describing the 
knowledge creation process by clearly distinguishing personal and organizational knowledge. 
Personal knowledge is served by psychological and cognitive structures. Organizational 
knowledge is served by decision communication structures. This distinction can help unravel the 
interdependent and complex relationship between individuals and the organization in the creation 
of organizational knowledge. Nonaka and his colleagues’ (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al., 
2000) concept of shared contexts or “ba” is rather ambiguous. A “ba” is not necessarily a 
physical space: it includes virtual space like emails, as well as mental space like shared ideals 
(Nonaka et al., 2000, p. 14). The authors claimed that “Ba sets a boundary for interactions 
amongst individuals, and yet its boundary is open” (p. 15). It is unclear how those boundaries are 
215 
 
set, and what a boundary that is simultaneously open and closed looks like. Luhmann’s concepts 
of interaction systems and episodes are much more rigorous in their definitions. A study 
analyzing concepts like ba and the SECI model through a social systems lens might help clear up 
some of the ambiguities for better applicability to empirical studies. 
Implications for practice 
The findings of this study have immediate implications for managers of organizations, 
especially executives responsible for developing corporate strategy. One of the greatest strengths 
of the AI summit format from a strategizing perspective is that it combines strategy development 
with execution. What managers call “execution” happens when an organization adjusts its 
organizational knowledge and structures to enable the production of new decisions based on the 
new strategy the organization has selected. In typical methods of strategy development, there is a 
lag between the development of corporate strategy and it execution. However, one of the key 
features of an AI summit is the organization’s ability to change its decision premises while the 
strategic episode is still taking place. The most significant of these structural changes is the 
emergence of self-organized project teams. At many organizations, it could take weeks, 
sometimes months to put together a working team or task force to begin implementing a strategic 
initiative. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the new team will be functional. Depending on 
how the members are selected, some employees may resent the extra work the new initiative 
creates for them. 
The teams that form during the AI summit are somewhat different. Participants 
spontaneously decide for themselves whether they want to be part of an emerging initiative or 
not. Therefore, the members tend to be highly energized and motivated from the outset. Working 
groups like project teams and task forces are essential for any new organizational program to be 
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executed.  The AI summit not only enables such groups to form on the spot without the normal 
time lag of weeks and months, but does so in a manner that encourages these groups to become 
hot groups. 
The formation of hot groups is one thing. Whether or not they continue to flourish after 
the summit ends is a completely different matter. Project management after the summit is a 
critical element of post-summit activities, an element that appears to be seriously neglected. One 
of the biggest takeaways of this study is for managers to recognize the importance of project 
management in making an AI summit successful. Organizations that have a specialized, project 
management office (PMO) might consider having at least one person from that office to be part 
of the summit steering committee. Once the summit is over, a project manager could be assigned 
to oversee and monitor the various project teams that emerged during the summit. The self-
organizing project team in and of itself is a form of new organizational knowledge because the 
team represents a new structure that changes how the organization makes subsequent decisions. 
In order for decision communications to continue to be produced, additional communication 
channels in the form of email groups and meetings may need to be formed.  Such activities 
require management and coordination. The project manager may also need to initiate 
negotiations with executives to allocate the funding and resources required by the project teams. 
Organizations without a dedicated PMO should assign someone with project management 
expertise to help support the activities of the teams that emerged from the summit. 
Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt (1999) gave some general guidelines on how organizations 
can nurture hot groups. They suggest that a good way to begin is to do the opposite of what 
organizational manuals prescribe. For example, they suggest that less organization is better than 
more. Hot groups need room to innovate. Micro-management can stifle their progress. Another 
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suggestion is to loosen controls, not tighten them. Existing organizational controls may 
undermine the very results that the groups are trying to deliver, especially if the group is working 
on an innovative initiative that may be considered a threat to existing business units. Lipman-
Blumen and Leavitt also advocated for increasing the span of control of the managers in hot 
groups rather. Limiting the span of control can diminish the opportunities that the hot group is 
able to exploit. 
An AI summit is indeed resource intensive. That said, in order to gain competitive 
advantage in a hypercompetitive world (D’Aveni, 1994), experimenting with large group 
strategizing methods like the AI summit may no longer be a luxury but a necessity.  The format 
can bring payoffs beyond the incubation of hot groups. I argued that including external 
stakeholders in an organization’s strategizing activities boosts an organization’s intelligence. 
Developing strategy together with the customer is unconventional and may initially sound risky 
to some managers. The AI summit is a strategic episode in which organizational boundaries are 
temporarily suspended and relaxed. Participants strategize as though they belong to one entity, 
whether they are internal or external stakeholders. The positive orientation of AI summits creates 
a safe environment for customers and suppliers to provide feedback which they may not 
otherwise be willing to share. Taken together, interactions at an AI summit result in a freer flow 
of information that produces decisions that may not have been possible under normal conditions.  
For the summit to achieve its full potential in developing and executing strategy, summit 
organizers must also be mindful of existing organizational structures and their potential impact. 
First, the summit must have the buy-in of its executives. Executives must be willing to share 
decision-making authority with the summit participants. Otherwise, the ideas and new 
knowledge generated at the summit will not only be buried and converted to nonknowledge, but 
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existing structures will be reinforced and made more rigid. If the organizers had positioned the 
AI summit as a way to transform the organization, then such an outcome would be highly 
demotivating. 
The selection of summit participants is critical. Organizational decisions cannot be 
produced during the summit unless the positions associated with those decisions are represented 
at the summit, whether those positions are at the top, middle or bottom of the organizational 
pyramid. It is unclear how inclusive and diverse a summit has to be for an AI summit to be 
successful. Wholeness is an important concept in AI, and therefore, the rule of thumb is to be as 
inclusive as possible. At the very minimum, anybody who plays a key role in executing (or 
blocking) the task assigned to the summit ought to be selected for participation. The absence (or 
lukewarm participation) of important decision makers will certainly undermine the knowledge-
generating capacity of a summit. Organizers should be careful not to overlook important opinion 
and thought leaders, gatekeepers, and subject matter experts.  
Sometimes, the true experts may not be the people with the official title. Customer 
service representatives may have much better information about consumer behavior as it relates 
to their particular organization than the marketing specialists that rely on aggregated market data, 
for example. The benefit of having the whole system in the room is that it makes it easy to locate 
and take advantage of the people with the expertise needed for the task at hand. The spirit of 
contribution at a summit compels participants to tap into their personal knowledge to contribute 
useful information. Here again, the organization is able to access what might otherwise have 
been trapped as nonknowledge. While other large group methods have the potential of surfacing 
nonknowledge, the AI summit format is particularly strong in this area because of the focus on 
opportunities and positive aspects of organizing. 
219 
 
Finally, summit organizers and participants may want to reconsider what activities are 
necessary after the summit to reconnect the decisions produced during the strategic episode back 
to the organization’s day-to-day operations. Maintaining the positive momentum of the summit 
is secondary. Most important is how to prevent the fragile and tentative new structures that 
emerged at the summit from disintegrating. These structures include communication channels, 
programs, people and their positions. They constitute an organization’s knowledge, because the 
structures orient how an organization deals with information after the summit ends. A social 
systems perspective suggests that documenting what happened at a summit in the form of reports 
and videos, then distributing them organization wide (especially to the people who did not 
participate) has limited impact. First, the act of distributing information does not constitute 
communication under Luhmann’s definition, until somebody understands (or misunderstands) 
the information that has been transmitted. The notion of a “communication rollout” to the 
organization is misguided. More importantly, efforts to communicate may enhance the personal 
knowledge of the people who read or view the reports by evoking thoughts and emotions, but not 
the organizational knowledge base. Organizational knowledge is produced by changing or 
creating organizational structures. Post-summit activities should therefore be directed towards 
monitoring and managing the structural changes initiated at the summit. The project management 
aspect is crucial for decision communications to continue to produce more decisions in order to 
contribute to the autopoiesis of the organization.  
Experimenting with “experience meetings” 
This study sought to understand how and why an AI summit generates organizational 
knowledge. Taken together, the findings suggest that the social dynamics found in an AI summit 
not only enable an organization to create new structures and hence knowledge, but also 
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accelerate the process. Using the jargon of the information age, an AI summit can be described 
as a crowdsourcing platform for developing strategy—with a twist. The twist comes in two 
forms: positivity and physical, face-to-face interaction. Social networking sites on the Internet 
arrived with great fanfare in the 21st century, and are undoubtedly revolutionizing how people 
communicate. Conferences sound anachronistic in contrast. But ignore them at your peril. The 
potential of innovative conference formats has only just begun to be tapped.  
As I went back to early management theories for this research, I discovered that one 
person had the foresight to anticipate these large group methods nearly one hundred years ago. 
Her name is Mary Parker Follett, a political scientist who in her later career, became a thought 
leader in management. Drucker called Parker Follett a prophet of management (Graham, 1995) 
whose insights on managing organizations were light years ahead of her peers. In the midst of 
the roaring twenties, she advocated for a democratic form of governance through which people 
could fulfill their potential and strengthen the groups to which they belong (Graham, 1995, p. vii). 
It is stunning how she had a keen sense of an embodied mind almost half a century before 
Maturana and Varela formalized their theory of autopoiesis. Her thoughts foreshadow 
Luhmann’s social systems theory. Consider the following quotes from her 1924 book, Creative 
experience:  
• Democracy…is an assertion that the people who are doing the doing are also 
thereby doing the thinking. (p. 203)  
• Integration, the resolution of conflict…must take place on the motor level, not on 
the intellectual level. (p. 150) 
• Interpretation, like everything else, originates on the motor level. (p. 216) 
• We cannot get genuine agreement by mere discussion in conference. As our 
responses are governed by past habits, by what has been incorporate in the 
organism, the only way of getting other responses is by getting other things 
incorporated in the organism. (p. 150) 
• There is no use chasing through the universe for a “real” you or a “real” me; it is 
more useful to study our interactions, these are certainly real. (p. 177) 
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• There is no static collective will nor “group mind”: we have continuing activity; 
at any one moment the function which that activity is of the situation is the 
collective will. Thus its nature is wholly dynamic. We must think no more in 
terms of social institutions but of social activities. (p. 207) 
• The idea of collective will as a unifying of wills must go; there is only a collective 
will as a unifying of activities—a different matter. (p. 208) 
• Psychology now shows us how experience generates its own thought, will, 
purpose. This means that between expert and people is a chasm which ideas 
cannot cross. (p. 205) 
Nohria, the current dean of Harvard Business School, noted how he was struck by the 
clarity and comprehensiveness with which Parker Follett articulated the organizational principles 
that were in vogue in the 90s (Nohria, 1995, p. 156). For example, she wrote that authority must 
be derived from knowledge and experience, not rank, recognizing that knowledge does not only 
reside at the top. Nevertheless, Nohria remained highly skeptical and pessimistic about 
organizations ever achieving Parker Follett’s brand of democratic governance, concluding that 
her principles are more idealistic than pragmatic. 
I am inclined to agree with Nohria. The string of corporate scandals in the knowledge 
society we have experienced in the 21st century only support his claims. I would point out though 
that at the time of his writing, large group methods of strategizing were only just beginning to 
come of age. Interestingly, one of the techniques Parker Follett advocated for achieving 
democratic forms of governance was the experience meeting (1924, pp. 212-216). An experience 
meeting has three steps:  1) Present the meeting topic in a way that clearly shows its relation to 
our lives; 2) Find anything in our own experience that throws light on the question; and 3) Unite 
our various experiences with material provided by the expert. After the meeting, the participants 
are encouraged to experiment based on what they learned. They would return to another meeting 
to suggest what new directions experiments can take.  
“I am not hereby glorifying ‘the people,’” she stressed. She rejected a “mystic faith in a 
rightness of public opinion” (p. 216). The origin of power, she believed, came from experience. 
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Nearly a century has passed since Parker Follett urgently advocated for “experience meetings as 
an experiment in democracy” (p. 216). Experiments with large group methods such as AI 
summits are in full swing among giant organizations such as Walmart and the U.S. Navy. 
Companies like Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, the maker of the ubiquitous K-cup coffee 
system, have used AI summits to articulate their corporate purpose. The impetus for such 
experimentation is not democratic ideals, but the economic realities of a knowledge-based 
society.  
Companies require a high spirit of performance (Drucker, 2008) to thrive in times of high 
uncertainty. An organization “will have the thrill of excitement, the sense of challenge, and the 
satisfaction of achievement if its energies are put where the results are, and that means on the 
opportunities” (p. 284). Parker Follett’s insights on democratic governance were derived through 
a synthesis of psychological research and her empirical observations of social work as a political 
scientist. They deal with dynamics at the individual system level. Luhmann’s theory of social 
systems gives us a different and complementary vantage point—the organizational view. 
Through experimentation in both theory and practice using multiple approaches, eventually, we 
may hit upon a method for conducting effective experience meetings.  
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